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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-19-10375
State of Idaho
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFFERY DWYANE STEGALL
Defendant.

§
§
§
§
§

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number:

Kootenai County District Court
Meyer, Cynthia K.C.
06/24/2019
47612-2019

CASE INFORMATION

Offense
Jurisdiction: County
1. Driving Under the Influence-(2nd Offense
Felony Violation Within 15 Years)
TCN: 1D2800114003

Deg

Statute

I 18-8005(9){F} FEL

Date

Case Type: Criminal

06/21/2019

{2}

Related Cases
CV28-19-4606 (Related Case)
CASE ASSIGNMENT

DATE

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CR28-19-10375
Kootenai County District Court
07/08/2019
Meyer, Cynthia K.C.

PARTY INFORMATION

lead Attorneys

State

State of Idaho

Defendant

Stegall, Jeffrey Dwayne

McHugh, Bernard William
208-446- I S00(W)
Onosko, Benjamin Martin
Retained
208-446-1 72 1(W)
EVENTS

DATE

&

ORDERS OF THE COURT

06/23/2019

Miscellaneous
JUDGE MEYER

06/24/2019

Video Arraignment (1 :00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Combo, James)

06/24/2019

New Case - Criminal

06/24/2019

•

Criminal Complaint (Judicial Officer: Combo, James)

06/24/2019

•

Affidavit of Probable Cause

06/24/2019

•

Notice of DL Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing
*****REFUSAL******

06/24/2019

•

Probable Cause Order (Judicial Officer: Combo, James )
WEEKEND PC

06/24/2019

•

Probable Cause Order (Judicial Officer: Combo, James )

06/24/2019

•

INDEX

Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Combo, James )
First Appearance ARRN 06/24/2019
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-19-10375
06/24/2019

•

Application for Attorney at Public Expense (Judicial Officer: Combo, James )

06/24/2019

•

Order Appointing Public Defender (Judicial Officer: Combo, James )

06/24/2019

•

Conditions of Bail or Release (Judicial Officer: Combo, James )

06/25/2019

.Notice of Hearing

prelims
06/26/2019

•

Request for Discovery

Plaintiffs
06/26/2019

•

Response to Request for Discovery

Plaintiffs
06/27/2019

•

Response to Request for Discovery

Defendant's
06/27/2019

•

Notice of Appearance

Request for Timely Preliminary Hearing Motion for Bond Reduction and Notice ofHearing
06/27/2019

•

Request for Discovery

Defendant's
07/02/2019
07/02/2019

Preliminary Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Clerk, Magistrate Court)
•

Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Stow, James D. )

PHSC 712119
07/05/2019

07/05/2019

Preliminary Hearing (1 :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Mayli A.)
2 witnesses
•

Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Plaiintiffs 1st
07/05/2019

•

Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Plaintiffs 2nd
07/05/2019

•

Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Mayli A.)

-PH
07/05/2019

Bound Over (after Prelim) (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Mayli A. )

07/05/2019

•

Order Binding Defendant Over to District Court (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Mayli A. )

07/08/2019

•

Information Filed

07/08/2019

•

Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery

Plaintiffs RE: Expert Witness
07/08/2019

•

Supplemental Request for Discovery

Defendant's
07/08/2019

.Motion
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-19-10375
for Preparation of Preliminary Hearing Transcript
07/10/2019

•

07/10/2019

•

Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
Plaiintiffs 3rd

07/10/2019

•

Response to Request for Discovery
Plaintiffs Response to De/Supp Request

07/11/2019

•

Order (Judicial Officer: Walsh, Mayli A.)
to Amend Complaint

07/11/2019

•

Amended Complaint Filed

07/11/2019

•

Motion for Bond Reduction
/OR

07/11/2019

.Notice of Hearing
Motion/or Bond Reduction/OR

07/16/2019

•

Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
2nd Supp Response to Disocvery JIB: Expert Witness

07/16/2019

•

Response to Request for Discovery
P/aintiffs 2nd Response to DefSupp Request for Discovery

07/22/2019

•

Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
Plaintiffs 4th

07/25/2019

•

State's Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery
Plaintiffs 5th

07/29/2019

•

07/29/2019

Order for Preliminary Hearing Transcript (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C. )

Arraignment - District Court (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)

CANCELED Motion for Bond Reduction (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Onosko

07/29/2019

•

07/29/2019

11 Transcript Filed

Reporter's Notice of Transcript(s) Lodged
Pre/im Reporter Keri Veare Pages 81

Prelim
07/29/2019

07/29/2019

07/30/2019

•

Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C. )
- Arraignment; Court Reporter Diane Bolane

Plea (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
1. Driving Under the Intluence-(2nd Offense Felony Violation Within 15 Years)
Not Guilty
TCN: ID2800114003 :

•

Witness List
Plaintiffs
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-19-10375
08/07/2019

•

08/09/2019

•

Notice of Hearing
Motion to Suppress

08/12/2019

•

Subpoena Returned
Served-MD

08/12/2019

•

Subpoena Returned
Served-JD

08/12/2019

•

Subpoena Returned
Served-CM

08/13/2019

•

Supplemental Request for Discovery
Defendant's

08/15/2019

•

Response to Request for Discovery
Plaintiffs Response to Defendants Supp Request

10/01/2019

•

Brief Filed
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress

10/07/2019

.Reply

10/11/2019

Motion to Suppress

CANCELED Motion to Suppress (1 :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
Onosko-2 hours

10/18/2019

•

Motion to Suppress (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Onosko-2 hours

10/18/2019

•

Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
- Motion to Suppress; court reporter Diane Bolan

10/24/2019

•

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated

10/28/2019

•

Motion to Suppress
State's Motion to Suppress Closing Argument

10/29/2019

•

Miscellaneous
Closing Argument

11/04/2019

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
2 Days

11/04/2019

.Reply
Closing Argument Reply

11/21/2019

•

Pre-trial Conference (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)

11/21/2019

•

Preliminary Jury Instructions
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-19-10375
Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions
11/21/2019

•

Witness List
Defendant's

11/21/2019

•

Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
- PTC; court reporter Diane Bolan

11/22/2019

•

11/22/2019

.Motion
Requiring Kootenai County Sheriffs Office to Accept Clothing for Defendant to Wear During
Jury Trial

11/25/2019

•

Order (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Requiring Kootenai County Sheriffs Office to Accept Clothing for Defendant to Wear During
Jury Trial

11/26/2019

•

Order (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C. )
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Suppress

11/27/2019

•

Supplemental Request for Discovery
Plaintiffs

11/27/2019

•

12/02/2019

Exhibit List/Log

Defendants Requested Jury Instructions

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
2days

12/02/2019

•

12/03/2019

.Motion
to Shorten Time

12/03/2019

•

Motion for Bond Reduction
/OR

12/03/2019

•

Notice of Hearing
Motion for Bond Reduction/OR

Notice of Appeal

12/05/2019

Motion for Bond Reduction (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Onosko

12/05/2019

Motion Hearing (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
KCPA--stay proceedings

12/05/2019

•

12/05/2019

.Motion
to Stay Proceedings

12/05/2019

.Notice of Hearing
- Motion to Stay Proceedings

Order (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
to Shorten Time-Bond Hearing
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KOOTENAI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CR28-19-10375
12/05/2019

.Motion
to Shorten Time

12/05/2019

•

Order (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
to Shorten Time-Motion to Stay Proceedings

12/05/2019

•

Court Minutes (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C. )
- Bond Hearing, Motion to Stay; court reporter Diane Bolan

12/05/2019

•

12/06/2019

•

12/06/2019

.Motion
for Appointment ofState Appellate Public Defender in Direct Appeal Retaining Trial Counsel
for Residual Purposes

12/09/2019

•

CANCELED Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Vacated
2days

12/09/2019

•

Order (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C. )
to Stay Proceedings

12/10/2019

•

Order (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
for Appointment ofState Appellate Public Defender in Direct Appeal Retaining Trial Counsel
for Residual Purposes

12/10/2019

.Motion
to Amend Stay Proceedings

12/12/2019

•

Order (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
Amended Order to Stay Proceedings

12/12/2019

•

Reporter's Notice ofTranscript(s) Lodged
-Appeal

12/12/2019

II Transcript Filed

Conditions of Bail or Release (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C. )
Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc
Clerks Record and Reporters Transcripts Due Date Set

-Appeal
12/12/2019

Case Summary

03/13/2020

•

Status Conference ( I :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)

07/17/2020

•

Status Conference ( l :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)

11/13/2020

•

Status Conference (1 :30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Meyer, Cynthia K.C.)
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BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83 816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us

2019 JUN 2l+ AM IJ : 28

IN THE DISTRJCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRJCT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR28-19Plaintiff,

lo?>1~

vs.

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,

Agency Case: 19ISP13 62

Defendant.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _, appeared personally before me, and being first
duly sworn on oath, that the above-named defendant did commit the crime of: DRIVING A
MOTOR VElllCLE WlllLE UNDER THE INFLUENCE, a Felony, Idaho Code §§ 18-8004,

18-8005(9), § 19-25 14 committed as fo llows:
That the Defendant, JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL, on or about the 21st day of June,
2019 in Kootenai County, Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle,
to-wit: a 2000 Subaru Legacy, on or at westbound 1-90 near milepost 35, while under the
influence of alcohol, drugs and/or an intoxicating substance, all of which is contrary to the form,
force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity
of the people of the State of Idaho. Said complainant therefore prays for proceedings according
to law.

Page 1 of3

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
Page 8

PART II
The Complaina nt further informs the court that the Defendant, JEFFERY DWAYNE
STEGALL , was previously convicted of one (1) or more violations of the provis ions of section
18-8004( I )(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, and/or substantial ly conforming foreign criminal
violation(s ), within fifteen (15) years, to wit:
th
1. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR05-2246 8, on or about the 27 day of

February, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, State ofldaho.
th
2. A Felony DUI conviction in case number DC09-474B , on or about the 11 day of

September, 2011, in the County of Flathead, State of Montana,
th
3. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR15-1557 , on or about the 13 day of

June, 2016, in the County of Shoshone, State of Idaho,
PART III
The Prosecuting Attorney further informs the Court that the defendant, JEFFERY
DWAYNE STEGALL, while committing the offense(s) of Driving Under the Influence, as
charged in the Complaint, had been previously been convicted of at least two (2) separate felony
offenses, and, pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-2514, is properly considered a persistent violator.
Defendant' s previous conviction s consist of the following felony offenses:
th
1. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR05-2246 8, on or about the 27 day of

February, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho.
th
2. A Felony DUI conviction in case number DC09-474B , on or about the 11 day of

September, 2011, in the County of Flathead, State of Montana,
th
3. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR15-1557 , on or about the 13 day of

June, 2016, in the County of Shoshone, State of Idaho, all of which is contrary to

Page 2 of3

CRIMINA L COMPLAI NT
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the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace
and dignity of the people of the State of Idaho. Said complainant therefore prays for proceedings
according to law.

DATED this TI_ day of June, 2019.

COMPLAINANT

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Jl/lfaay of June, 2019.

Page 3 of 3

CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
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Departmental Report# Cl90013 62

fl'_E:'.):

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 1sT JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTf fllilJH
THE STA TE OF IDAHO,

CLiilK

24 Mi II: 21

1srn;11aa1
o·· :)u, Y

Plaintiff,

CR1l·1~ -1tJ?A-r

coURT cAsE NUMBE R
PROBABLE CAUSE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF ARREST AND/OR REFUSAL TO TAKE TEST
Jeffery Dwayne Stegall
Defendant.

State: Montana
State ofldaho,
ss
County of Kootenai
I, Matthew Heinle, the undersigned, being fust duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that:
1. I am a peace officer employed by Idaho State Police.
under the
2. The defendant was arrested on 06/21/2019 at 1834 D AM rgj PM for the crime of driving while
influence of alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances pursuant to Section 18-8004 Idaho Code.
Second or more DUI offense in the last five years and under 21? (18-8004A)
Second or more DUI offense in the last five years and excessive? (18-8004C)
Second or more DUI offense in the last ten years and over 2 1? ( 18-8005)

YES~ NO O FELONY O MISDEME ANOR
DYES~ NO D FELONY D MISDEME ANOR
~ YES D NO ~ FELONY D MISDEME ANOR

0

3. Location of Occurrence: Westbound Interstate 90 near milepost 35
4. Identified the defendant as: Jeffery Dwayne Stegall by: (check box)
□Military ID rgjState ID Card 0Studen t ID Card □Drivers License
□Paperwork found 0Verbal ID by defendant
identified defendant.
Witness:
Other:

□Credit Cards

5. Actual physical control established by: □Observation by affiant □Observation by Officer
~Admis sion of Defendant to:Corporal Jonathan Cushman , 0Statem ent of Witness:
0Other:
6. I believe that there is probable cause to believe the defendant committed such crime because of the following
facts:
(NOTE: You must state the source of all information provided below. State what you observed and what
you learned from someone else, identifying that person):

n _ __
rrr

1

... CA

., ,,... ,,,f\1c

l\"'7 l'\C
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PROBABLE CAUSE FOR STOP AND ARREST:

On June 2!51, 2019 at approximately 1813 hours, I, Idaho State Police Trooper Matthew Heinle was on
duty in Smelterville, Shoshone County, Idaho. I responded to the report of an unknown injury, rollove~ crash on
westbound Interstate 90 at milepost 35 in Kootenai County, Idaho. Idaho State Police Sergeant Justin Klitch and
Corporal Jonathan Cushman also responded to the crash.
While traveling westbound near milepost 35, I observed a red passenger car parked along the right shoulder of the
westbound lanes. The vehicle did not appear to have been in a crash so I continued westbound looking for the
reported crash scene. Corporal Cushman stopped out with the red car, a 2000 Subaru Legacy bearing Idaho license
plate 8BLN722, to see if it was involved in the reported crash.
The Subaru had one male occupant in the driver's seat and was not running nor were the keys in the ignition. The
male occupant seated in the driver's seat told Corporal Cushman on two occasions he had driven the vehicle to its
current location, but also said he wasn' t driving and that another occupant, who ' d walked away to get help was
driving, not him. The male indicated he'd been broken down for approximately 20 minutes. The vehicle had
belongings on the front passenger seat and rear seats, consistent with him being the only occupant, which would
have been the driver. The keys to the Subaru were later found concealed in between the front passenger seat and
center console.
The male and only occupant was later identified by his Montana identification card as Jeffery Dwayne STEGALL
Sergeant Klitch, Corporal Cushman, and I had driven through this area approximately 30-45
minutes before the contact and the Subaru was not on the shoulder. Sergeant Justin Klitch and I also drove the
area looking for the reported crash and did not observe any pedestrians walking on or along the Interstate in either
direction.
I arrived at the scene of the Subaru at approximately 1829 hours, as STEGALL was exiting the vehicle.
STEGALL had very poor balance and had to be pulled out of the roadway so he wouldn' t be run over. STEGALL
had the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emitting off his breath. STEGALL admitted he hadn' t consumed any
alcohol since the vehicle had been stopped. STEGALL became very agitated taking an aggressive posture and
balling his fists. STEGALL had glassy and bloodshot eyes, a flushed face and slurred speech.
A driver' s check through Idaho State Police Regional Communication Center North revealed STEGALL had a
Felony Warrant for his arrest for an Idaho Department of Corrections Parole Violation. STEGALL was on
parole/probation for Felony DUI. STEGALL has two prior convictions for Felony DU I in Idaho (dates:
02/27/2006 and 06/13/2016 and one prior conviction for Felony DUI in Montana (date: 09/ 15/2011). STEGALL
resisted being handcuffed when he was told he was under arrest and it took three Troopers to restrain him.
STEGALL was played the ALS Advisory, but refused to provide a breath or blood sample. A warrant to draw
STEGALL's blood was applied for and granted by the Honorable Judge Combo.
Although STEGALL was not observed driving or in actual physical control of the Subaru, he initially admitted to
driving and all evidence was consistent with him being the driver prior to the vehicle breaking down. STEGALL
was transported to the Kootenai County Jail where he was booked for Driving Under the Influence - Refusal, and
Felony Parole Violation.

'") / l"'t /" I \ 1 C

r t

f l\"'7 I\C
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D.U. I. NOTES
Odor of alcoholic beverage
Admitted drinking alcoholic beverage
Slurred speech
Impaired memory
Glassy/bloodshot eyes

[:g]Yes
[:g]Yes
[:g]Yes
[:gjYes
[:g]Yes

ONo
ONo
ONo
O No
ONo

Sobriety Tests-Me ets Decision Points?
OYes [:g]No
Gaze Nystagmus
OYes [:gjNo
Walk & Turn
OYes [:g]No
One Leg Stand
Crash Involved
Injury

OYes
OYes

[:gjNo
[:gjNo

Other Stegall did not perform Field Soriety Tests as he became very agitated and uncooperative.
OYes
Drugs Suspected
Reason Drugs are Suspected:

[:g]No

Drug Recognition Evaluation Performed

DYes

[:g]No

Prior to being offered the test, the defendant was substantially informed of the consequences of refusal and failure
of the test as required by Section 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code.

[:gJ Defendant was tested for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances. The test(s) was/were

performed in compliance with Section 18-8003 & 18-8004 (4 ), Idaho Code, and the standards and methods
adopted by the Idaho State Police.

by: □Breath Instrument Type: D Intoxilyzer D Alco-Sensor/Lifeloc Serial#
BAC:
[:gJ Blood AND/OR OUrine [:gJ Obtained with a warrant Test results pending? [:gJ Yes D No (attached)
D Refused any test besides SFST's
Date certification expires:
Name of person administering breath test:
-------

---------

TO THE COURT.
NOTE: THE AME OF THE DECLARANT AND THE DATES MUST BE TYPED BELOW FOR ELECTRONIC SUBMlS IO
.
THIS FORM SHOULD THEN BE PRJNTED, SIG ED AND SUBMITTED WITH THE REST OF THE COMPLAINT PAPERWORK
that the information
I certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho, pursuant to Idaho Code 9-1406,
ofmy information
best
the
to
correct
and
true
is
herein
included
be
may
that
documents
and
reports
attached
and
document
contained in this
and belief.

DATE:

06/21/2019

SIGNm ~

::::1J

/,
(Signature of Declarant)

PRINTED NAME: Matthew Heinle

-, I,..,

11"'\f\ 1 C

r.' fT f\"71\C
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Notice of Suspension for Failure of Evidentiary Testing

ITD 3814 (Rev. 01-19)
Supply# 019680909

(Advisory for Sections 18-8002 and 18-8002A, Idaho Code)

in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while under
1. I have reasonable grounds to believe that you were driving or were
required by law to take one or more evidentiary test(s)
the influence of alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances. You are
intoxicating substances in your body. After submitting
to determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other
al test(s) made by a person of your own choosing.
to the test(s) you may, when practicable, at your own expense , have addition
test(s) to determine the alcohol concentration or
You do not have the right to talk to a lawyer before taking any evidentiary
presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances in your body.
t to Section 18-8002 , Idaho Code:
2. If you refuse to take or fail to complete any of the offered tests pursuan
($250).
dollars
fifty
A. You are subject to a civil penalty of two hundred
interlock system, at your expense, on all motor
B. You are subject to mandatory installation of a state approved ignition
.
/
suspension period.
the
of
end
the
g
vehicles you operate for a period to end one (1) year followin
County
I
to the Magistrate Court of p._LfpY'"'l
C. You have the right to submit a written request within seven (7) days
your
why
and
te and pass evidentiary testing
for a hearing to show cause why you refused to submit to or failed to comple
ded.
suspen
be
not
driver's license should
court will sustain the civil penalty and your license will be
D. If you do not request a hearing or do not prevail at the hearing, the
refusal; and two (2) years if this is your second refusal
suspended with no driving privileges for one (1) year if this is your first
installation of a state approved ignition interlock system,
within ten (10) years. Additionally you will be subject to the mandatory
year following the end of the suspension period.
at your expense, on all motor vehicles you operate for a period of one (1)
(Unless you meet the provisions of paragraph 4 below).
18-8002A, Idaho Code:
3. If you take and fail to pass the evidentiary test(s) pursuant to Section
to install, at your own expense , a state
required
be
will
you
A. I will serve you with this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION and
end one (1 ) year following the end of the
to
period
a
for
operate
you
approved ignition interlock system on all motor vehicles
suspension period.
before the Idaho Transportation Department to show
B. You have the right to an administrative hearing on the suspension
should not be suspended. The request must be made in
cause why you failed the evidentiary test and why your driver's license
Date of Service on this NOTICE OF SUSPENSION.
writing and received by the department within seven (7) days from the
.
You also have the right to judicial review of the Hearing Officer's decision
not request a hearing before the department or do not
do
and
testing
the
pass
to
fail
and
testing
iary
C. If you complete evident
ded and you will be required to install, at your own
prevail at the hearing , your driver's license or driving privileges will be suspen
operate for a period to end one (1) year following
you
expense, a state approved ignition interlock system on all motor vehicles
for ninety (90) days if this is your first failure of an
the end of the suspension period. Your driver's license will be suspended
privileges after the first thirty (30) days. The
driving
mercial
non-com
evidentiary testing , but you may request restricted
of evidentiary testing within five (5) years. You will not be
suspension will be for one (1) year if this is your second or more failure
you meet the provisions of paragraph 4 below.)
able to obtain a temporary restricted license during this period. (Unless
at least forty-five (45) days of an absolute
4. If you are admitted to a problem solving court program and have served
for non-commercial driving privileges for the purpose
suspension of driving privileges, you may be eligible for a restricted permit
only if a state approved ignition interlock system has
of getting to and from work, school, or an alcohol treatment program, but
been installed, at our ex ense, on all vehicles o erated b ou.

NOTICE OF SUSPENSION If you have failed the evident iary test(s), your

(30)
driving privileges are hereby suspended per #3 above, comme ncing thirty
tere~
adminis
was
test
urine
or
blood
a
lf
notice.
days from the date of service on this
results.
test
the
of
receipt
upon
ion
Suspens
of
the department may serve a Notice

Date of Service:

is separa te from any other Suspension
This Suspension for Failure or Refusal of the Evidentiary Test(s)
Notice for more information.
ordere d by the Court. Please refer to the back of this Suspension
Print Name and 1.0. Number of Reporting Officer

Signature of Reporting Officec_

"L/;;:z_,,. - -' /
Failur/

0

;real:

~

CJ Urine/Blood
ff-'...

~. ,s

Agency Code

uou.L

Telephone Number

f l-Od

W .< -t-eiP W

:EJ. Refusal

White Copy - If failure - to ITD; if refusal - to Court

Yellow Copy• to Law Enforcement

P .. . COP ,

Pink Copy - to Court

Goldenrod Copy - to Driver
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Suspension Information:

The audio version of this notice substantially conforms to the written text of the Suspersio n and
Mandatory Ignition Interlock Advisory on the reverse side.

For Refusal of Evidentiary Tes ting (Pursuant to Section 18-8002. Idaho Code}
. .
.
.
.
You ha"c the right to submit a written request within seven (7) days to the Magistrate Court indicated on
the face ofth1s notice for a hearing t~ show_ cause
why you refused to submit to or failed to complete and pass e\identiary testing. This is your opportunity to
sho,.,, cause \\hy you refused to_subrrut _or failed to
complete and pass e, identiary test mg and,, h)' your dri\er's license should not be su pended. Note: A heanng
request for refusmg C\ 1denuary testmg must be
submitted to the Magistrate Court.
If you fail to request a hearing or do not prevail at the hearing, you are subject to a $250 civil penalty and the
court ,,ill suspend your dmer'~ license and 'or
driving privileges with absolute!) no dri, mg pri\ 1lcges for one (I) )ear for your first offense, or for t\.\O (2)
)'Cars for your second offense wllhm ten ( I0) years
(unless you meet the provisions of paragraph 4 as noted in the Suspension Advisory on the reverse side).
For Failing Ev1deolia ry Tes ting (Pursuant lo Section 18-8002A. Idaho Code}
You have been served this Notice ofSu~pensio11 by a peace officer who had reasonable grounds to believe
that you were operatmg a vehicle while
intoxicated. After submitting to the test(s), you may. when practicable. ha\e additional tests conducted
at your o,rn expense.
If you take thee, ident1ary test(s) and the results mdicate an alcohol concentration of .08 or greater (.02
or greater if you are under 21 years of age), or
the presence of drugs or other intoxicatmg substances in violation of the provisions of Sections 18-8004,
I8-8004C, and 18-8006, ldaho Code, the
peace officer shall:
I.
Serve you with this Notice ofSmpens,011, which becomes effective thirty (30) days after the date of service
indicated on the reverse side of
this notice. Failure of an evidentiary test will result in a ninety (90) day suspension of driving privilege
, with absolutely no driHng pri\ileges during
the first thirty (30) days of suspension. You may request restricted dnving privileges during the final sixty
(60) days of the suspension. If this 1s not
your first failure of an evidentiary test within the last five (5) years, all of your driving privileges will
be suspended for one (I) year with no dnvmg
privileges of any kind (unless you meet the provisions of paragraph 4 as noted in the Suspension Ad\.isory
on the reverse side).
2. If you were operating or in actual physical control of a commercial vehicle and the evidentiary test
resu lts indicate an alcohol concentration of:
A.
.04 to less than .08, your commercial dming privileges wi ll be suspended for ninety (90) days. You will
have absolutely no commercial
driving privileges of any kind.
8.
.08 or greater (.02 or greater if you are under 21 )'ears of age), or test results that indicate the presence
of drugs or other intoxicating
substances, all of your driving pmileges will be suspended for ninety (90) days, with possible non-comme
rcial driving privileges for the frna l si,ty
(60) days of the suspenston. You will have absolutely no commercial driving privileges of any kind during
the full ninety (90) day suspension.
C.
lf this is not your first failure of an evidentiaf)' test \\ ithin the last five (5) years, all of your driving pmileges
will be suspended for one (I)
year and you will have absolutely no driving privileges of any kind (unless you meet the provisions of
paragraph 4 as noted in the Suspension
Advisory on the reverse side).
Hearing Request for Failure of Evidentiary Test
You have the right to request an administrative hearing on the suspension before the Idaho Transporta
tion Departmen t. Your request must be made
m writing and be received by the department no later than seven (7) days after the date of service on
this ,'\'otice o{ Sus pemion. The request must
state t he iss ues intended to be ra ised at the bea ring, and must include )'Our name, date of birth, dmer's
license number, date of arre t, and daytime
telephone number because the hearing will be held by telephone. The burden of proof, by preponderance
of e\. 1dence. shall be upon the driver as to the
issues raised in the hearing, pursuant to Section l 8-8002A(7), Idaho Code. The mandatof) requiremen
t to install an approved ignition interlod. system
is not an issue that may be raised at the administrative hearing per ldaho Code.
If you request a hearing, it shall be held within twenty (20) days of the date the hearing request was received
by the Idaho Transportation Department
(Section l 8-8002A. Idaho Code) If you do not request an administra ti\.e bearing '"itbin se\en (7)
day!> of service of this l\otice ofS uspe1Hion,
your right to contest the uspension is '"aived. This suspensio n is separate and apart fro m any
suspension that may be ordered by the court as
a result of any criminal charges that may be brought against you.
J udicial Review
You may appeal the decision of the Hearing Officer by seeking judicial re, ie,\ to the District Court (Section
I 8-8002A. Idaho Code). Your app<!al
must be filed as a civil proceeding in the District Court, pursuant to Chapter 52. Title 67. Jdaho Code.
Restricted Driving Permits
If ~~ur dm mg pri\ ilege_s are suspended for a period of ninety (90) days pursuant to ect1on I 8-8002A,
Idaho Code, you may request restricted driving
privileges for the final sixty (60) days of the suspension (IDAPA Rule 39.02.70). Restricted driving privileges
will not allow you to operate a
commercial motor \Chicle. You may apply for a restricted driving permit by pnnting or downloadin g
the Restricted Dm ing Permit Application (ITD
Form .· 3227) from our ,\eb:,ite, dm\..idaho. go\., and submitting the completed application via mail at
the address below, via email at
RDPermits a. itd.idaho.gov, or via fax at 208-287-3880 .
Reinstatem ent and Mandatory Ignition Interlock System Requireme nts
B~fore b~mg reinst_a!ed on ~is suspcn:,ion, you wi ll be required to pay a reinstatement fee. Any other
suspension imposed by the court for this ofTcnse
will require an additional reinstatement fee. For refusal ofan e\identiary test or failure to pass an evidential")
test. you will be required to install, at
)Our O\\_n expe~se, a s~te approved 1gniuon interlock system on all motor vehicles you operate for a period
of one year following the end of your
suspension penod. A hst of stale approved providers is avai lable at: https://apps.itd.idaho.gov/apps/ohs
/docs/lgnition-Jnterlock-Providers.pdf.
;fo request an admi~istra~ i:·e h~aring_re lating t~ an administra ti\e license suspension for failing
evidcntiary testing
Make your request m wntmg, mcludmg a daytime telephone number, to the Idaho Transporta
tion Departmen t. Driver Services
Section, PO Box 7129, Boise ID 83707-1129, or
Fax your request to Driver Services at (208) 332-4124, or
Email your request to ALSPublic @,itd.idah o.gov

I i·ou have uestions or need additional in ormanon re ardin this notice or ·our drfrin, 1rh'ile es,
call Drirer Service~ at (208 334-8735.
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Allred, Natalie

i- lLLJ.

From:

Sent:
To:

Cc:

Subject:
Attachments:

James Combo <jcombo@kcgov.us>
Sunday, June 23, 2019 7:26 AM
19 JUN 2t. AM
Heinle, Matthew J.
PC Affidavits; Schenck, Chris; Klitch, Justin; Ashby, Allen;
Scotch, Justin; DL D1 Dispatchers; Allred, Natalie; Mallory,
Ramey, Katrina; incustody
-~=...,
i)~i.""':,u.1.l~I '
Re: 48 Hour In Custody for STEGALL, Jeffery Dwayne #C19001 362

zn

11 : 27

%~

image002.jpg; image004.jpg

(Jf'/3·/Ut-/&tlJ

I find probable cause for the arrest and continued detention of the defendant for the charge set forth in the attached
police report.
James Combo
District Court Magistrate #332
June 23, 2019@ 7:20 am
Sent from my iPhone
On Jun 23, 2019, at 12:15 AM, Heinle, Matthew J.
<Matthew.Heinle@isp.idaho.gov<mailto:Matthew.Heinle@isp.idaho.gov>> wrote :
Hello,
Attached are the supporting documents for the DUI and Warrant arrest of Jeffery Dwayne STEGALL #09001362.
Respectfu Ily,

<image002 .jpg> <image004.jpg>
Trooper Matthew Heinle
Idaho State Police
D-1 Patrol
615 West Wilbur Ave .
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83815
(208) 209-8620
Emai l: matthew.heinle@isp.idaho.gov<mailto:matthew.heinle@isp.idaho.gov>

CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail is intended only for the personal and confidential use of the individual(s) named
as recipients (or the employee or agent responsi ble to deliver it to the intended re ci pient) and is covered by the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521. It may contain information that is privileged,
confidential and/o r protected from disclosure under applicable law including, but not limited to, the attorney client
privilege and/or work product doctrine. If you are not the intended recipient of this transmission, please not ify the
sender immediately by telephone . Do not deliver, distribute or copy this transmission, disclose it s contents or take any
action in reliance on the information it contains.
1
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Defendant's name: Jeffery Dwayne Stegall
Date of arrest: 06/2 1/2019

ORDER

2019 JUN24 AM II: 21

Based upon the above Affidavit, the Court hereby finds that there is Probable Cause for ~T~
· · p,~:.-!Jl~'
crime(s) has (have) been committed, and that the Defendant committed said crime(s), and th~at~(,~~~~til..lt.l.J....
nEPIJTY
may be required to post bail prior to being released.
Dated this ..clf!1ctay of

~

, 201£, at _ _ _= hours.

pJedEn/lt/td

M ~tW/)/d/i,~{/'I)

IDAHO

CHARGE

CODE

V IOLATION

1.

18-8005(6)

Driving Under the Influence - Refusal

2.
3.

4.

") /I"'\ / "'I f\ 1 C
r.r T f\'7 f\C
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Description CR28-19-10375 Stegall, Jeffery 20190624 First Appearance Arraignment
Judge James Combo
Clerk Alyssa Schertz
Defendants Rights
I

Date 16/24/2019

Time
02:23:26 PM

I

Speaker

Judge Combo

02:23:31 PM IDef
02:23 :40 PM

Location I 1K-CRT6

I

IJ

Note
Calls Case. Defendant present (In Custody) via video; PA- Ian
Hopkins; DA- Peter Dan
Undestands Rights.
Reviews Charges- DUI FEL
Reviews Penalities.

02:25:54 PM IJ

Set out for PH in 14 days.

02:26:07 PM IJ

Appoints PD.

I 02:26:16 PM
PA

Requesting bond $250,000.00
ETG Testing 8x Monthly
Reviews Criminal History.

I 02:28:09 PM IDA

Reserved till PH

I 02:28:20 PM IPA

12 Prior FT As.

I 02:28:27 PM IJ

Sets bond $250,000.00
Reviews Bond Conditions/Terms.

I 02:29:26 PM IEnd

Produced by FTR Gold™
www. fortherecord. com
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I

STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY
FIL D:
A

'

rfi~1~4lj'lii
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

Cf<l~ ·{Cf · 1631 ~

Case No.
Order Upon Request for Public Defender
1.C . §19-854

~efendant requested appointment of counsel at public expense. The Court finds Defendant
indigent pursuant to I.C. § 19-854. The public defender is ordered to represent Defendant in all
matters pertaining to th is action . Defendant may be requ ired to reimburse the county for al l or a
portion of the costs of representation .
The Kootenai County Public Defender's Office is located at 1607 Lincoln Way Coeur d' Alene,
ID 83814. The phone number is (208) 446-1700.

D The Court does not find Defendant to be indigent, the application for Pub lic defender is
denied .
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

__,,,..
~,._. .'l#/.o..+-7'._
'.

I hereby certify that a true and correct co y of the foregoing was emailed on

l,o ~ . ,/f?\

to :

Prosecutor:
~

ootenai County: kcpaicourts@kcgov .us

b Coeur d' Alene : cdaprosnotices@cdaid .org
□

Post Falls: legal@postfallsidaho.org
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

□ Other :

Public Defender:
\p1dtax@kcgov.us

Dated

@

l v8~-- l9

D15 Order Upon Request for Public Defender LC . §19-854- D-CR (O R25) (Appv.02.22. 16)

Page 1 of 1
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STATE OF IDAHO
COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

FI LED ---.---,~"""------'='-=~-!:-

AT _______,.::;__;=---

I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRIC
FT
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STA TE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

2.S-\C\- IU:315

CASENO.CRORDER SETTING BAIL or
RELEASE ON OWN RECOGNIZANCE and
CONDITIONS

V.

fondant
The above case having come before the Court on the below date and the Court having
considered the factors in I.C.R. 46, now therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that bail be set in the amount of $_-~
.....~<-=
~r>'aK)--.,c
_ _ _ __
and the following are established as the conditions ofrelease:

/

1.

THE DEFENDANT SHALL:

0" Commit no new criminal offenses greater than an infraction (a finding of probable cause on a
/ubsequent offense is sufficient to revoke bail);

2.
3.

~fiign waiver of extradition and file with the Court;

i

4. D
5.
6.
7.

Make all court appearances timely;

po NOT consume alcohol, or controlled substances that are not prescribed by a doctor;

fi1';Promptly notify the Court and defense counsel of any change of address;
v1' }i'aintain regular contact with defense counsel;
,,,h,J/.

0"Do NOT drive, operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle ~ t a

elia lie0Rse a-ed

1, 1

c.ittmtl!oce;
8. D Obtain a Substance Abuse/Batterer's Evaluation from an approved evaluator by: _ _ _ _ _ __
9.

□

10. □

Submit to: □ EtG □ Drug □ Both EtG & Drug urinalysis testing _ _ times monthly through:
[ ] Avertest (address/phone below)
[ ] Absolute (address/phone below)
[ ] Other________ ___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Results to be provided to the
Prosecuting Attorney's office, Public Defender/Defense Attorney_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , □ Court
Other:

Defendant has acknowledged these conditions in open court, and is advised that a violation of any

term may ,•~~~be defendant being returned to jail.

-'£1

~

Copies sent
/
To: .
C
\ Date: --"'-~f-"'--'--'---'----'--- - - - - ,<r--\@i'rosecutor
[ ] m court ':,Q 1 1 1 ~
~efense Counsel
[ ] in court
~
D Defendant
[ ] in court
Q1}il jailpw@kcgov.us
D Avertest FAX: (208) 416-2539, 500 N Government Way,
□ Avertest Emailed: coeurdaleneid@avertest.com
□ Absolute FAX: (208) 758-0401 , 5433 N Government Way, Suite B, CD'A, ID, Ph: (208) 758-0051
□ Absolute Emailed: fastdrugtesting@gmail.com
□ Probation Depa
ent: kcmp@kcgov.us
th r,""<":;"""'"---t-"i"it---

- --

e.Y\f't3\ \

ir.-t--f---;(------------- --

Defendant
ORDER SETTING BAIL AND CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

Date
PAO-1001 12/ 18
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Description CR28-19-10375 Stegall, Jeffrey 20190702 Preliminary Hearing Status Conference
Judge Stow
Clerk Mary Andersen

I

Date 17/2/2019
Time

09:10:04 AM

Location I1K-CRT12

I

I Speaker
Judge Stow

Note
Calls Case, PA Whitaker, DA Naftz present with Defendant, in
custody, for Preliminary Hearing Status Conference

09:10:05 AM IMr. Naftz

Ask to leave set.

09:10:08 AM Mr.
Whitaker

Request a continuance, have 2 witnesses but one may be
unavailable.

09:10:31 AM IMr. Naftz

We object.

09: 10:34 AM IJudge Stow Deny continuance, leave on for Friday.
09: 10:39 AM IEnd

Produced by FTR Gold TM
www. fortherecord. com
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Description CR 28-19-10375 Stegall, Jeffrey 20190705 Preliminary Hearing
Judge Walsh
Clerk Wanda Butler
Date

17/5/2019 1

Location lKCRT3

I
Time

02:42:09
PM

Speaker
J

Note

Jeffrey Stegall

02:42:13
PM

DF here in custody with Ms. Taylor and Ms. McClinton for state.

02:42:24
PM

Preliminary Hearing.

02:42:29
PM

PA

02:42:54
PM

Motion to amend criminal complaint paragraph 2 - reviews language
.232 alcohol content
Don't have amended complaint, received blood report not long ago.
Happy to provide.

02:43: 11
PM

DA

No objection

02:43: 16
PM

J

So amended, please provide amended complaint and order to amend
complaint.

02:43:36
PM

DA

Exclude witnesses

02:43:44
PM

PA

No obj

02:43:46
PM

J

Granted.

02:43:53
PM

DA

Appropriate to read the amended criminal complaint.

02:44:04
PM

J

Reads amended complaint.

02:44:49
PM

DF

Understand complaint.

02:44:59
PM

PA

Call Jonathan Cushman

02:45:22
PM

Clerk

Oath for testimony.

02:45:24

Jonathan I am a Trooper with the Idaho State Police. I am POST certified. Did
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PM

Cushman receive training in persons under the influence of alcohol. Describes.

02:46:20
PM

Attended ARIDE. Describes persons symptoms under influence.

02:47:19
PM

Vehicle did catch our attention. Two other officers there with me. Left
to call of vehicle crash.

02:47:49
PM

DA

Objection

02:47:57
PM

J

We'll cut to the chase.

02:48:04
PM

J

Sustained.

02:48:07
PM

Jonathan
Describes vehicle. Did make contact.
Cushman

02:48:32
PM

Kootenai County State of Idaho. 1 occupant in vehicle.

02:49:05
PM

I walked to passenger side. He was in driver seat slumped forward
asleep.

02:49:41
PM

No keys in ignition.

02:49:52
PM

He was ID'd by picture from Montana. He is here at DF table.

02:50:06
PM

I smelled alcohol when I leaned in.

02:50:44
PM

Believe he indicated he was fine.

02:51:37
PM

Describes how defendant reached for buttons for windows wouldn't
work, no keys.

02:52:10
PM

I opened up passenger door to speak to him.

02:52:25
PM

Later when he was out of the vehicle I could smell the alcohol.

02:52:45
PM

Describes how he was seated at the steering wheel.

02:53:04
PM

Slurred speech was extreme and continued during conversation. I did
ask him to get out of the car.

02:53:43
PM

Changed couple times. He said vehicle stalled.

02:54:36

DA

Objection reading from notes.
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I

PM
02:54:42

I

PM

I

11

02:54:48

I

PM

Please tum notes over once memory is refreshed.

I

02:55:10

Cushman Mechanical issue with vehicle why on side of the road.

PM
02:55:27

He said he was alone. He confirmed.

PM
02:55:35

From Idaho Falls heading to Portand Oregon.

PM
02:55:58
PM

He commented we were just parked here.

02:56:05

He said other occupants left looking for help. Believe he said west other
persons left.

PM
02:56:48

Ask for his DL. Had ID. I said you shouldn't be driving. Told him he
was driving and he was lying.

PM
02:57:29

He said yes he was lying. He didn't change his story for me.

PM
02:58:04
PM

I asked him to get out, I walked to the rear of the car, and he stumbled in
the lane of the highway. Other officer had to drag him back out of rude.
Sat him in guardrail so he wouldn't fall over.

02:59:09

PM
02:59:20

PM
02:59:23

PM
02:59:31

DA

Object and move to strike.

PA

That's fine.

J

Sustained, testimony stricken.

Cushman I asked Hiami ifhe wanted to take over the FST's. Never performed.

PM
02:59:53

PM
I

I

03:01 :22

I

PM
PM

No containers in vehicle. No containers around vehicle.
At some point I did have the keys to the vehicle.

I

03:02:42

I

PM

I ran his driving status. Felony warrant. Klitch spoke to him. DF stood
up quick agitated - appeared he was squaring off with my Sgt. Due to
escalation arrest him on felony warrant and do tests at the jail.

I

03:01 :46

I

Sustained.

He said he had been there 20 minutes. Fit the time line. Describes.

I
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03:03:19

I
I

PM
03:03:37
PM
03:03:44

I

PM
03:03:47

PM
03:04:27

PM
03:05:12
PM
03:05:21

PM
03:06:21

PM
03:07:33

PM
03:08:57
PM
03:09:19

PM
03:09:52

PM
03:10:16

PM
03:10:59

PM
03:11:22

PM
03:11:29

PM
03:12:05

PM
03:12:34

PM
03:13:27

PM

I
IPA

No one was walking down the side of the road.

loA

ex

Nothing further.

Cushman W almart in Smelterville. I never found an accident.
Part of the special teams unit - I'm on DUI side. We were doing
emphasis in Shoshone. I am a deputy in Bonner.
Sgt got there first. Other troopers headed there.
Not on cell phone. No was not looking for a Subaru. Let me rephrase.
Part of my job is to look for stopped cars and pedestrians walking.
Roselake closest exit. Exit 34. mile from vehicle. Left Rear was on fog
line. Describes.
Yes this is all on video. Parked car length away from the other vehicle.
All on dashcam. Audio attached to video.
Describes the landscape of the area where the car is.
Didn't look to see if there were people or containers where down.
Somebody could sit on top of the seat with the stuff in it. I have them in
pictures.
Yes inventoried what was in vehicle. Things could be moved. Don't
know if in the bag.
Can't tell you what was in the back seat. Checked the truck. Don't
remember what was there.
Don't remember what was under seats.
Somebody else provided the keys to me - some point located then
handed to me.
At some point they were in plain view. Think Sgt was looking.
There was some rings etc. Put in ignition and turned it on. I didn't try to
start the car. He said had mechanical issues. Don't know if the key
would have started the car.
He never said somebody else drove the vehicle. He said had other
people traveling with him that walked for help. I think he made a
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I
I

03:14:33
PM

I

comment - may have offered that. He made reference of a brother, then
made reference to a funeral.

I

Don't know who car was registered to. Not his car, don't know who it
belonged to. ID plates 8B Bonneville County.

03:15:43

I

PM
03:15:48

I

PM
03:15:52

I

PM
03:15:56
PM

I
IDA

All I have.

IPA

ReDX

Cushman It was light out.

03: 16:04

Yes trained to look for broken down vehicle.

PM
03:16:16

No vehicle, no people walking. Key did fit. Tum it to the on position.
Didn't locate an other information indicating that someone else was in
the car. I can't recall what we took out of the vehicle.

PM
03:17:11
PM
03:17:19
PM
03:17:21

PM
03: 17:24

PM
03:17:30

PM
03:17:37
PM

I can't remember - probably located clothing.
DA

Nothing.

J

Excused.

PA

Dustin Klitch DX

Clerk

Oath for testimony.

Dustin
Klitch

Patrol Sgt with ISP 13 years, POST supervisors certificate. Reviews
training on impairment by alcohol consumption.

03:19:02

I

PM

I

03:19:23
PM

I

I

I
I

Located vehicle, maroon red Subaru parked on side road, hazard parked
on fog line. Possible crash.

I

Coming from W almart in Smelterville. I did have other troopers behind
me, Hinlynn, and Cushman.

03:19:59

I

PM
03:20:19

I

PM

Reviews indicators for alcohol consumption. At least 50.
6/21/19 I was on duty 6:22 pm Milepost 40 and 34 in Kootenai County
Idaho WB.

03:19:41

PM

Yes, I stayed until vehicle was towed.

I

I directed Cushman to stop.
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03:20:24
PM

Vehicle was a hazard, close to where crash was reported.

03:20:44
PM

Hour before was in that same location. No vehicle there at that time.

03:21 :00
PM

No one walking on side ofroadway.

03:21:47
PM

I had a civilian ISP dispatch as a rider with me.

03:21:57
PM

There was one male subject in driver seat at DF table Mr. Stegall.
Trooper Cushman. Trooper Hinlynn.

03:22:34
PM

I listened to Cushman speak to him. Poor coordination acting abnormal,
stumbled into the lane of travel I grabbed him by the back of the shirt
and pulled him back.

03:23:08
PM

Immediately suspected he was impaired. Smell odor of alcohol
beverage. It was strong.

03:23:31
PM

I don't recall if I asked him ifhe consumed any.

03:23:43
PM

He was irritable, mood swings, conversing to very angry, almost
consider violent, flushed face, glassy/bloodshot eyes, ramble on.

03:24: 12
PM

Clear he was impaired on alcohol. He was adamant that he didn't drive
the vehicle. He said a friend was driving. Don't believe he provided a
name. He was very uncooperative.

03:24:51
PM

No person came back to that vehicle. From time on scene to booking
process - 3-4 hours.

03:25:18
PM

30 min to an hour on roadway with vehicle.

03:26:09
PM

Cushman and Hinlynn placed him into custody, DF became angry stood
up in fighting stance, felony warrant was confirmed through dispatch. I
would not have done them right there - fst's. He was arrested. He
continued to be very much so uncooperative.

03:27:03
PM
I

Yes participated in inventory of vehicle. I found keys to vehicle between
center console and front passenger seat. In my opinion they were
concealed. Would have to purposely put them there or fall there.

I

I

Would have to look at video. No containers in video. Amongst other
things yes looking for alcohol containers. Rear seat and front seat
belongings on it. Consistent with being the drivers.

03:28:39
PM
I
I 03:28:47

I

I

03:27:52
PM

There was stuff.

I

Multiple belongings on front passenger seat, and rear seat made it if
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PM

siting in vehicle have to sit on multiple items.

03:29:26
PM

Not that I found. Just found the keys.

03:29:43
PM

Hinnlynn transported DF to the jail. Based on his behavior, not safe to
go to the jail by himself, I followed him to the jail.

03:30: 13
PM

I did assist to prepare a warrant for blood draw. It was obtained. the
blood was drawn, done in Jail booking room by officer who was trained
to do it.

03:30:44
PM

very minute amount of blood. Provided to Hinnlynn. I did supervise
that. It was packaged.

03:31:17
PM

Brack and Hinnlynn packaged it. Everything I observed done
accordance to policy.

03:31 :35
PM

Pl Ex. 1

03:31 :39
PM

Recognize it - ISP forensics report on blood collected.

03:31:49
PM

DA

Move to strike on blood collected.

03:31 :56
PM

J

Sustained.

03:32:00
PM

Klitch

Case number and suspects name, Mr. Stegall. Yes agency case number
was same as generated in this matter.
Hinnlynn was the Trooper who submitted this. Yes description of the
tube was what I observed being packaged.

03:32:49
PM
03:33:30
PM

PA

Move to admit PL 1?

03:33:35
PM

DA

Objection voir dire?

03:33:39
PM

J

You may.

03:33:42
PM

Klitch

In booking room. At most 15 feet away. I did - I was gone - can't recall
how long. Gone for a while.

03:34:24
PM

DA

Remain standing on objection.

03:34:30
PM

J

Overruled, PL 1 admitted.

Klitch

I did talk to him about what he drank. Acknowledged he had been
drinking, before blood draw, indicated he had an alcohol problem.
Talked about that then did the blood draw.

03:34:51
PM
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03:35:33
PM

No never mentioned he drank after getting to the location of the Subaru.
Didn't say what or how much.

03:36:02
PM

He continued to look impaired. FST's were not done at the jail, not safe
to do so.

03:36:19
PM

He was uncooperative. Yes cooperated for the blood draw.

03:36:39
PM

He wasn't fighting, just a difficult process to put it mildly.

03:36:53
PM

PA

Nothing further.

03:36:56
PM

DA

ex

03:36:58
PM

Klitch

Yea part of the problem was not able to hit the vein. I would have to
review the video. I believe this was processed on the video.

03:37:46
PM

Correct DUI emphasis. Shoshone. Within hour of getting there, would
have passed MP 35 in an hour ofus returning that call.

03:38:37
PM

Have to look at CAD, believe just started at 1600 not sure.

03:39:03
PM

Yes told him to stop while we kept going. No other cars parked in area.

03:39:36
PM

5 min maybe, didn't locate crash so turned around.

03:39:49
PM

DF was still inside vehicle. Not sure if doors were open.

03:40:08
PM

Within a minute after I got there, he was sitting on guard rails. I did
stand by him.

03:40:33
PM

Other Troopers conducting drivers checks. DF wasn't free to leave, not
in cuffs. No miranda yet.

03:40:58
PM

I may have asked him a couple questions. Can't recall what I asked him.

03:41:46
PM

Have to review the video to find out when searching vehicle.

03:42: 17
PM

15-30 minutes - yes looking through car. I was preparing the vehicle to
be towed, not necessarily looking for evidence. I did not take inventory.
Not that I recall didn't direct someone else to do it.

03:43:42
PM

Based on totality believe they were concealed. Denial on him driving.
Yes purposefully hidden based on him saying he wasn't driving.
Describes key chain.

03:45:03

Have to see video, not a large key ring.
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I

PM

I

03:45:31
I

PM

I believe I directed somebody to photography the seats.
I

03:46:02
I

PM

Don't recall looking in the vehicle other than finding the keys. I did not
locate alcohol container. Not specifically looking for alcohol.

I

03:46:34

Didn't look down the hill for container. Looked for people down hill. I
did - there was a silver blue car on the bottom frontage road, parked
down there caught my attention. I asked them to come to me, they took
off. They took off.

PM

03:47:31
PM

We did - stopped by another Trooper. No contact with them.

03:48:15
PM

I had not read him miranda. 30 min to the jail. He showed up pretty soon
to take the blood, but warrant process took sometime.

03:49: 14

Approximately 2 hours yes.

PM
03:49:26

He is placed in holding cell from patrol car.

PM
03:49:48
PM
03:50:06
PM
03:50:10

PM
03:50:33

PM
03:51:10

PM
03:51:24
PM

He was in that cell. I did not read him miranda. I did ask him questions.
DA

That's all.

PA

ReDX

Klitch
J

Discussion on photos on laptop. May use for refresh of recollection.

Klitch

Yes, thought there was a chair/Table - consistent with what I saw.
Believe it was a folding camping chair or maybe a tent.

03:52:05

That's the trunk area maybe don't recall - lot of stuff consistent with
what my vehicle would look like if I was driving by my self.

PM
03:52:53
PM

That's how it looked. Backseat personal belongings, bags, 6-12 inches of
items on backseat.

03:53:42

All 3 seats filled with stuff.

PM
03:53:51

PM
03:53:59

PM

PA

Those have been disclosed to DF.

DA

Sent over, just had not seen them. RE CX
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03:54:12

PM
03:54:57
PM
03:55:00

PM
03:55:01

PM
03:55:05

PM
03:55:12
PM
03:55:15

PM

Klitch

Yes fold up chair. Collapse in a 5 X 5 X 3 inch long.

PA

No re DX.

J

Excused.

PA

State rests.

DA

No evidence.

J

Argument

PA

Substantial evidence presented to bind over. Driving vehicle. Troopers
not seen any other car in that area.

03:56:04

Everything points to DF driving that car. Reviews.

PM
03:56:22

Contents of vehicle pointed to one driver.

PM
03:56:55
PM

Evidence from other troopers. Keys in close proximity to driver.
Based upon all that, state has met its burden. Was impaired by alcohol,
blood draw lab report.

03:57:21

PM
03:57:43

PM

DA

03:58:12

Keys not in his pocket. People down below was interested in what they
were doing.

PM
03:58:32

Not met burden as to consumption of alcohol or who driver was.

PM
03:58:41

PM

J

03:59:02

PM

Based on Ex. 1 state has met burden 5. 1 substantial and competent
evidence for every element DUI
I will hold him to answer in the DC J. Meyer assigned.

PM
03:59:39

I think the court should not bind over, state has issues with case, alcohol
consumption, who, when, and where.

end
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. STATE OF IDAHO. COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
J24 w. GARDEN AVENUE, P.O. BOX 9000, COEURD' ALENE, IDAHO 83816/ 5 /

rJ /
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359P

STATE OF IDAHO

FILED

vs.
Jeffrt>V Dwayne Stegall

CLERK~ F THE DISTRICT COURT

BY

ORDER

FELONY CASE# CR28-19-10375

.m.

AT

WGR&...iv~DEPUTY
J-1uoLDING
( ] DISMISSING CHARGE(S)

CHARGE(S):
Driving Under the lnfluence-(2nd Offense Ft>lonv Violation Within 15 Years)

I 18-8005(9){F} {2}

Amended to: - - -- - -- - - -- - -- -- - - -- - -- - - -- - -- - - - -

[

] Dismissed - insufficient evidence to hold defendant to answer charge(s). [ ]Bond exonerated. [ ]NCO Lifted.
(Specify dismissed charge(s) on above line, if other charges still pending)

[

] Preliminary hearing having been waived by the defendant on the above listed charge(s),

~ Pre liminary heari ng having been held in the above entitled matter, and it appearing to me that the offense(s) set
forth above has/ have been committed, and there is sufficient cause to believe the named defendant is guilty
thereof,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant is held to answer the above charge(s) and is bound over to District Court.
The Prosecuting Attorney shalJ file an Information that includes all charges under this case number.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be admitted to bail in the amount of $._ _ _ _ _ _ _ and is
committed to the custody of the Kootenai County Sheriff pending the giving of such bail.
[

] Defendant was advised of the charges and potential penalties and of defendant's rights, and having waived his/her
constitutional rights to: a) trial by jury; b) remain silent; and c) confront witnesses, thereafter pied guilty to the
c harge(s) contained in the Information filed by the Prosecuting Attorney.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all pretrial motions in this case shall be filed not later than 42 days after the date
of this order unless ordered otherwise. All such pretrial motions in this matter shall be accompanied by a brief in support of the
motion, and a notice of hearing for a date scheduled through the Court.

THIS CASE IS ASSIGNED TO JUDGE

ENTERED this

Copies sent

_21

[ '/...Prosecutor

<"

day of

~9

~

/!.. • (!_ · ~

~½

as follows:

[~efense Attorney

[ ] Assigned District Judge: [ ]interoffice delivery

Deputy Clerk

c,/h :t1u.O..,

WaM.ri.£..AwH.1/lJ

p () ~ Defendant ~
] emailed____ _

[ ./4:A Office via email:

j.,tl)'cb

~ a il (if in custody via email atjailsgts @kcgov.us)
[ ] KCSO Records fax 446-1307 (re: NCO)

Order Holding Defendant/Dismissing Case
RevS/16
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Electronically Filed
7/8/2019 10:01 AM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us
Assigned Attorney
Laura McClinton

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR28-19-10375
Plaintiff,

INFORMATION

vs.

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,

Fingerprint #: 2800114003
Defendant.

BARRY MCHUGH, Prosecuting Attorney in and for the County of Kootenai, State of
Idaho, who prosecutes in its behalf, comes now into Court, and does accuse JEFFERY

DWAYNE STEGALL with committing the crime(s) of: DRIVING A MOTOR VEHICLE
WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE, Idaho Code §§18-8004, 18-8005(6), committed as
follows:
That the Defendant, JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL, on or about the 21st day of June,
2019 in Kootenai County, Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle,
to-wit: a 2000 Subaru Legacy, on or at westbound 1-90 near milepost 35, while under the
influence of alcohol, drugs and/or an intoxicating substance, and/or with an alcohol
concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: .232 as shown by an analysis of his blood, all of which is

INFORMATION
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contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against
the peace and dignity of the people of the State of Idaho.
PART II
The Complainant further informs the court that the Defendant, JEFFERY DWAYNE
STEGALL, was previously convicted of one (1) or more violations of the provisions of section
18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, and/or substantially conforming foreign criminal
violation(s), within fifteen (15) years, to wit:
1. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR05-22468, on or about the 27th day of
February, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho.
2. A Felony DUI conviction in case number DC09-474B, on or about the 11th day of
September, 2011, in the County of Flathead, State of Montana,
3. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR15-1557, on or about the 13th day of
June, 2016, in the County of Shoshone, State of Idaho,
PART III
The Prosecuting Attorney further informs the Court that the defendant, JEFFERY
DWAYNE STEGALL, while committing the offense(s) of Driving Under the Influence, as
charged in the Complaint, had been previously been convicted of at least two (2) separate felony
offenses, and, pursuant to Idaho Code §19-2514, is properly considered a persistent violator.
Defendant's previous convictions consist of the following felony offenses:
1. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR05-22468, on or about the 27th day of
February, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho.
2. A Felony DUI conviction in case number DC09-474B, on or about the 11th day of
September, 2011, in the County of Flathead, State of Montana,

INFORMATION
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3. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR15-1557, on or about the 13 th day of
June, 2016, in the County of Shoshone, State of Idaho, all of which is contrary to
the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against the
peace and dignity of the people of the State of Idaho.
DATED this 5th day of July, 2019.
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

~-,(I~
Laura McClinton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of July, 2019, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was caused to be delivered as follows:
mailed
faxed r1 hand delivered P" emailed
JusticeWeb P" !Courts
Kootenai County Public Defender
Benjamin M Onosko

r
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Electronically Filed
7/8/2019 3:49 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8448
iCourt Email: pdfax@kcgov.us

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CASE NUMBER CR28-19-0010375
F

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
V.
JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL AKA:
Jeffrey Dwayne Stegall,

MOTION FOR PREPARATION
OF PRELIMINARY HEARING
TRANSCRIPT

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named defendant, by and through their attorney and hereby
moves the Court for an Order directing the clerk of the court to prepare and complete the
transcript of the Preliminary Hearing held in the above-entitled matter on 07/05/2019, before the
Honorable Clark A. Peterson. This motion is made on the grounds that the transcript of said
hearing is necessary for defense counsel in order to prepare a defense on behalf of the defendant
in this matter.
Counsel for the defendant further moves the Court to order that the costs necessary for
the preparation and completion of the transcript be paid at county expense and at no expense to
the Defense. This Motion is made on the grounds that the defendant was determined to be

MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT
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indigent by the above-entitled Court, and further, that their representation is provided for by the
Kootenai County Public Defender.

~_ day of July, 2019.
DATED this _ _
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BENJAMIN M. ONOSKO
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the

:[

day of July, 2019, addressed to:

Kootenai County Prosecutor

MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT

PAGE2
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Filed:07/10/2019 07:29:33
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8448
Email: pdfax@kcgov.us
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

CASE NUMBER CR28-19-0010375
F

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,

V.
JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL AKA:
Jeffrey Dwayne Stegall,

ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF
PRELIMINARY HEARING
TRANSCRIPT

Defendant.

The Court having before it the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing, now,
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the clerk of the court shall prepare and complete the
transcript of the Preliminary Hearing held in the above-entitled matter on 07/05/2019.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the costs necessary for the preparation and completion
of said transcript shall be paid at county expense and at no expense to the defense.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the transcript shall be complete and submitted to all
August
_ _ _ _, 2019.
_ _ day of _ _
parties to this action no later than the _9th
Signed: 7/9/2019 05:44 PM

DATED this _ _ _ day of July, 2019.

~
c
T JUDGE
DIST
ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the _ _ _ day of July, 2019, addressed to:
Kootenai County Public Defender pdfax@kcgov.us
Kootenai County Prosecutor kcpaicourts@kcgov.us
Kally Young@kyoung@kcgov.us

Signed: 7/10/2019 07:29 AM

ORDER FOR PREPARATION OF PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT
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Filed:07/11/2019 14:41:38
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Butler, Wanda

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CRCR28-19-10375

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

ORDER TO AMEND
CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

vs.

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
Defendant.

Based upon the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the CRIMINAL COMPLAINT is hereby amended.
Signed: 7/9/2019 08:07 AM

ENTERED this _ _ day of JULY, 2019.

·---~"""""""'=---

JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 7/11/2019 02:41 PM

I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of July, 2019 that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
delivered as indicated below:
✓

✓

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney (email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us)
Coeur d'Alene Prosecuting Attorney (email: cdaprosnotices@cdaid.org)
Post Falls Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Rathdrum Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Kootenai County Public Defender (email: pdfax@kcgov.us)
Defendant/Defendant's Attorney: bonosko@kcgov.us
Kootenai County Warrants (email: warrants@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Jail (j ailpw@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Work Release (email: workrelease@kcgov.us)
Community Service (email: jhicks@kcgov.us)
Adult Misdemeanor Probation (email: kcmp@kcgov.us)
Probation & Parole (email: distl@idoc.idaho.gov;
ccdsentencingteam@idoc.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Transportation (fax: 208-334-8739)
BCI (cch@isp.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Corrections (email: centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov)
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

JIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

(j~~

By:-----------
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Filed:07/11/2019 14:43:29
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Butler, Wanda

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us
Assigned Attorney
Laura McClinton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR28-19-10375
Plaintiff,

AMENDED CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT

vs.

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,

Fingerprint #: 2800114003
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Laura McClinton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney and amends the
complaint as follows: that the above-named defendant did commit the crime(s) of DRIVING A

MOTOR VEHICLE WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE, Idaho Code §§18-8004, 188005(6), committed as follows:
That the Defendant, JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL, on or about the 21st day of June,
2019 in Kootenai County, Idaho, did drive or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle,
to-wit: a 2000 Subaru Legacy, on or at westbound I-90 near milepost 35, while under the
influence of alcohol, drugs and/or an intoxicating substance, and/or with an alcohol

AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
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concentration of .08 or more, to-wit: .232 as shown by an analysis of his blood, all of which is
contrary to the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against
the peace and dignity of the people of the State of Idaho.
PART II
The Complainant further informs the court that the Defendant, JEFFERY DWAYNE
STEGALL, was previously convicted of one (1) or more violations of the provisions of section
18-8004(1)(a), (b) or (c), Idaho Code, and/or substantially conforming foreign criminal
violation(s), within fifteen (15) years, to wit:
1. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR05-22468, on or about the 27th day of
February, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho.
2. A Felony DUI conviction in case number DC09-474B, on or about the 11th day of
September, 2011, in the County of Flathead, State of Montana,
3. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR15-1557, on or about the 13th day of
June, 2016, in the County of Shoshone, State of Idaho,
PART III
The Prosecuting Attorney further informs the Court that the defendant, JEFFERY
DWAYNE STEGALL, while committing the offense(s) of Driving Under the Influence, as
charged in the Complaint, had been previously been convicted of at least two (2) separate felony
offenses, and, pursuant to Idaho Code §19-2514, is properly considered a persistent violator.
Defendant's previous convictions consist of the following felony offenses:
1. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR05-22468, on or about the 27th day of
February, 2006, in the County of Kootenai, State of Idaho.

AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT
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2. A Felony DUI conviction in case number DC09-474B, on or about the 11 th day of
September, 2011, in the County of Flathead, State of Montana,
3. A Felony DUI conviction in case number CR15-1557, on or about the 13 th day of
June, 2016, in the County of Shoshone, State of Idaho, all of which is contrary to
the form, force and effect of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace
and dignity of the people of the State of Idaho. Said complainant therefore prays for proceedings
according to law.
DATED this 8th day of July, 2019.
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

~-,(I~
Laura McClinton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 8th day of July, 2019, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was caused to be delivered as follows:
mailed
faxed r1 hand delivered
emailed
JusticeWeb P" !Courts
Kootenai County Public Defender
Benjamin M Onosko

r

AMENDED CRIMINAL COMPLAINT

r

r

r
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Electronically Filed
7/11/2019 7:39 AM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

Anne C. Taylor, Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 5836
iCourt Email: pdfax@kcgov.us

Assigned Attorney:
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, Bar Number: 8448

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
V.
JEFFERY D. STEGALL AKA: JEFFREY
DWAYNE STEGALL
Defendant.

CASE NUMBER CR28-19-0010375
F
MOTION FOR RECOGNIZANCE
RELEASE OR REDUCTION OF BOND

COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, by and through their attorney, Benjamin M.
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for its Order releasing the
defendant on their own recognizance or reducing the bond in this matter.
This motion is made pursuant to the 8th and 14th amendments of the U.S. Constitution;
Article I,§§ 6 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution; and I.C.R. 46.
This motion is made on the grounds that defendant has ties to the community and is not a
flight risk, and the bond as set violates the defendant's rights to due process and to be free from

MOTION FOR RECOGNIZANCE RELEASE
OR REDUCTION OF BOND
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excessive bond and cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the U.S. and Idaho
Constitutions.
Counsel requests that this Motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument,
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is ten minutes.

lo_·_day of July, 2019.
DATED this _ _
ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:
BENJAMIN M ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
day of July, 2019, addressed to:
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the

l\

Kootenai County Prosecutor
Interoffice Mail

-I<.:_ iCourt kcpaicourts@kcgov.us

~
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Description CR 28-19-10375 Stegall, Jeffrey 20190729 Arraignment in District Court
Judge Meyer
Court Reporter Diane Bolan
Clerk Tiffany Burton
I

Location I1K-CRT9

Date I7/29/2019 I
Time

I Speaker
03:04:00 PM Judge
Meyer
03:04:33 PM

Note
Calls case; Def present in custody w/ DA Mr. Onosko; PA Mr.
Black

~ I have read the information, waive reading. Correct name, DOB and
SSN are correct. Understands trial rights.

03:10:11 PM IDef

Def will plead Not Guilty.

03:10:35 PM IDA

I plead Not Guilty to DUI.

03:10:40 PM

11

Enter plea.

03:11 :01 PM IPA

2 days for trial.

03:11:04 PM IDA

Agree.

03:11 :0SPM

~ Will set trial for November 4, 2019 at 9:00 AM. PTC will be
October 24, 2019 at 2:30 PM.

03:12:15 PM IDA

Will withdraw the motion for the bond hearing today.

03:12:24 PM IEnd
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Electronically Filed
7/30/2019 4:20 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us
Assigned Attorney
Laura McClinton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR28-19-10375

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS
LIST

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL
Defendant.

The Plaintiff may call the following witnesses at trial, although not necessarily in the
same order as listed.
Kevin Kessler, 615 W Wilbur Ave Coeur d Alene, ID 83815
Jeremy Johnston, 615 W. Wilbur Ave., ISP Forensics Lab Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Stuart Jacobson, 615 W. Wilbur, Ste. B Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Jonathan Cushman, 615 W Wilbur Ave Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Justin Klitch, 615 W Wilbur Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Cody Ercanbrack, 615 W Wilbur Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Matthew Heinle, 615 W. Wilbur Ave. Coeur d'Alene, ID 83815
Candice Macomber, 3823 E. Michelle Street Idaho Falls, ID 83401
Michael James Daugherty, 150 Reed Road Cataldo, ID 83810
Jennifer Marie Daugherty, 411 Bunker Avenue #204 Kellogg, ID 83837
II
II
II
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The State reserves the right to supplement discovery as it becomes available.

DATED this 30th day of July, 2019.

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

~-,(I~
Laura McClinton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of July, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was caused to be delivered as follows: r mailed r faxed r1 hand delivered r
emailed r JusticeWeb P" ICourts
Kootenai County Public Defender
Benjamin M Onosko
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Electronically Filed
8/7/2019 3:07 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

Anne C. Taylor, Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 5836
iCourt Email: pdfax@kcgov.us

Assigned Attorney:
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, Bar Number: 8448

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

V.

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
AKA: JEFFREY DWAYNE STEGALL

CR28-19-0010375
F

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, by and through his attorney, Benjamin M
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for an Order to Suppress certain
evidence.

FACTS
On June 21, 2019, at approximately 6:22 p.m., officers Cushman, Heinle, and Klitch were
running code to a reported roll over car crash on 1-90. Officer Cushman observed a vehicle that
showed no signs of being involved in the rollover accident parked on the side of the road.
Officer Cushman pulled behind the vehicle with his emergency red and blue lights on to contact
the occupant of the vehicle. Officer Cushman reports that he did this in order to make contact
with the occupant and see whether he was involved in the roll over crash.
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The sole occupant of the vehicle at that time was Defendant, Jeffery Stegall, who was
asleep in the driver seat. The vehicle was not running, and the keys were not in the ignition.
Officer Cushman walked up to the passenger side and knocked on the window, waking Mr.
Stegall. Officer Cushman reported that the back passenger window was cracked, and he could
smell alcohol inside the vehicle. Officer Cushman asked if Mr. Stegall was ok, and Mr. Stegall
responded he was. Officer Cushman then asked Mr. Stegall to open the door, and Mr. Stegall
complied. Officer Cushman asked Mr. Stegall for his identification, and Mr. Stegall handed it to
the officer. The two continued to converse, but officer Cushman never asked Mr. Stegall any
questions about a vehicle accident.
Officer Cushman suspected Mr. Stegall had committed a DUI, and had Mr. Stegall step
out of the vehicle. Mr. Stegall spoke with other officers on the side of the road while officer
Cushman ran his information.

Officer Cushman learned Mr. Stegall had a warrant, and at

approximately 6:33 p.m., Mr. Stegall was placed under arrest.
Officers placed Mr. Stegall in the back of officer Heinle's vehicle, and the officers
continued to interrogate Mr. Stegall about the possible DUI prior to advising him of his Miranda
rights. At approximately 6:39, officer Heinle advised Mr. Stegall of his Miranda rights. At
approximately 6:41, Mr. Stegall told officers he was done talking to them, said he would get a
lawyer, and asked them to leave him alone.

Despite this request, officers continued to

interrogate Mr. Stegall concerning the DUI.
Mr. Stegall was transported to the jail, and arrived at approximately 7:35 p.m. Mr.
Stegall was asked to submit to a breath test, but refused. A warrant was obtained for a blood
draw, and at approximately 9:30 p.m. officer Ercanbrack began the blood draw. Mr. Stegall
informed the officer he should try and get blood out of a vein in his hand, but officer Ercanbrack
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decided against this. Officer Ercanbrack then stuck the needle into Mr. Stegall's arm, and was
only able to obtain a small amount of blood. The officer then rendered medical aid to Mr.
Stegall to stop the bleeding in his arm. Officer Ercanbrack then attempted to obtain a blood
sample from Mr. Stegall's hand, but the officer was unable to. Officer Ercanbrack then indicated
they should try and call someone else to collect the blood.
An officer at the jail asked Mr. Stegall if he would like to do a different evidentiary test,
and Mr. Stegall said no, he would like his lawyer. Mr. Stegall told the officers several other
times he wanted his attorney. Mr. Stegall told the officers he would not consent to going to the
hospital with them for another blood draw, and said he would not give any more blood without
his lawyer. Eventually, the officers decided they would just go with what they already had, and
Mr. Stegall was taken back to a solitary jail cell.
Despite his repeated requests for an attorney, Mr. Stegall was not given access to a
phone, and not allowed to call an attorney that evening. Mr. Stegall was not given access to a
phone until sometime the next morning.

LEGAL STANDARD
The due process clause under the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a criminal
defendant "fundamental fairness" in the criminal proceedings against him. State v. Carr, 128
Idaho 181, 911 P.2d 774 (Ct. App. 1995). "The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due
process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,294 (1973). Due process is a flexible concept, and must

be applied to the unique facts and circumstances of every case. Carr, at 184, 911 P .2d at 777.
"[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
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procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial
interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. As for
the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to
inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to
exercise it, the following measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be
warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (footnote omitted). Statements given while
in a custodial interrogation setting implicate both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
ARGUMENT

I.

Seizure

Mr. Stegall was seized by officer Cushman when the officer pulled his vehicle behind
Mr. Stegall with his emergency lights on, approached the vehicle, and asked Mr. Stegall to open
the vehicle door.
"A seizure under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs only 'when the officer,
by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a
citizen."' State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho 610,612, 7 P.3d 219,221 (2000) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 904 (1968)).
Idaho Code §49-1404 prohibits a person from fleeing a police officer when given a visual
signal to stop, i.e., when an officer turns on his emergency lights. Our Courts have found that an
officer's use of his emergency lights behind a vehicle constitutes a communication to the
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occupants of the vehicle that they are not free to leave. See e.g., State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho
482,211 P.3d 91 (2009); State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690,991 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999).
Additionally, the act of taking a license from the driver of a vehicle constitutes a seizure. State v.
Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 826 P.2d 481 (Ct. App. 1991). Stopping a vehicle in order to

investigate whether the occupant may have been involved in, or seen, a car accident is an
unlawful seizure absent reasonable cause to believe the occupants actually had such information.
State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752,947 P.2d 1000 (1997).

In this case, officer Cushman reported that he pulled in behind Mr. Stegall's vehicle. It
appears his emergency lights were activated at this time. That action would communicate to any
reasonable citizen that they are not free to leave, and must remain on scene in order for the
officer to contact them. The officer approached the vehicle and knocked on the passenger side
window to wake Mr. Stegall. Officer Cushman asked Mr. Stegall ifhe was all right, and Mr.
Stegall responded he was. Officer Cushman reported that the back passenger window was
partially down, and he could smell alcohol in the vehicle. Officer Cushman then asked Mr.
Stegall to open the passenger door to the vehicle, and Mr. Stegall complied. This request came
within about 10 seconds of Officer Cushman's first contact with Mr. Stegall. At no time during
this portion of the encounter, or thereafter, did officer Cushman ask Mr. Stegall any questions
concerning the rollover accident.
Officer Cushman's actions in pulling behind Mr. Stegall's vehicle with his overhead
lights on, knocking on the window, and immediately asking Mr. Stegall to open the door would
have communicated to any reasonable person that he was not free to leave. Mr. Stegall was
seized at least by this point in time, and the State therefore bears the burden of justifying this
seizure.
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Defendant requests the Court find he was illegally seized by officer Cushman, and
suppress any evidence gained after this unlawful seizure.
II.

Miranda

Mr. Stegall's Miranda rights were violated when he was subjected to custodial
interrogation prior to the reading of his rights, and, after he invoked his right to counsel.
The safeguards of Miranda kick into effect once a defendant's freedom of action is
curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125
(1982). In making this determination, "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the
suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420,
442 (1984).
The Supreme Court has held that when a defendant, suspected of driving under the
influence of drugs, is taken into custody he must be Mirandized prior to any interrogation.
Berkemer, 468 U.S. 420. In Berkemer, a defendant was stopped by a police officer for a traffic

offense. The officer suspected the defendant of DUI, and had him perform Field Sobriety Tests.
After performing poorly on the tests, the defendant was arrested and taken to the jail. The officer
suspected the defendant was under the influence of drugs, and the defendant gave incriminating
statements to that effect without ever having been Mirandized. The Supreme Court found that in
circumstances such as this, "the incentive for police to try and induce a defendant to incriminate
himself may well be substantial." Id., at 432-433. While the Court left for the trial court the
determination of precisely when defendant was "in custody," it did hold that "respondent was 'in
custody' at least as of the moment he was formally placed under arrested and instructed to get
into the police car." Id., at 434.
"By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
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after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Miranda, at 444. "[C]ustodial interrogations, by their very nature, generate
'compelling pressures which work to undermine the individuals will to resist and to compel him
to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely."' Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 420
(1986) (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)). Because of this simple truth,
the admissibility of a defendant's statements made during a custodial interrogation hinges on the
State's ability to show the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights. This requirement has two parts, "[f]irst, the relinquishment of the right must
have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather
than intimidation, coercion, or deception. Second, the waiver must have been made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision
to abandon it." Id., at 421.
"If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that

he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease."

Miranda, at 473-474.

"An

individual's right to cut off questioning pursuant to Miranda must be 'scrupulously honored."'
Person, at 938, 104 P.3d at 980 (quoting Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975)).

"[P]olice may not proceed with questioning if the suspect indicates a desire to remain silent."
State v. Law, 136 Idaho 721, 724, 39 P.3d 661, 664 (Ct. App. 2002). Once a person has shown

an intent to exercise his Fifth Amendment right, "any statement taken after the person invokes
his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise." Miranda, at
474.
In order to determine whether a statement is given voluntarily, a court must examine the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the police efforts to obtain the statement. State v.
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Davis, 115 Idaho 462, 464, 767 P.2d 837, 839 (Ct. App. 1989).

"Under this standard, a

confession is voluntary only if it is a product of the defendant's free will ... " Id. Factors that
have been used by other courts to determine the voluntariness of a confession include, "whether

Miranda warnings were given, the youth of the accused, the accused's level of education or low
intelligence, the length of the detention, the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning,
and deprivation of food or sleep." State v. Brown, 155 Idaho 423, 430, 313 P.3d 751, 758 (Ct.
App. 2013). The giving of Miranda warnings are a "necessary, but by no means sufficient,
condition for establishing a valid waiver." Moran, at 452 (STEVENS J. DISSENTING).
A defendant's relinquishment of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights must be the
product of a "free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Moran,
at 421. Evidence that a defendant was tricked or cajoled into waiving his rights will show that
the waiver was not voluntary. Miranda, at 476. When a defendant challenges the voluntariness
of his confession, the State bears the burden of proving that the confession was voluntary. Lego

v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972). "[T]he state must establish a voluntary, knowing, and
intelligent waiver of the suspect's rights." State v. Person, 140 Idaho 934, 937, 104 P.3d 976,
979 (Ct. App. 2004). "[C]ourts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver," of
fundamental rights. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,404 (1977).
Coercive police conduct can include "physical or psychological" methods, or any other
"methods offensive to due process." State v. Doe, at 814, 948 P .2d at 169. An officer's motives
for employing coercive practices are irrelevant, the only question a court needs to answer is
"whether the police conduct in any way deprived the defendant of his free will." Davis, at 465,
767 P.2d at 840.
"The Fifth Amendment protection against compelled self-incrimination provides the right
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to counsel at custodial interrogations." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 629 (1986) (citing
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,482 (1981); Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470).

"[T]he assertion of the right to counsel [is] a significant event." Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. at 485. "[O]nce a defendant in custody asks to speak with a lawyer, all interrogation must
cease until a lawyer is present."

Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 293 (1980) (citing

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474).

The Supreme Court has clarified that once a suspect in custody asks to speak with a
lawyer, the police may not initiate any "express questioning or its functional equivalent." Innis,
446 U.S. at 300-301. As the Court more fully explained:
[T]he term "interrogation" under Miranda refers not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the
perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus
reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in
custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices,
without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A
practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an
incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But,
since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results
of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to
words or actions on the part of police officers that they should have
known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
Id., at 301-302.

One famous example of the functional equivalent of questioning is the "Christian burial
speech," discussed by the Supreme Court in the context of the Sixth Amendment. Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 392 (1977). In that case, the officer told the defendant he wanted "to

give you something to think about while we're traveling ... " Id. The officer proceeded to tell the
defendant that law enforcement really wanted to find the victim's body. Id. The officer told the
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defendant "I do not want you to answer me. I don't want to discuss it any further." Id., at 293.
However, the defendant did begin discussing the case. The Supreme Court found the statements
given by the defendant to be in violation of his Sixth Amendment right.
In this case, Mr. Stegall's rights under Miranda were violated in two respects: first, when
he was subjected to custodial interrogation without having been advised of his rights under
Miranda, and second, when the officers continued to question Mr. Stegall after he invoked his

right to counsel.
Mr. Stegall was placed in handcuffs, and told he was under arrest at approximately 6:33
p.m. Despite being in custody at this point, officers continued to question Mr. Stegall about the
underlying facts of the alleged DUI. This questioning continued until approximately 6:39, when
Mr. Stegall was read his Miranda rights. Because this questioning occurred while Mr. Stegall
was in custody but prior to being informed of his rights, Defendant asks this Court to suppress
any responses to questions Mr. Stegall gave during this time.
Approximately one minute after being informed of his Miranda rights, Mr. Stegall
invoked his right to remain silent, and his right to an attorney. Despite this invocation of his
rights, officers continued to question Mr. Stegall about the underlying facts of the alleged DUI.
Because this questioning occurred after Mr. Stegall had invoked his right to remain silent and his
right to counsel, Defendant asks this Court to suppress any responses to questions Mr. Stegall
gave after this time.

III.

Due Process

Mr. Stegall's right to due process was denied to him when the State refused to allow him
to contact his attorney in order to obtain exculpatory evidence in the case against him.
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When considering a due process challenge, the Court must consider three factors:
( 1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the existing procedures
used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and (3) the government's interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Carr, at 184, 911 P.2d at 777.

The first factor, the private interest affected in this case, is Mr. Stegall's interest in
procuring evidence which would challenge the State's allegation that he was drunk. Officer
Heinle arrested Mr. Stegall for DUI based on officer Cushman's observations of Mr. Stegall.
The best, and perhaps only, evidence that Mr. Stegall could obtain to contradict officer
Cushman's conclusions had to be collected within a relatively short period of time after his
arrest, or it would be lost forever. For example, Mr. Stegall and his attorney could have arranged
for Mr. Stegall to have his blood drawn to contradict the officer's finding that he was intoxicated,
or contradict the results of the State's own testing. Additionally, Mr. Stegall and his attorney
could have arranged for photographs or video to be taken of Mr. Stegall, or for physical tests to
be done to show that he was not showing signs of impairment at the time. Our Court of Appeals
has previously found that in DUI cases, a defendant's ability to gather this evidence implicates
"substantial" interests of the defendant. Id., at 185, 911 P .2d at 778. In this case, Mr. Stegall
was deprived of his only opportunity to gather exculpatory evidence to fight the State's
allegations, which has a direct impact on his right to a fair trial; this is certainly a substantial
interest.
The second factor, the State's procedure of not allowing an arrestee timely access to a
phone to contact an attorney, "causes a great risk of erroneous deprivation of the arrestee's
interest in obtaining evidence in his or her defense." Id. This factor also weighs in Mr. Stegall's
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favor.
With regard to the third factor, the burden on the State is extremely minimal. Mr. Stegall
only requested the right to speak to his attorney by phone.

Our Court in Carr found the

requirement that a defendant be allowed to call an attorney by telephone is a "minimal" burden.
Id. This final factor also weighs in Mr. Stegall's favor.

The State may attempt to argue that the third factor weighs in its favor because Mr.
Stegall was combative with the officers at times. While this is certainly true, and a factor to be
considered, Mr. Stegall's combativeness had substantially subsided by the time he was brought
to the jail. Mr. Stegall was never physically combative with deputies at the jail, although he was
sometimes verbally rude. Additionally, by the time the warrant was obtained Mr. Stegall did not
fight the blood draw, he gave the officer suggestions for how to actually hit a vein, and was even
allowed to be un-cuffed so the blood draw could be accomplished. When he was taken out of the
room by officers, he went willingly and was not combative. Had Mr. Stegall been given access
to a telephone at this time, approximately 9:45 p.m., he still could have contacted an attorney and
still obtained exculpatory evidence. Thus, while the State's argument may support a claim that
some delay was justified, it cannot justify detaining Mr. Stegall in isolation with no access to a
phone until the next morning, nearly 12 hours after his arrest.
In this case, Mr. Stegall requested an attorney immediately upon being taken into custody
at approximately 6:40 p.m. He was not given access to a phone to call his attorney until the next
day, well after the time for collecting pertinent evidence had passed for Mr. Stegall. Despite
being aware of his wishes, the State denied Mr. Stegall access to a telephone and thus denied him
the opportunity to gather evidence pertinent to his lack of intoxication.
This case is similar-to other Idaho cases where our Courts have found a defendant's due
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process rights to have been violated. In Carr, a defendant was arrested for DUI and requested to
speak with an attorney. She was not allowed to make a phone call until approximately five hours
after she was booked into jail. Our Court of Appeals found the State's action of denying the
defendant access to a telephone to be unreasonable, and a violation of the defendant's right to
due process. Id., at 185, 911 P.2d at 778. On another occasion, our Court of Appeals found a
defendant's right to due process was violated when, following her arrest for DUI, she was denied
access to a telephone for three and one-half hours after the original stop, and half an hour after
she was booked. State v. Madden, 127 Idaho 896, 908 P.2d 587 (Ct. App. 1995).
Our own Carr and Madden holdings are in line with other States' decisions on the issue
of access to a telephone following an arrest for being under the influence. See e.g., City of

Tacoma v. Heater, 409 P .2d 867 (Wash. 1966); State v. Krozel, 190 A.2d 61 (Conn. 1963 ); In re
Newbern, 78 A.L.R.2d 901 (Cal, Ct. App. 1959); Winston v. Commonwealth, 49 S.E.2d 611 (Va.
1948); State v. Johnson, 208 A.2d 444 (N.J. Superior Ct. 1965). In Heater, the Washington
supreme court found a DUI defendant to have been denied due process because he was denied
access to a telephone for 4 hours following his arrest; effectively depriving him of the "most
effective" way to challenge the state's evidence.
Just as in Carr and numerous other state cases, the State deprived Mr. Stegall of his only
opportunity to have an attorney gather exculpatory evidence of this DUI. By denying him access
to a telephone the whole evening, the State substantially impaired Mr. Stegall's ability to defend
himself against this charge.
The facts of this case are also unique, and prejudice to Mr. Stegall is increased, because
the State indicates it has now destroyed the blood that was drawn from Mr. Stegall that evening.
Not only was Mr. Stegall deprived of the chance to obtain his own blood draw for testing, now,
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he has been deprived of the chance to have the State's evidence independently tested by an
expert of his choosing.
For the forgoing reasons, Defendant requests the Court find his Due Process rights were
violated, and prohibit the State from introducing the results of any blood tests conducted in this
case.

CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests this Court Grant his Motion to Suppress Evidence, and
suppress any evidence obtained in violation of his Constitutional rights.
Counsel requests that this motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument,
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is 2 hours.

DATED this

z

day of August, 2019.

ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:

~

&---------

BENJAMIN M ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the

~

day of August, 2019, addressed

to:
Kootenai County Prosecutor
__ Via Fax (208) 446-2168
Interoffice Mail
----V Via iCourt kcpaicourts@kcgov.us
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Electronically Filed
10/1/2019 12:25 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

BARRY McHUGH
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Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814
Telephone: (208) 446-1800

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
V.
)
)
JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
)
)
Defendant.
)
___________ )

Case No. CR28-19-10375

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

COMES NOW Barry McHugh, Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney, by and through
Laura McClinton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, and hereby submits the State's Brief in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence.

ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

Whether the detention of Mr. Stegall prior to his arrest lawful;

II.

Whether Mr. Stegall's Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was
violated; and

III.

Whether Mr. Stegall's right to due process was violated, assuming he was not
allowed to call his attorney after being booked into jail.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 21, 2019, Idaho State Police Sergeant Klitch, Corporal Cushman, and Trooper
Heinle responded to a report of a rollover crash with unknown injury near milepost 35 on
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westbound Interstate 90. When they passed milepost 35 heading west, the officers noticed a red
Subaru stopped on the right shoulder with its wheel on the fog line. The vehicle had not been at
that location when Tpr. Heinle drove by less than an hour earlier.
As the third responding unit, Cpl. Cushman stopped and parked approximately one car's
length behind the Subaru to see whether it was involved in the reported crash. The lights on his
patrol vehicle were not activated when he pulled over at 6:22 p.m.-almost exactly one hour
before sunset. Sgt. Klitch and Tpr. Heinle continued the search, covering an area extending from
milepost 32 to 48. They returned to assist Cpl. Cushman after the search failed to tum up any
signs of a crash.
When Cpl. Cushman approached the Subaru, a man-later identified as Jeffery Dwayne
Stegall by his Montana identification card-was slumped over in the driver's seat. There were no
keys in the ignition. The front and rear passenger seats were covered with six to twelve inches of
clothing, bags, and other personal belongings, including a cooler and a folding chair, so that any
passengers would have to sit on top of the items to fit within the vehicle. Cpl. Cushman woke
Mr. Stegall and inquired through the partially open rear window whether he was okay. As he did
so, he detected a strong odor of alcohol coming from inside the vehicle. Mr. Stegall replied that
he was fine. Cpl. Cushman, noticing Mr. Stegall' s extremely slurred speech and glassy,
bloodshot eyes, asked Mr. Stegall to open the door so he could speak with him further.
It took Mr. Stegall about eighty seconds to figure out how to unlock the door. Once he

did so, he told Cpl. Cushman that the vehicle had "stalled out." In response to Cpl. Cushman's
inquiries, Mr. Stegall gave conflicting stories. He initially claimed that he was driving alone,
then said that he was traveling with two passengers. According to Mr. Stegall, the passengers
went looking for help on foot after the car broke down. He also stated that he had been parked
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there for about 20 minutes, but later changed the time to 90 minutes, then one hour. He further
claimed that both he and his friend had driven; however, none of the troopers had encountered
any pedestrians during their search. Mr. Stegall finally acknowledged that he did not have his
driver's license on him and that he had in fact been driving.
Once Sgt. Klitch and Tpr. Heinle arrived, they pulled over behind Cpl. Cushman with
their lights activated. At 6:29 p.m., Cpl. Cushman had Mr. Stegall exit and walk to the back of
the Subaru. Sgt. Klitch had to physically pull Mr. Stegall toward the shoulder to prevent him
from stumbling onto the highway. Cpl. Cushman then directed Mr. Stegall to sit on the guardrail
and activated his emergency lights. While Sgt. Klitch and Cpl. Cushman were questioning Mr.
Stegall, he stood up suddenly and assumed an intimidating posture. Tpr. Heinle moved from his
patrol vehicle to join the other officers. Mr. Stegall began swinging his arms violently while
cussing at Sgt. Klitch.
At that point, a status check on Mr. Stegall' s identification returned an active felony
warrant for a parole violation. It took all three officers to handcuff Mr. Stegall, who resisted
arrest. They placed him in the back of Tpr. Heinle' s patrol car following a weapons search of his
person. Mr. Stegall demanded a lawyer. However, he also admitted to drinking before driving to
the current location rather than after.
At 6:39 p.m., Tpr. Heinle Mirandized Mr. Stegall, who stated he understood the warning.
Mr. Stegall told Tpr. Heinle that his friend had started walking westbound and that he did not
know who owned the Subaru. Afterwards, he said it was registered to someone named Candice.
He then began kicking the backseat partition. He also refused to provide a breath or blood
sample, requiring Tpr. Heinle to obtain a warrant for a blood draw. The keys to the Subaru
turned up during a search of the center console.
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At the jail, Trooper Ercanbrack, a certified phlebotomist, was able to draw only a partial
vial of blood from Mr. Stegall. Mr. Stegall refused to submit to another blood test and became
violent when the officers at the jail told him he had to go to the hospital to procure the sample.
He also rejected their offer to seek a different kind of blood alcohol test, insisting he be allowed
to contact a lawyer instead. Eventually, the officers decided to make do with the existing sample.
The partial vial of blood, which was booked into evidence at the Idaho State Police District 1
office, returned a BAC reading of .232.
Defense counsel asserts that Mr. Stegall was denied his requested phone call at the jail,
although the state is unable to corroborate his assertion. Counsel further contends that ISP
destroyed evidence of Mr. Stegall's blood. The state has been informed that no such destruction
occurred and that ISP currently has possession of the sample taken at the jail.
Mr. Stegall was charged with driving under the influence. At Mr. Stegall's preliminary
hearing, the Honorable Judge Walsh bound Mr. Stegall over to the District Court. Mr. Stegall
subsequently filed a Motion to Suppress. Specifically, he seeks exclusion from trial of any
statements he made following his arrest as well as evidence of his blood alcohol concentration.

LEGAL STANDARD
I. W arrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unconstitutional. State v.

Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 182, 135 P.3d 536, 538 (Ct. App. 2005); U.S. Constitutional
Amendment IV; Idaho Constitution Article I, § 17. Thus, a defendant may seek to suppress any
evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search. Wigginton at 185, 13 5 P. 3 d at 541. To
withstand a motion to suppress, the state must overcome the presumption that the warrantless
search was unconstitutional by showing either that the search was reasonable under the
circumstances or that a valid exception to the warrant requirement justified the search. State v.
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Weaver, 127 Idaho 288, 290, 900 P.2d 196, 198 (1995).

II. A court may suppress any involuntary statements a defendant makes during a custodial
interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966); U.S. Const. Am. V. The defendant
has the burden of showing he was in custody at the time he made the statements. State v. James,
148 Idaho 574, 577, 225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010).
III. A defendant's right to due process in a criminal proceeding includes an opportunity to
defend against the state's accusations. State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 183-184, 911 P.2d 774, 776777 (Ct. App. 1995); U.S. Const. Am. VI. The court may suppress any evidence where the
defendant was denied a fair opportunity to defend himself. Id. at 183, 911 P.3d at 776.
ARGUMENT

I.

The detention of Mr. Stegall was lawful because Cpl. Cushman (A) made
contact with him pursuant to his community caretaking function and (B)
detained him based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

A detention is a seizure of limited invasiveness and duration. State v. Godwin, 122 Idaho
491,493, 826 P.2d 452, 454 (1991) As such, detentions are lawful as long as they follow the
same constitutional protections of individual privacy rights as full-scale seizures. Id.; Id. Const.
Art. I, § 17. To pass constitutional muster, a detention must be narrowly tailored to its underlying
purpose. State v. Gomez 144 Idaho 865, 869, 172 P.3d 1140, 1144 (Ct. App. 2007). A peace
officer may therefore detain an individual only in certain circumstances. State v. Maddox, 13 7
Idaho 821, 824, 54 P.3d 464, 467 (Ct. App. 2002).
Those circumstances frequently require the detaining officer to have a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Id. However, a detention is also lawful when conducted pursuant
to the officer's community caretaking function. Id. At times, it may also be permissible to
expand the scope and duration of a detention. Gomez at 869, 172 P.3d atl 144. This is the case
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when the detaining officer's "observations [and] general inquiries" give rise to a reasonable,
articulable suspicion of some other criminal activity. Id.
Cpl. Cushman did not detain Mr. Stegall merely by pulling up behind him without
activating his emergency lights. Even if Cpl. Cushman's initial contact with Mr. Stegall did
constitute a detention, it nevertheless fell within his community caretaking function. Moreover,
he expanded the detention based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

A.

Even if Cpl. Cushman's initial contact with Mr. Stegall constituted a
detention, it was a lawful exercise of his community caretaking function.

The community caretaking function imposes a duty on peace officers to help citizens in
need of assistance. State v. Mireles, 133 Idaho 690, 692, 991 P.2d 878, 880 (Ct. App. 1999).
Although it is a means of ensuring public safety, its purpose is entirely distinct from the pursuit
of crime. Maddox at 824, 54 P .3d 464 at 467. An officer invokes his caretaking function when he
has a "genuine and warranted concern" for a person's safety. State v. Cutler, 143 Idaho 297, 302,
141 P.3d 1166, 1171 (Ct. App. 2006). Moreover, that concern must be objectively reasonable.

Maddox at 824, 54 P.3d 464 at 467. The reasonableness of the officer's concern "is to be tested
on practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable persons act." Id. (citations
omitted). Assisting the injured and providing emergency services both fall under an officer's
community caretaking function. Cutler at 302, 141 P.3d at 1171.
When an officer believes the driver of a vehicle on the side of the road may be in need of
emergency assistance, he is allowed to pull up behind the vehicle and initiate contact with the
driver. Mireles at 693, 991 P.2d at 881. The activation of his emergency lights constitutes a
detention because it indicates that the driver is not free to leave. Nevertheless, such a detention is
a reasonable method of ensuring the safety of the driver and officer. Id. Moreover, absent some
show of authority indicating the driver is not free to go about his business, that contact is
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generally consensual and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. State v. Nickel, 134 Idaho
610, 612-613, 7 P.3d 219, 221-222 (2000); see also State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844, 103 P.3d
454, 457 (2004) (no seizure where, pursuant to community caretaking function, officer stopped
to ask pedestrian questions concerning his safety without activating overhead lights, and
pedestrian voluntarily complied with officer's request to check identification).
Cpl. Cushman was responding to a reported car accident when he first made contact with
Mr. Stegall. During a search of approximately fourteen miles of road, Mr. Stegall was the only
person-other than those driving on the highway-that ISP encountered. His vehicle appeared to
be disabled at the time and was almost protruding into the traffic lane. Since no other vehicles
appeared to have been involved in an accident, Cpl. Cushman reasonably decided to make sure
Mr. Stegall was not injured and did not otherwise need assistance. When he stopped his patrol
car, he neither blocked Mr. Stegall's path to the highway nor activated his emergency lights.
Such conduct does not rise to the level of a detention.
However, even if a detention did occur, it was proper under the community caretaking
function. Upon approaching the vehicle, Cpl. Cushman discovered Mr. Stegall slumped over in
the driver's seat. The report of the accident, the location of the vehicle on the shoulder in a
remote area of Interstate 90, and Mr. Stegall's physical condition made it reasonable for Cpl.
Cushman to inquire about Mr. Stegall's health and safety. Only after this lawful contact did Cpl.
Cushman notice the odor of alcohol, providing him with a reasonable suspicion on which to
detain or continue detaining Mr. Stegall.

B.

Cpl. Cushman lawfully initiated or expanded the detention of Mr. Stegall.

An officer may expand the scope and duration of a detention when his observations give
rise to a reasonable suspicion that the detainee is involved in criminal activity. Gomez at 869,
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172 P.3d at 1144. The reasonableness of his suspicion depends on an objective assessment of the
totality of the circumstances. State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 112, 294 P.3d 1121, 1124, (2013).
The Court of Appeals has held that the odor of alcoholic beverage on a suspect' s breath
combined with her slurred speech and admission to having consumed alcohol furnishes a
reasonable suspicion on which to initiate a detention. State v. Pick, 124 Idaho 601, 605, 861 P.2d
12 66, 1270 (Ct. App. 1993).
Once an officer has decided to detain an individual on such a reasonable suspicion, he has
several means available for carrying out the detention. State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 497,
198 P.3d 128, 135 (Ct. App. 2008). First, he is justified in making further inquiries. Id. He may
also request the suspect's driver's license and registration to check their status. State v. Howell,
159 Idaho 245, 248, 358 P.3d 806, 809 (Ct. App. 2017). Additionally, he may direct the driver to
exit the vehicle. State v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000). Ifhe
suspects the driver of DUI, he may also administer field sobriety tests, as these are often the least
intrusive means of dispelling or confirming his suspicion. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 483,
988 P.2d 700, 709 (Ct. App. 2009).
When Cpl. Cushman approached the Subaru, he detected the odor of alcoholic beverage
emanating from inside the vehicle. He also noticed that Mr. Stegall' s speech was extremely
slurred and his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. These were clear indicia of intoxication.
Furthermore, Mr. Stegall was the only person in the vehicle and was seated in the driver's seat.
In fact, every other seat in the car was covered in several inches of clothing and other items.
Based on these observations, Cpl. Cushman concluded that Mr. Stegall had been driving. Thus,
Cp. Cushman had a reasonable suspicion of DUI on which to detain Mr. Stegall. Finally, he
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acted lawfully by making further inquiries and directing Mr. Stegall to step outside the vehicle.
For these reasons, Mr. Stegall's detention occurred within constitutional bounds.
II.

Law enforcement did not violate Mr. Stegall's Fifth Amendment rights
before arresting him or after Mirandizing him because (A) Mr. Stegall was
not subject to a custodial interrogation prior to his arrest and (B) his postMiranda statements were not the result of coercion.

The Fifth Amendment guarantees the protection of criminal suspects against compulsory
self-incrimination. State v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 31,304 P. 3d 304,306 (Ct. App. 2013); U.S.
Const. Am. V. As a means of enforcing this guarantee, officers must inform the accused of their
right to counsel and to remain silent. Id.; see Miranda at 467-68. However, "[t]he requirement
for Miranda warnings is triggered by custodial interrogation." State v. Arenas, 161 Idaho 642,
645, 389 P.3d 187, 190 (Ct. App. 2016) (emphasis added). Those rights only exist in this limited
context. State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430,436,258 P.3d 850, 956 (Ct. App. 2011). It is true that
after his arrest but before being Mirandized, Mr. Stegall admitted to drinking before driving.
However, even if this statement implicated the Fifth Amendment, he made his pre-arrest and
post-Miranda statements voluntarily.

A.

Mr. Stegall was not subject to a custodial interrogation prior to his formal
arrest.

Miranda warnings are only required when one is subject to a custodial interrogation.
Arenas at 645-646, 389 P.3d at 190-191. A person is "in custody" whenever law enforcement
limits his freedom through a formal arrest or "to a degree associated with formal arrest." Id. at
646, 389 P.3d at 191. The question of whether an interrogation is custodial depends on "how a
reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood his or her situation." Id.
Factors affecting this perception include:
the degree ofrestraint on the person's freedom of movement (including whether the person
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is placed in handcuffs), whether the subject is informed that the detention is more than
temporary, the location and visibility of the interrogation, whether other individuals were
present, the number of questions asked, the duration of the interrogation or detention, the
time of the interrogation, the number of officers present, the number of officers involved
in the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, and the nature and manner of the
questioning.
Id. The Court of Appeals found that a suspect was "in custody" when four officers responded to

a traffic stop as opposed to one or two and remained during the subsequent investigation. State v.
Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 611, 798 P.2d 453, 456 (Ct. App. 1990); cf State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho

573, 634 P.2d 435 (no Miranda violation where surplus officers withdrew prior to questioning
and nature of questioning was general).
Even when a suspect is in custody, Miranda does not apply unless he is being
interrogated. Arenas at 646, 389 P.3d at 191. An interrogation is limited "to words or actions on
the part of police officers that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response." Id. (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980)).
Prior to his arrest, Mr. Stegall was not in handcuffs. The initial detention took place in a
highly public setting along an interstate highway. Exactly ten minutes passed between the point
at which Mr. Stegall stepped out of the vehicle and the time he was Mirandized. Moreover, the
officers' questioning was not coercive. Rather, it was focused on obtaining a general picture of
Mr. Stegall's situation, including the possibility of the existence of other passengers and the
reason the Subaru was on the shoulder.
The presence of the additional officer in this case did not create a custodial situation. At
the time Sgt. Klitch and Tpr. Heinle arrived, Mr. Stegall had just exited his vehicle. Moreover,
only Cpl. Cushman and Sgt. Klitch questioned Mr. Stegall while he waited on the guardrail.
During that time, Tpr. Heinle remained behind at his patrol car. One or more of the officers
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might have withdrawn had Mr. Stegall not grown violent shortly after moving to the guardrail.
Only after he began threatening the other officers, did Tpr. Heinle join the group. In fact, it took
the strength of all three men to handcuff Mr. Stegall. The number of officers present is
insufficient to make a reasonable person in Mr. Stegall's position think that he was in custody.
Thus, prior to his arrest, no custodial interrogation had taken place.

B.

The officers did not coerce Mr. Stegall's post-Miranda statements.

Miranda warnings are required to prevent the defendant from making involuntary
admissions under the coercive pressure of custodial interrogations. State v. Huffaker, 160 Idaho
400,404,374 P.3d 563, 567 (2016). However, the failure to administer a Miranda warning to an
in-custody suspect does not automatically invalidate any statements the suspect makes after
receiving the appropriate warning. State v. Wass, 162 Idaho 361, 364, 396 P.3d 1243, 1246
(2017). The U.S. Supreme Court refused to extend Miranda to such statements absent deliberate
coercion, holding that "the admissibility of any subsequent statement should tum in these
circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made." Id. (quoting Oregon v.

Elstadt, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985)).
Whether a suspect voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights depends on the totality
of the circumstances. State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 497, 660 P.2d 1336, 1340 (1983).
Following this analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that where an officer mistakenly
questions a suspect and elicits an incriminating statement, the immediate administration of a

Miranda warning will cure subsequent statements of the taint of illegality. Wass at 367, 396 P .3d
at 1249.
After his arrest, Mr. Stegall admitted to drinking prior to driving the Subaru. Tpr. Heinle
immediately Mirandized Mr. Stegall, who stated he understood his rights. None of the officers
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used any coercive tactics to elicit Mr. Stegall' s subsequent statements, nor is there any evidence
they intentionally withheld his Miranda warning as a tactic to elicit a confession. Mr. Stegall was
therefore in a position to make a voluntary and informed waiver of his rights. Accordingly, the
initial delay in administering his Miranda warning after his arrest did not taint the validity of his
subsequent statements.

III.

Denying Mr. Stegall access to a phone at the jail would not have violated his
right to due process since (A) he had no right to counsel prior to completing a
blood test and (B) he affirmatively rejected the offer to seek alternative
evidentiary testing.

Mr. Stegall insists that the state did not abide by due process when it denied him the use
of a phone to call his lawyer. The state has no direct knowledge of the veracity of this allegation.
However, assuming it is true, Mr. Stegall's argument fails on two independent grounds: (A) his
refusal to complete the first blood test and (B) his decision not to seek an alternative test.

A.

Mr. Stegall's right to counsel had not attached prior to completing a blood
test.

The right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment does not attach until the initiation of
formal judicial proceedings. State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 86, 952 P.2d 402, 408 (Ct. App.
1998); U.S. Const. Amend. VI. To invoke this right, the prosecution must have reached a
"critical stage." Id. at 86-87, 953 P.3d at 408-409 (citations omitted). Accordingly, an individual
who refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test during the investigatory stage of a criminal
proceeding does not have a right to counsel. Id.; see also State v. Shelton, 129 Idaho 877, 934
P.2d 943 (Ct. App. 1997) (holding that a defendant may not invoke the right to counsel
immediately upon completing a BAC test); State v. McNeely, 119 Idaho 182, 187, 804 P.2d 911,
916 (Ct. App. 1990) (noting that in Idaho, the driver of a motor vehicle impliedly gives advance
consent to submit to BAC testing).
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After his arrest, Mr. Stegall refused to submit to either a breath or blood sample, forcing
the officers to obtain a warrant to draw his blood. When the phlebotomist was only able to draw
a partial vial of blood, the officers asked Mr. Stegall to provide another sample. Mr. Stegall
refused the officers' request and instead demanded a lawyer. At that point, the officers were
justified in seeking an adequate sample. Until Mr. Stegall agreed to provide that sample, he had
no right to counsel.

B.

Mr. Stegall affirmatively rejected the offer to seek a second blood test.

The state must exercise "fundamental fairness" whenever it deprives a defendant in a
criminal prosecution of his right to life, liberty, or property. Carr at 183-184, 911 P.3d at 776777. This notion includes the right to a reasonable opportunity to collect exculpatory evidence in
order to defend against the state's accusations. Id. Thus, a person arrested under suspicion of
DUI has a right to seek additional tests to counter a state-administered blood alcohol test. Idaho
Code§ 18-8002(4)(f) (2019). However, any tests sought must be at his own expense. Id.
To adhere to due process, the state must permit the defendant to call his attorney. Carr at
184, 911 P.3d at 777. Because of the exigency created by blood-alcohol metabolism, a phone call
is often the sole means of arranging additional evidentiary testing. State v. Hedges, 143 Idaho
884, 887, 154 P.3d 1074, 1077 (Ct. App. 2007). Given this policy, a due process violation only
occurs when the state denies the defendant the means to obtain exculpatory evidence "upon [his]
request to arrange for an independent test." Id. at 887, 154 P.3d at 1077. In other words, "a
defendant must affirmatively assert his or her right to an independent test in order to trigger a
duty on the part of the police." Id. at 888, 154 P.3d a 1078. Moreover, that assertion must be
"clear and unambiguous." Id. Since it is the right to seek additional tests that the Constitution
guarantees, and not the right to actually obtain it, the state has no duty to administer requested
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testing. Id. at 888, 154 P.3d at 1078; State v. Rountree, 129 Idaho 146, 149, 922 P.2d 1072, 1075
(Ct. App. 1996).
The effect of denying the defendant a phone call following his affirmative rejection of an
offer to obtain secondary testing is an unsettled issue in Idaho case law. However, courts have
only found violations of the right to phone access when the defendant asked to obtain another
test. The exception to this rule is State v. Carr, an earlier case dealing with this issue. However,
later cases defined the exact parameters of this right. See Carr, supra (violation where defendant
neither asserted nor waived right, but asked to make phone call); but cf State v. Madden, 127
Idaho 894, 908 P.3d 587 (Ct. App. 1995) (violation where defendant asserted right to seek
additional test and asked to contact attorney); State v. Cantrell, 139 Idaho 409, 80 P.3d 345 (Ct.
App. 2003) (no violation where defendant neither asserted right nor requested phone call);

Hedges, supra (no violation where defendant did not make a clear, unambiguous assertion of
right); Rountree, supra (no violation where state refused to administer additional test). Thus, it is
clear that suppression of state-administered blood alcohol results is premised on the defendant's
request to arrange alternative testing.
Even if Mr. Stegall had a right to seek additional testing despite refusing to provide a full
vial of blood, he never made an affirmative statement triggering that right. In fact, he rejected the
offer to seek a different blood test. His request to contact his lawyer was therefore not a clear,
unambiguous invocation of his right. Regardless of whether and when he should have been able
to make a phone call, denying him that call did not interfere with his right to obtain
counterevidence, since that right never materialized.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Stegall has not made a case for the suppression of
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any evidence arising out of his detention and arrest. The state therefore requests that this Court
deny the Defendant's Motion to Suppress.
DATED this 1st day of October 2019.

Laura McClinton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, by and through his attorney, Benjamin M
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Reply.

I. Mr. Stegall's Statements to Law Enforcement
There are two relevant time periods for the Court to consider when looking at
Defendant's Motion to Suppress based upon violations of his Miranda, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendment rights. The first time period is after Mr. Stegall is placed in custody, but prior to
being advised of his Miranda rights. The second time period is after Mr. Stegall was advised of
his Miranda rights.
With regard to the first time period, it appears the State and Defendant are in agreement.
It appears both parties agree that Mr. Stegall was placed in custody at approximately 6:33 p.m.
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when officers told Mr. Stegall that he was under arrest and began putting handcuffs on him. It
also appears both parties agree that Mr. Stegall was not advised of his Miranda rights until
approximately 6:39 p.m. During this time, Mr. Stegall was interrogated by the officers. The
State has not disputed any of these facts, and it appears the State concedes that any statements
made by Mr. Stegall during this time period should be suppressed.
The second time period is after Mr. Stegall was advised of his Miranda rights. For the
first minute after being advised of his rights, Mr. Stegall talked to the officers. However, at
approximately 6:41 :20 p.m., Mr. Stegall told the officers "I'm done talking to you. I'll get a
lawyer .. .I'm done." This was clearly an invocation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights,
and should have signaled to the officers that it was time to stop questioning Mr. Stegall. But the
officers did not stop. They continued to question Mr. Stegall, and Mr. Stegall answered their
questions. This was a violation of his rights, and warrants suppression of all statements made to
the officers after he invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
"[O]nce a defendant in custody asks to speak with a lawyer, all interrogation must cease
until a lawyer is present." Rhode lslandv. Innis, 446 U.S. 291,293 (1980) (citing Miranda, 384
U.S. at 474). "[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial
interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he
responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his
rights." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,484 (1981).
In this case, Defendant maintains that his rights were violated when officers continued to
interrogate him after he had invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. The State
has not directly addressed this argument in its Brief, but instead cites the Court to the Wass case,
where a defendant's statements were held to be voluntary.
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distinguishable from Mr. Stegall's case because the defendant in Wass actually waived his right
to remain silent and right to counsel after being informed of those rights. In this case, Mr.
Stegall exercised his rights.

Thus, this case is much more in line with Edwards, where a

defendant exercised his right to counsel, but was questioned by police afterwards.
Because Mr. Stegall was interrogated by police after exercising his right to remain silent
and his right to counsel, this Court should suppress all statements by Mr. Stegall after he invoked
his rights.
II. Due Process

The State argues that suppression is not warranted in this case because Mr. Stegall did not
affirmatively request an independent test, and because Mr. Stegall declined the officers' request
to go to the hospital for another blood draw.
At the outset, it is important to remember that there is both a statutory right to
independent testing, as well as a Due Process right to contact an attorney to gather exculpatory
evidence. State v. Hedges, 143 Idaho 884, 886, 154 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Ct. App. 2007) ("The right
of a defendant charged with an alcohol-related driving offense to obtain additional testing is
derived from both statutory and constitutional sources.")
In this case, Mr. Stegall asks for suppression because of a violation of his Due Process
rights when he was denied access to a phone to call an attorney. This fact indicates this case is
governed by Carr, not Hedges. In Carr, our Court found a Due Process violation when the
defendant asked to call her attorney but was denied access to a phone for several hours. The
Court did not care that the defendant did not request an independent test, it was the denial of
access to a phone that mattered. In Hedges, the Court found no violation of the defendant's
statutory rights, because he did not make a request to set up an independent test. The Hedges
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Court did not deal with the situation presented in this case, that being a defendant's denial of
access to a phone when one is requested.
The State's additional argument that suppression is inappropriate because Mr. Stegall
declined the officers' request that he go to the hospital for another blood draw lacks any support
from case law. It also defies logic to argue that if a defendant does not agree to submit to a test
requested by the State in order for them to gain inculpatory evidence against him, he thereby
waives his own right to obtain testing to gather exculpatory evidence. Mr. Stegall, and any
criminal defendant, has a Due Process right to have his attorney conduct an independent
investigation and conduct independent testing in a case. Aside from select statutes that deal
explicitly with the issue, Defendant is unaware of any law or case holding that a defendant
somehow waives or loses his right to conduct independent testing by refusing to submit to the
State's request for testing. See e.g., Idaho Code§ 18-207(4) (prohibiting introduction of expert
testimony on defendant's mental state unless the State is afforded an equal opportunity to
examine defendant).
Because Mr. Stegall's Due Process rights were violated when he was denied access to a
phone to call an attorney, Defendant requests the Court suppress the results of any blood tests in
this case.
DATED this

2-

day of October, 2019.

ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:

~ · ~ .

BEN.JAMIN M ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the

"J:

day of October, 2019, addressed

to:
Kootenai County Prosecutor
Via Fax (208) 446-2168
Interoffice Mail
Via iCourt kcpaicourts@kcgov.us

i
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Description CR28-19-10375 Stegall, Jeffrey Dwayne 20191018 Motion to Suppress
Judge Meyer
Clerk Denice Larsen
Court Reporter Diane Bolan
Date 10/18/2019

Location lKCRTl0

I

I

Time

I Speaker

Note

08:59:34
AM
I
09:03:09
AM

Judge
Meyer

09:04:48
AM
I
09:05:03
AM
I

Judge
Meyer

09:05:05
AM
I
09:08:00
AM

Jonathan
Cushman

I am employed with the ISP as a state trooper. I am POST certified.
Describes DUI training. Describes duties.

Jonathan
Cushman

06/19/19 I was on duty. I was running code to the report of a crash in
the area of Cataldo in 1-90. I believe they reported a possible roll over
crash. I was the third trooper, I saw a red I think 2000 Subaru stopped
on the right hand side of the road around the crash. This was in
Kootenai County. Sgt. Klitch asked me to stop. My lights were
activated. I couldn't see anyone inside the vehicle and I couldn't see
the front end of the vehicle.

Jonathan
Cushman

The vehicle was in the area of the crash and the left tire was on the
fog line. It was daylight, 6:20, summer time still light out. I got out of
my car and approached the passenger side of the vehicle.

Jonathan
Cushman

I observed Mr. Stegall seated in the driver's seat. He was passed out,
slumped in the seat. Mr. Stegall is in the courtroom seated next to
counsel. He was slumped like he was sleeping, his body just kind of
leaning forward. He was asleep or passed out, I wasn't sure.

Jonathan
Cushman

I had concern about his well being and a hazard to the public. I was
on the passenger side, I knocked on the front window which woke
Mr. Stegall. I did not have my weapon drawn. I leaned toward the

~
M

09:11:18
AM

~
M

Calls case. Def present in custody. Ben Onosko for def. Laura
McClinton for state.

In the brief I indicated I didn't believe Corporal Cushman's
emergency lights were activated. However, after I was speaking to
him, he indicated they were on. I would concede there was a
Laura
detention. We have a stipulation to PL 1, 2, 3. We are stipulating to
McClinton
admitting those three videos. Ask the court to review them after we
concluded the motion to suppress. Both sides may introduce a portion
of the videos, but not their entirety.
PL 1, 2, 3 are admitted.

Laura
Call Jonathan Cushman
McClinton
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I

09:13:57
AM

I

back partially open window and asked if he was alright. He said he
was fine.

Jonathan
Cushman

When he first woke up and looked back, his speech was extremely
slurred. I could smell the strong odor of alcohol. His eyes were
extremely glassy and bloodshot. He was the only person in the
vehicle. I had concerns he may be impaired. I asked him if we could
open the front door. It was locked. It took him about 80 seconds to
figure out which buttons to push. He kept trying to reach for keys that
were not in the ignition

Jonathan
Cushman

Once the door was open I could see and hear him more clearly. He
indicated the vehicle had stalled out, something about a timing belt. I
asked if he had been traveling alone and he indicated he had. He said
nobody else was with him, reaffirming he would be the driver. I
smelled the odor of alcohol.

Jonathan
Cushman

He indicated he was coming from Portland, OR. He made some
indication that his brother was with him, but then went on to state he
lost his brother not long ago. Then he indicated there were two other
people with him that walked off. He did not specifically ever deny not
driving to me. I didn't see anyone walking off from the vehicle.

Jonathan
Cushman

When I traveled eastbound on I-90 I did not see his vehicle on the
side of the road. I would have seen it.

Jonathan
Cushman

I asked him for ID, he produced a Montana ID card which is when I
identified who he was. He indicated all he had was an ID. I made a
comment that he shouldn't be driving. He made a comment that he
wasn't driving. We had a little back and forth about that. He
eventually admitted he was by himself traveling. At this point I
moved toward having him exit the vehicle.

09:21:32
AM
I
09:22:07
AM
I

Jonathan
Cushman

The vehicle wasn't on and no keys were in the ignition. He indicated
he was there approximately 20 minutes.

Jonathan
Cushman

Re PL 4, 5, 6--photos I took on scene of the inside of the vehicle.

09:22:23
AM
I
09:22:29
AM
I

Laura
Move to admit PL 4, 5, 6
McClinton
Ben
Onosko

No objection

09:22:31
AM
I
09:22:40
AM

Judge
Meyer

PL 4, 5, 6 are admitted.

Jonathan
Cushman

Re PL 4--describes photo. Re PL 5--describes photo. Re PL 6-describes photo. I asked him out of the vehicle to investigate a
possible DUI. While on scene Sgt. Klitch asked if I needed another
unit and I said yes. Sgt. Klitch walked up behind me right as I asked

09:15:54
AM

09:17:13
AM

09:18:46
AM
I
09:20:01
AM
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I

I
09:25:21
AM

Mr. Stegall out of the vehicle.

Jonathan
Cushman

I was not able to complete FST's. Eventually he made it to the back of
the vehicle. I sat him on the guard rail. I went to do a driver's check.
He returned with a felony warrant out of Idaho. During that
conversation, I observed Mr. Stegall stand up and take an aggressive
stance. We sat him back down and Sgt. had further conversation. But
he was further agitated and we felt for safety it would not be the best
place for the FST's

Jonathan
Cushman

His balance was clearly an issue, he stumbled in the slow lane of the
interstate. Sgt. Klitch had to grab him. I could smell the odor of
alcohol on his person. It was very strong.

Jonathan
Cushman

He was placed inside Trooper Heinle's vehicle. I simply waited on
scene. I did inventory search of the vehicle, that was about the time I
took those photographs. There were four closed cans of beer in the
back of the vehicle.

Ben
Onosko

Cross

Jonathan
Cushman

I was running code to a roll over crash. I was the third vehicle. The
two in front of me had their lights on. I probably saw other vehicles
that were pulled over and not all the way off the road.

Jonathan
Cushman

I stopped to see if Mr. Stegall was involved in the crash. It was
reported as a roll over crash. If I recall the correct verbiage, after I got
his ID and I made the comment that he shouldn't be driving, he made
the comment I ain't driving.

M

Jonathan
Cushman

He said something along the lines, he admitted again that he was in
fact traveling alone which is an indication he would be the driver. I
would have to watch the video to see what his exact words were.

M

Jonathan
Cushman

His speech was slurred. There were other vehicles passing along the
highway. I did not mis hear what he said. I did not observe the blood
draw.

09:35:40
AM
I
09:39:19
AM
I

Jonathan
Cushman

At some point I spoke with Det. Heinle. By the time he exited the
vehicle I believed he was extremely intoxicated.

09:39:22
AM
I
09:39:26
AM
I

Judge
Meyer

Sustained

Jonathan
Cushman

I don't know if the items on the passenger seat were there when the
car was traveling.

09:40:10
AM
I

Laura
Re direct
McClinton

~
M

09:28:15
AM

09:29:43
AM
I

~
M

09:31:14
AM

~
~

Laura
Objection, speculation
McClinton
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09:40:13
AM

Jonathan
Cushman

It was extremely slurred speech. That is an indicator of alcohol
consumption. His glassy, blood shot eyes were a possible indicator of
alcohol consumption. I was on scene with Mr. Stegall's vehicle
probably in the neighborhood of an hour. I did not see anyone
approach Mr. Stegall's vehicle and indicate they were a passenger.

09:41 :45
AM
I
09:42:57
AM
I

Jonathan
Cushman

I believed he was heavily under the influence of alcohol and part of
that impairment is inability to focus, split attention, things like that.

09:48:22
AM
I
09:50:05
AM
I

Jonathan
Cushman

He said I am driving by myself. I could clearly hear it on the side of
the road and I responded to it.

Ben
Onosko

Re cross

Jonathan
Cushman

I can hear Mr. Stegall say I am driving by myself on the video. I don't
remember a conversation where I said Mr. Stegall was beyond
hammered.

09:51:35
AM

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 1. Time: 6:47

09:52:09
AM

Jonathan
Cushman

Trooper Heinle said that and I agreed.

09:53:45
AM

Jonathan
Cushman

I did not fully inventory the vehicle.

09:54: 14
AM

Laura
Re direct
McClinton

09:54:18
AM

Jonathan
Cushman

I believe his wallet was in their and he had a pill bottle in there.

09:54:46
AM

Judge
Meyer

Witness excused.

09:54:53
AM

Laura
Call Matthew Heinle.
McClinton

09:55:40
AM

Matthew
Heinle

I am employed with the ISP as a trooper in District 1. I am POST
certified. Describes DUI training.

~

Matthew
Heinle

06/21/19 I was on duty driving in a marked patrol vehicle. It was a
call to respond to a crash at Milepost 35. I was with Corporal
Cushman and Sgt. Klitch.

Matthew
Heinle

It was around Milepost 35 or 36 ish. It was stopped on the side of the
road and as I drove by it there was a single occupant in the vehicle. I
drove past it to see if there was any evidence of a crash. This one
didn't appear to be in a crash. It appeared to be very close to the road.

~
M

M

09:58:06
AM

Laura
Plays PL 1.
McClinton
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I

I
Matthew
Heinle

I did not see Corporal Cushman stop out with the vehicle initially. I
responded back to it about five minutes later. It appeared they were
trying to have Mr. Stegall exit the vehicle. Sgt. Klitch and Corporal
Cushman. I saw Mr. Stegall exited the vehicle. He was walking
backwards, almost like he was under arrest already. He was very
uncoordinated and almost fell into the lane of travel.

Matthew
Heinle

The driver was assisted out of the lane of travel by Sgt. Klitch. The
driver is at the defense table in the orange jumpsuit. When he stepped
out he was put on the guard rail to sit down. I started looking through
the vehicle's windows. I noticed a lot of items, looked like hastily
packed luggage. A lot of random items.

Matthew
Heinle

I did not see any other occupants in the vehicle or around the vehicle.
He was placed under arrest for having a felony warrant out of Idaho
Falls. I placed him in handcuffs. It required Sgt. Klitch to secure his
left arm and Corporal Cushman had to hold his right. He was pulling
his arms away. We were giving him commands what to do with his
arms. He was not compliant at first.

Matthew
Heinle

Then he became cooperative. I placed him in my vehicle. He did a lot
of ranting and said a lot of things that wasn't related to a warrant. I
asked him when he last consumed alcohol prior to advising him of his
Miranda warnings.

Matthew
Heinle

I prepared him for a breath test. I transported him to the jail. He
continued talking to me. There were multiple times when he said
something about wanting a lawyer. He continued to talk to me. He
made unsolicited statements to me.

Matthew
Heinle

I pulled into the Sally port and let them know he was uncooperative.
His mood would fluctuate. We asked again if he would comply with
an evidentiary sample and he said no. I wanted to administer a breath
test and he declined. He was very erratic with his behavior and to do
FST's he would have to be out of his cuffs and we didn't want to fight
with him.

Matthew
Heinle

Trooper Ercanbrack arrived to do a blood draw. Mr. Stegall was
brought to our area. I was present while Trooper Ercanbrack
attempted to do a blood draw. There were times when it appeared he
would initially try to fight it, but we were able to de-escalate it and
keep him as calm as we could. He did not indicate he wanted a phone
call.

Matthew
Heinle

Trooper Ercanbrack was only able to fill part of one vile of blood. We
try to grab two so one can be used for our test and another to be for an
independent test if they want. Initially we suggested the hospital be
used for the blood draw. Mr. Stegall said he would go down fighting.

09:59:36
AM

10:01:22
AM

10:02:39
AM

10:04:19
AM

10:05:11
AM

10:07:31
AM

10:09:16
AM

10:11:30
AM

It is what we consider a traffic hazard. Corporal Cushman stopped.
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Ben
Onosko

Cross

I

10:13:18
AM

I

10:13:20
AM

Matthew
Heinle

I had a conversation with Corporal Cushman about taking over a DUI
investigation.

Matthew
Heinle

I was asking him administrative type questions before he was
Mirandized. There was no evidence at the scene of open containers.
After about a minute he told me he was done talking to me. He said
he would get a lawyer. That signals to me to stop asking questions. I
continued to engage in conversation, making me think he wanted to
talk.

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 2.

Matthew
Heinle

I asked if he knew where he was due to his belligerence. Based on my
experience with anybody in custody when they say they are done,
they stop talking. So by his continued talking it made me think he had
more to say.

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 2.

Matthew
Heinle

I asked if he was heading to Oregon. He answered the question
before, to me that was administrative in nature if he even knew where
he was. It is my way of seeing his faculties. Does he know where he
is at, who does the car belong to, they are questions I would ask
anyone. To get his vehicle towed I didn't have to know ifhe knew
where he was or where he was planning on going.

10:23:54
AM

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 2.

~

Matthew
Heinle

I heard the statement why don't you go figure out what he said. I had
reason to believe he was DUI. By asking what he said, he meant
Corporal Cushman.

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 2.

I

10:26:39
AM

I

10:26:55
AM

Matthew
Heinle

I said want me to keep the window open so you can talk to him.
Should he want to talk.

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 2.

I

10:27:23
AM

Matthew
Heinle

He said leave me the fuck alone. Before that he kicked the partition
and yelled for us so we thought he wanted to recontact us. I did say he
was impaired. Mr. Stegall was very belligerent and intoxicated. As far
as coordination, slurred speech, flushed face. His memory seemed
fine as to where he was and where he was going. I didn't seen any

10:14:54
AM

I

10:17:59
AM
10:20:22
AM

I

10:21:54
AM
10:22:14
AM

I

M

10:28:00
AM
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I

I

indicators of memory impairment.

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 2.

I

10:30:05
AM

Matthew
Heinle

I made the comment that I would go and try to talk to him.

I

10:31:05
AM

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 2.

I

10:31:17
AM

~

Matthew
Heinle

Officer Klitch said he didn't know where he was drinking. I said I
could try to ask him. I said I can talk to him about where and how
long ago.

10:33:47
AM

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 2.

10:35:31
AM

Matthew
Heinle

Mr. Stegall indicated he wanted a lawyer.

10:36:14
AM

Ben
Onosko

Plays PL 2.

10:37:43
AM

Matthew
Heinle

He said I want my lawyer, that's all I want. After ALS I asked more
questions.

10:38:05
AM

Judge
Meyer

Recess.

10:38:15
AM

Judge
Meyer

Back on the record.

10:47:51
AM

Ben
Onosko

Continues cross.

~

Matthew
Heinle

I drove Mr. Stegall to the jail and he was placed in a holding cell. I
don't know if there was a phone in the cell. During the blood draw he
said he wanted a lawyer. He never asked me to use a phone.

M

M

I

10:49:18
AM

10:49:23
AM
I
10:49:26
AM

~
M

Laura
Objection, speculation
McClinton
Judge
Meyer

Overruled.

Matthew
Heinle

The most common way of contacting a lawyer would be by phone. Re
DF A--1 recognize the top two sheets, I have never seen the other.
The top sheet is the analysis report of his blood draw. We don't get
the other portions of the blood draw report.

Matthew
Heinle

I did not do anything to facilitate his access to a phone in the jail. I
wasn't by all the jail staff that had contact with him. I never saw
anyone provide Mr. Stegall access to a phone.
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I

10:53:45
AM
10:53:50
AM

Laura
Redirect
McClinton
Matthew
Heinle

When he said I'll get a lawyer, I mean that to be he will get a lawyer
in the future. He never stopped talking, he continued to re-engage to
me and others. There are times that he was talking in the back of the
vehicle when we were not in the vehicle.

10:55:30
AM

Matthew
Heinle

He was shouting and sounded like he was kicking the partition.

10:56:09
AM

Ben
Onosko

Re cross

10:56: 11
AM

Matthew
Heinle

I don't remember if he said the handcuffs were hurting.

10:57:09
AM

Judge
Meyer

Witness excused.

10:57:13
AM

Laura
Call Sgt. Justin Klitch.
McClinton

10:57:21
AM

F

~
M

Justin
Klitch

I am a patrol sergeant with ISP. I am POST certified, I hold a
supervisor certificate. Describes duties. Describes motorist assists .
We are trained and required to stop and check on motorists.

Justin
Klitch

06/21/19 we were in Shoshone County on patrol. We received a
reported collision on Milepost 35 in Kootenai County, ID. Trooper
Cushman and Heinle were with me. It was light, the sun was out and
the weather was clear. I had been in the area before that day, no
longer than 50 minutes. I had driven past Milepost 35 going the other
direction. I didn't see any vehicles on the side of the road at that time.

Justin
Klitch

I observed a maroon Subaru on the right shoulder that was close if not
on the fog line. I passed the vehicle. I told Trooper Cushman to stop
and check on the vehicle. It was in the same location or close to the
crash.

Justin
Klitch

Trooper Cushman requested assistance and I responded back to that
location. I observed Trooper Cushman at the front passenger door of
the Subaru and at that point he was asking the driver to exit the
vehicle. Trooper Matt Hienle was pulling up at the same time as me.

Justin
Klitch

Mr. Stegall had poor balanced and staggered into 1-90, I grabbed him
out of the lane of travel. Corporal Cushman had returned to his
vehicle to perform a driver's check. Mr. Stegall is seated at the
defendant table wearing a orange jumpsuit and a goatee. I had
concerns about a possible DUI. He had poor balance, mood swings,

11:00:01
AM

11:01:36
AM

11 :02:53
AM

11 :03:48
AM

Swears witness.
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I

I
11 :05:26
AM

11:07:22
AM

11 :08:27
AM

Justin
Klitch

We attempted to detain him for a warrant. He was uncooperative and
resistant when we were placing him in handcuffs. He was placed in
the back seat of Trooper Heinle's patrol vehicle. I approached and
spoke to Mr. Stegall. I believe my question was in regards to him
driving the vehicle which he adamantly denied. He became angry
again and said something to the effect that he didn't want to talk
anymore and he would get an atty.

Justin
Klitch

At one point I thought he was going to fight me on the side of the
road. His demeanor throughout the contact, at one point he was
kicking in the car. He was searched for weapons and contraband and
placed into a temporary holding cell at the jail.

Justin
Klitch

He refused to provide a breath sample. We obtained a warrant for a
blood draw. Trooper Ercanbrack attempted to take blood. We took
two videos of the blood draw. He never indicated he wanted a phone
call or his own evidentiary sample.

Justin
Klitch

During the blood draw he was seated in a chair, his mood swings
continued, sometimes cooperative and sometimes he wasn't, both
verbally and physically. Trooper Ercanbrack was able to take a small
amount of blood. He attempted to take two samples. He was
unsuccessful at taking two. We take two samples, one for the state,
one for the defendant. We suggested taking him to the hospital for the
blood draw, he was very verbal at not wanting to do that.

Justin
Klitch

Due to his behavior and the risk of physical altercation I determined
the risk to the public and medical staff was too great to take him to
the hospital. Trooper Ercanbrack was fairly nervous based on the
defendant's stance and the way he was talking.

Justin
Klitch

Mr. Stegall was adamant he was not giving anymore blood. He did
not tell us he wanted to do a breath test or give blood at another
location. He did not indicate that he wanted to make a phone call that
I recall.

Ben
Onosko

Cross

Justin
Klitch

We took two videos of the blood draw at the jail. There is a gap
between the two videos. The court will not have the full encounter.
Our standard practice now is to send troopers to be trained as a
phlebotomist. It saves on costs.

11 :09:38
AM

11:11:38
AM

11:13:19
AM

I

11:14:09
AM
11:14:11
AM

glassy blood shot eyes, flushed face, slurred speech.

I

11:15:36
AM

Laura
Objection, speculation
McClinton

I

11:15:45
AM

Judge
Meyer

Sustained, lack of foundation.
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11:16:24
AM

Justin
Klitch

He may have said something like you are not getting any more blood
without my lawyer. We did not facilitate getting in touch with his atty
and going to the hospital. I am not sure if there is a phone in the
holding cell.

I

11: 18:07
AM

Laura
Redirect
McClinton
Justin
Klitch

Trooper Ercanbrack is a trained phlebotomist.

I

11:18:11
AM

Ben
Onosko

Re cross

I

11:18:28
AM

Justin
Klitch

I am not sure when he was certified, it was fairly recent though. I do
not know how many blood draw he has done or how many hours of
training he has.

Judge
Meyer

Witness excused.

I

11:19:06
AM

I

11:19:09
AM

Laura
State rests.
McClinton
Ben
Onosko

Call Mr. Stegall

I

11:19:12
AM

F

Swears witness

I

11:19:16
AM

~
M

11:19:38
AM

11:21:21
AM

~
Def

I

11:23:08
AM
11:23:10
AM

I

11 :24:34
AM

I recall being taken to the jail on 06/21/19. When I first got to the jail
they put me in I think a rubber room. There was no phones, no
nothing. I was in there until my blood draw. I said I wanted a lawyer.
I recall getting my blood drawn.
After I was taken to another room off the entrance where we came
into the jail. There was numerous people in there. I sat in a chair and
looked at paperwork. There were no phones in there. I asked to use a
phone. I was not given access to a phone. The following morning was
the first time I was given access to a phone. I was classified into a pod
the next morning and there was a phone in there. I believe it was right
before breakfast, so about 5am.

Laura
Cross
McClinton

~
Ben
Onosko

I was placed in a safety cell in the jail when I first arrived. I have no
reason to be in that cell. I have been in jail before. I know why people
get placed in a safety jail. When they are not cooperative with law
enforcement. I wasn't uncooperative when I was in there.
Objection, outside scope.
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I

11 :24:43
AM

Laura
He opened the door when he made that comment
McClinton

I

11 :24:50
AM

Judge
Meyer

~~
~~

Sustained.

Def

I remained in that cell until the blood draw. I knew they wanted to
draw blood. I refused the breath test. I didn't want FST's without a
lawyer. I was advised there was a warrant for a blood test.

Def

I told them where to try to get blood from me. The trooper had a
difficult time. I recommended trying my hand. I don't recall him
trying my hand.

Ben
Onosko

Objection, lack of foundation

I

11 :26:37
AM

Judge
Meyer

Sustained

I

11:26:44
AM

I

11 :26:47
AM

I

11:27:15
AM

~

I have had blood drawn many times before. My vein moves, so I say
go for the hand.

I

11:27:19
AM

Ben
Onosko

Objection, hearsay

Judge
Meyer

Overruled

Def

I would suspect it is easier when you are hydrated to draw blood. I
may have been dehydrated, there was no water available for hours. I
wasn't aware the blood draw was being videoed. I didn't ask for the
phone during the blood draw. I requested a lawyer I don't know how
many times. I did have one available, John Redal. I was going to get a
hold of him but I had no way.

Def

I didn't say I wanted my own independent testing because they had a
warrant and I thought that was it. I objected to going to the hospital. I
don't recall standing up from my seat. There were enough cops in the
room to take me down. I didn't want to go anywhere else after he
stabbed me in the arm four times. He had the chance to do it and he
didn't do it. I didn't want to take a breath test. I never heard them ask
at that time in the room.

Def

I never asked them to take a breath test after they suggested going to
the hospital. I told the booking officer I wanted a phone call before
the blood draw. I repeated it through the door that I wanted to call my
lawyer and it was never answered. I asked for a phone call after the
blood draw. I didn't ask the troopers for a phone call.

~

Every time I have been in jail if you ask for a lawyer you get a phone
call. I have been asked to give a breath or blood sample before.

11 :27:22
AM

11:30:10
AM

11:31:55
AM

I

11:33:43
AM
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I

11 :34:53
AM

Ben
Onosko

Re direct.

Def

I have heard that it is difficult to draw blood if you are dehydrated.
Trooper Ercanbrack never offered me any water. It was painful, he
was digging around in my arm. I stayed still as much as I could. He
had every opportunity to get what he could out of me, I wasn't
fighting. Blood squirted out of my arm, it was all over the place. He
was totally inexperienced in drawing blood.

Judge
Meyer

Witness excused.

Ben
Onosko

Move to admit DF A

11 :34:56
AM

11:36:18
AM
I
11 :36:43
AM
I
I

11 :36:48
AM

~

Laura
Object, lack of foundation. Re Rule 5.1.
McClinton
Ben
Onosko

It is just to show that the blood taken has been used up at this point.
The sample was consumed in analysis. There is no blood left for him
to even retest.

Judge
Meyer

Sustain the objection and not admit it.

I

11 :38:03
AM

Judge
Meyer

I want a listing of the statements you want suppressed.

I

11 :38:53
AM

~

Ben
Onosko

Everything after he revoked his Miranda would be inadmissible. It
would be easier for the state to indicate what statements they intend to
bring up in trial and I can state why they should be suppressed.

I

11:40:04
AM

Judge
Meyer

I just want to know what you want suppressed. This is your motion
and I want you to do it. I need to know what you want and why.

I

11:41:03
AM

Ben
Onosko

Any statement used by the state at trial is incriminating. I will have to
go through all these and express why. I will do that.

~

Ben
Onosko

Re seizure of Mr. Stegall. The trooper has testified his lights were on.
Re state vs Wixom. There was no indication that Mr. Stegall's vehicle
was involved in an accident.

Ben
Onosko

Re Miranda. Once he was placed in custody the Miranda rights
kicked in. Heinle asked him questions prior to giving Miranda rights.
Ask to suppress all the statements. Re Rhode Island vs Inness. It
doesn't require an express question.

11 :49:05
AM

Ben
Onosko

Reviews statements prior to Miranda. I object to all before being read
his Miranda rights.

11:51:06
AM

Ben
Onosko

Reviews statements made after Miranda rights given. Mr. Stegall
invoked to the officers his right to remain silent. The statement that

M

M

M

11 :44:01
AM

I

I
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I

Ben
Onosko

Reviews questions and statements after Miranda given.

Judge
Meyer

I am going to ask the parties to do the rest of your argument in
briefing. Mr. Onosko let us know when you will have your briefing
in. I can get simultaneous argument. Briefing due two weeks from
today.

Judge
Meyer

I think I need to vacate the trial.

I

12:07:14
PM

Ben
Onosko

Mr. Stegall is going to continue to assert his right to a speedy trial.

I

12:07:33
PM

Judge
Meyer

I will continue the trial. PTC 11/21/19 at 2:30. JT 12/02/19 at 9am.

I

12:08: 10
PM

I

12: 10:03
PM

~

I

11 :54:24
AM

I

he will get a lawyer invokes his right to counsel. The officers have a
duty to clear up confusion about getting a lawyer.

12:04:08
PM
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR28-19-10375

vs.

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,

STATE'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS
CLOSING ARGUMENT

Defendant.
COMES NOW, LAURA MCCLINTON, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai
County, Idaho, and hereby files its closing argument following the evidence presented at the
Motion to Suppress (hereinafter "MTS") on October 18, 2019 based on its recollection of the
testimony presented. Additionally, the State relies upon its response brief and the citations it
contains therein in support of its closing argument.

I.

The detention of Mr. Stegall was lawful pursuant to law enforcement's
community caretaking role.

The State concedes Mr. Stegall was detained when Corporal Cushman pulled in behind
the Defendant's vehicle with lights activated. However, the detention was lawful in light of
Corporal Cushman's community caretaking role that both he and Sergeant Klitch testified to in
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some detail at the MTS hearing. Sgt. Klitch testified that troopers have a duty to stop out with
disabled vehicles on the side of the road to ensure the safety of not only any occupants within the
vehicle, but also the general motoring public. In this case, it was particularly important that Cpl.
Cushman stopped out with Mr. Stegall’s vehicle, as it was partially parked on the fog line and
posed a traffic hazard to other vehicles traveling in that lane of travel.
Cpl. Cushman and Sgt. Klitch were also looking for a vehicle in that same area that may
have been involved in a roll-over crash. Given the location Mr. Stegall’s vehicle was parked, it
was also necessary that they make contact with the vehicle to ensure any occupants were okay
and did not need assistance. Defense counsel will likely argue that it was obvious Mr. Stegall’s
vehicle was not involved in a roll-over crash based on its appearance, but given the inherent
inaccuracies in information reported to dispatch and then subsequently relayed to law
enforcement, coupled with the fact that no other vehicles had been located in the vicinity the
crash was reported, it was still reasonable for law enforcement to ensure the safety of any
occupants within the vehicle as it may have been involved in some kind of accident. The law
enforcement officers were not merely stopping out with Mr. Stegall’s vehicle to ask questions
about an accident, but to make sure the driver and/or occupants were okay and not in need of
medical care.
A.

The detention of Mr. Stegall was lawfully extended based on reasonable
suspicion that he had committed the crime of driving under the influence.

As Cpl. Cushman approached the vehicle, he observed Mr. Stegall, alone, and slumped
over in the driver’s seat. At this point, Cpl. Cushman had a continuing duty to ensure Mr. Stegall
was okay to drive and was not in need of any medical assistance. Cpl. Cushman asked Mr.
STATE’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS CLOSING ARGUMENT
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Stegall to open the door to speak with him which took Mr. Stegall a significant time to
accomplish. Once the door was open, Cpl. Cushman could smell a strong odor of alcohol coming
from the vehicle and observed Mr. Stegall to have glassy, bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, all
of which he testified were indicators of alcohol impairment based on his training and experience.
Mr. Stegall initially indicated his vehicle had stalled out and he had been at the present location
for approximately 20 minutes. He stated he was alone and the driver. Mr. Stegall then changed
his story and stated he had not driven but the other passengers had left to get help. Although there
were no keys in the ignition, Cpt. Cushman had reasonable suspicion that Mr. Stegall was
impaired and had been driving the vehicle. Cpl. Cushman, Sgt. Klitch and Trooper Heinle all
testified they had driven through that same area within forty-five minutes to an hour of contacting
Mr. Stegall and had not observed his vehicle on the side of the road. Based on the observations of
Cpl. Cushman and the short time-frame in which Mr. Stegall could have arrived at the location,
there was reasonable suspicion for his continued detention to conduct a DUI investigation.
II.

Most of the statements made by Mr. Stegall to law enforcement are not
subject to suppression.

The testimony of Trooper Heinle as well as the in-car video footage shows that Mr.
Stegall was placed in the back seat of his patrol vehicle in handcuffs after being placed under
arrest for an outstanding warrant. The State acknowledges there were questions asked of Mr.
Stegall in the back-seat of the patrol vehicle prior to the administration of his Miranda rights,
which occurred at approximately 6:39 PM. However, the State only concedes that one of the
questions was likely to elicit an incriminating response- a question about doing all his drinking
prior to driving—it is clear that question was designed to elicit an incriminating response, to
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show that Mr. Stegall drank and then drove. Mr. Stegall’s affirmative response is suppressible.
However, the other questions posed of Mr. Stegall—where are you going, did you drink anything
after getting to this location, etc., are not designed to elicit an incriminating response. Asking
about drinking after parking his vehicle would not prove that Mr. Stegall has driven while
impaired but would show the opposite. If Mr. Stegall had admitted to drinking upon his arrival to
that location, it would have been evidence tending to show Mr. Stegall’s innocence. As such, his
response should not be suppressed.
Once Miranda warnings are administered, Mr. Stegall spoke to law enforcement for a
short time. He then stated something to the effect of “I’m done talking to you” and “I’ll get my
lawyer.” The statement, “I’ll get a lawyer” is a statement indicating that he will do something in
the future and not in the present. A statement of a future intention is not an unequivocal request
for an attorney that obligated Trooper Heinle to cease questioning him. See Davis v. United
States, 512 U.S. at 459, 114 S. Ct. at 2355, State v. Perez, 145 Idaho 383, at 387. (Ct. App.
2008).
While the statement “I’m done talking to you” sounds like a clear invocation of his right
to remain silent, the Court ought to consider not only Mr. Stegall’s words but his subsequent
actions. In this case, Mr. Stegall never stops talking despite his many statements to leave him
alone and he’s done talking. Mr. Stegall rants on and on and on. He rants when law enforcement
is outside of the patrol car and not speaking with him. He kicks the partition and makes a racket
to get the troopers’ attention. The ranting continues throughout the entire drive to the jail and
while at the jail. While Mr. Stegall says one thing, his actions speak to something completely
different. Based upon Mr. Stegall’s actions, his invocation of his right to remain silent or his later
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more direct requests to speak to a lawyer were never clear and unequivocal. See State v. Law, 136
Idaho 721, 725, 39 P. 3d 661, 665 (Ct. App. 2002). It is clear, however, that Trooper Heinle did
not understand that Mr. Stegall wished to remain silent and not answer questions because he
continued to engage with him. The later statements about an attorney on the part of Mr. Stegall
were always followed by him reinstating the conversation with Trooper Heinle. The statements
made on the part of Mr. Stegall after indicating his desire to remain silent were voluntary and
most of the time unsolicited and should not be subject to suppression.
III.

Mr. Stegall’s due process rights were not violated as he never affirmatively
requested his own independent evidentiary testing.

The Court has the blood-draw videos at the jail before it. The video evidence and the
testimony of Trooper Heinle and Sgt. Klitch show that Mr. Stegall never once requested a phone
call nor, more importantly, made a request for independent evidentiary testing while the blooddraw was taking place. Mr. Stegall’s testimony confirmed these two things as fact. In fact, Mr.
Stegall refused to go to the hospital and complete a second blood draw which would have been
the second sample reserved for the defendant in a criminal case. Sgt. Klitch testified that Mr.
Stegall was not transported to the hospital for another blood-draw due to his combativeness at the
jail and prior uncooperative behavior earlier in the evening. Based on that, as well as some
difficulty obtaining blood from Mr. Stegall, only a partial sample was obtained. Mr. Stegall was
clear in his testimony that he had no desire to provide any more blood and did not ask to provide
any other kind of evidentiary sample, like a breath test. Mr. Stegall did not have the right to
contact an attorney for advice regarding the evidentiary testing he was required to submit to
based on the search warrant obtained in this case. Mr. Stegall claims he requested a phone call at
STATE’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS CLOSING ARGUMENT
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some point, but it is unclear from the record when that occurred, who that request was made to,
and how the denial came about. Without an affirmative request for an independent evidentiary
test, Mr. Stegall's due process argument must fail.
Dated this 28th day of October, 2019.
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

~7'1~
Laura McClinton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

CR28-19-0010375

F

V.
JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
AKA: JEFFREY DWAYNE STEGALL

CLOSING ARGUMENT

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, by and through his attorney, Benjamin M
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Closing Argument

I. Statements prior to Miranda
Defendant's rights under Miranda, the Fifth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment
were violated when the officers interrogated Defendant prior to his being informed of his
Miranda rights, and, when officers interrogated Defendant after he unequivocally invoked his

right to remain silent, and his right to speak with counsel prior to any further questioning.
When officer Heinle arrived on scene, he spoke with officer Cushman about the status of
the investigation. At approximately 6:31 :00 p.m., on officer Cushman's dash camera, the two
officers can be heard discussing the investigation. During this conversation, one of the officers
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makes a comment that the only thing left to do is determine when Mr. Stegall had his last drink.
One logical conclusion based on this comment is that the officers wanted to know whether or not
Mr. Stegall had only drank prior to driving the car, or, whether he may have drank anything after
he stopped driving.
After this conversation, and after Mr. Stegall was placed in custody, officers went and
interrogated him. This interrogation included direct questions such as where his passenger went,
what happened to his vehicle, how long he had been sitting in the car, who was driving, and
whether he had anything to drink after the vehicle stopped. This was all done prior to the
administration of Miranda warnings, despite the fact the officers had already discussed a desire
to get some of this information. Supreme Court precedent is clear, "[t]he Court in Miranda
required suppression of many statements that would have been admissible under traditional due
process analysis by presuming that statements made while in custody and without adequate
warnings were protected by the Fifth Amendment." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985).
The Miranda Court created a presumption that custodial interrogation without the benefits of
Miranda warnings is "inherently coercive," and this presumption is "irrebuttable." Id., at 305-

307.
Thus, any statements made by Mr. Stegall during this period of his in-custody
interrogation, approximately 6:33:20 to 6:39:40 (on officer Heinle's camera), must be suppressed
because the statements were made prior to the giving of Miranda warnings.
II. Statements after Invocation of Rights

After being read his Miranda rights, at approximately 6:41: 10, Mr. Stegall made a clear
invocation of his rights to cut off questioning, and his right to speak with an attorney prior to any
further questioning. On officer Heinle's camera, Mr. Stegall can be heard telling the officers that
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he is done talking to them and he will get a lawyer. Despite this clear invocation, officers
continued to interrogate Mr. Stegall. They asked him direct questions such as whether he knows
where he is now, where he was going, which direction his friend walked, whose vehicle it was,
and what his friend's name was.
Officer Heinle has attempted to explain this continued questioning of Mr. Stegall by
saying that Mr. Stegall himself reinitiated conversation with the officers. However, the evidence
in this case shows that Mr. Stegall did not initiate this questioning; the officers did. Immediately
after Mr. Stegall told asked the officers that he was done talking, to leave him alone, and that he
would get an attorney, officers asked him if he knew where he was. Mr. Stegall answered that
question. The officers then rattled off several more questions, and Mr. Stegall responded. At no
point did Mr. Stegall reinitiate these conversations.

Mr. Stegall simply responded to the

questions the officers were asking him. As the Supreme Court has held, "a valid waiver of [the
right to counsel] cannot be established by showing only that [defendant] responded to further
police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights." Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 ( 1981 ). That is precisely what happened in this case. The fact that

Mr. Stegall answered further questions by the officers does not show that he reinitiated
conversation with the officers. Officer Heinle's claim that Mr. Stegall reinitiated conversation
because he was answering the officer's questions is contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in
Edwards.

After this series of questions and answers, Mr. Stegall again told the officers to leave him
alone at approximately 6:42:30. Officer Heinle left the side of the vehicle at this time and went
to talk with officer Klitch. During this conversation, at approximately 6:44: 10, it appears officer
Klitch asked officer Heinle to "figure out what he said." At approximately 6:53: 10, officer
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Heinle said he would try to ask Mr. Stegall about some things, including where and how long
ago he was drinking. Officer Klitch then advised officer Heinle that Mr. Stegall should not be
questioned any further because he had already asked for a lawyer. As an aside, this statement by
officer Klitch strongly cuts against any implications by the State that Mr. Stegall's invocation of
his right to counsel was not clear. Officer Heinle then made the comment that Mr. Stegall will
probably mention something. At approximately 7:03:20, Mr. Stegall again told the officers that
he wants his lawyer, that's all he wants.
The totality of the circumstances show that Mr. Stegall invoked both his right to remain
silent, and his right to counsel. Despite these repeated invocations, the officers continued to
interrogate Mr. Stegall about this alleged DUI.

This intentional disregard for Mr. Stegall's

assertion of his rights is further compounded by Mr. Stegall's mental state. Officer Heinle told
other officers that Mr. Stegall was "beyond hammered." As our Courts have recognized, a
defendant's intoxication is a factor that needs to be considered when assessing whether any
waiver of his rights was voluntary. See State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983).
If officer Heinle believed that Mr. Stegall was "beyond hammered," it makes his attempts to

elicit statements from Mr. Stegall all the more troubling, and further suggests that any statements
made by Mr. Stegall were not the result of a "voluntary" waiver of his rights.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant seeks suppression of any statements he made while
in custody, after invoking his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
As a final note, the Court has inquired about specific statements Defendant seeks
suppression of. As stated above, Defendant seeks suppression of all statements he made after
invoking his rights.

While Defendant acknowledges that many of these statements appear

irrelevant or exculpatory, case law is clear that no such distinction is recognized.
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distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements alleged to be merely
'exculpatory.' If a statement made were in fact truly exculpatory it would, of course, never be
used by the prosecution. In fact, statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant
are often used to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement
given." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477 (1966).

This is precisely the reason why

Defendant seeks suppression of all his statements, because the State may seek to use any of these
statements, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, at trial. Since Defendant cannot anticipate what
statements the State will seek to introduce at trial, he must ask for suppression of all of the
statements.

III. Due Process Violations
Officer Klitch testified that Mr. Stegall complied with the State's attempt to draw his
blood at the jail. The officer testified that despite Mr. Stegall's cooperation, trooper Eckenbrach
was unable to get two vials of blood from Mr. Stegall. Officer Klitch was unaware of whether
officer Eckenbrach had ever performed a blood draw in the field before, and was unaware of
what training officer Eckenbrach had. Officer Klitch speculated that officer Eckenbrach may
have been unable to obtain sufficient blood samples because he was nervous. Officer Klitch
testified that normally the first vial is for the State to use, and the second vial is for Defendant to
use.
Mr. Stegall testified that after these attempts to draw blood, he asked a jailer to use a
phone. Mr. Stegall testified that he was not given access to a phone until the next morning,
approximately 5:00 a.m. The State offered no evidence or testimony to contradict this testimony.
Officer Klitch testified that he knew Mr. Stegall wanted an attorney, but did not do anything to
facilitate Mr. Stegall's access to a phone. Officer Klitch also testified that Mr. Stegall never
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specifically asked him to "use a phone," and Mr. Stegall confirmed this fact through his
testimony.
In this case, Mr. Stegall's due process right to gather exculpatory evidence was violated
when the State refused to allow him to use a phone during this critical stage. This violation was
compounded by the fact that the State's chosen phlebotomist was unable to obtain a second vial
of blood, and the fact that the first vial of blood was only available for the State's use.
The State's argument that Mr. Stegall was under some duty to tell the officers or jail staff
what he hoped to accomplish by calling an attorney has no relevance to this case, because Mr.
Stegall is not arguing that his statutory rights were violated as did the Defendant in State v.
Hedges, 143 Idaho 884, 886, 154 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Ct. App. 2007). Rather, Mr. Stegall is

arguing his constitutional rights were violated when he was denied access to a phone as did the
Defendant in State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181,911 P.2d 774 (1995).
In Carr, the defendant only asked for a telephone to contact her attorney. She did not
request an independent test, nor did she indicate in any manner what kind of evidence she hoped
to gather by being given access to a phone. The State in Carr argued that by not asking for an
additional test, Ms. Carr slumbered on her rights and therefore her rights were not violated. Our
Court found this argument to be "unconvincing, if not specious." Id., at 185, 911 P.2d at 778.
The State's argument in this case that Mr. Stegall was under some obligation to tell the officers
or jail staff why he wanted to contact his attorney, or affirmatively say that he wanted an
independent test, should likewise be rejected by this Court.
In a similar vein, the State has argued that by refusing the officer's request that he go to
the hospital so they could do more blood draws, Mr. Stegall waived his right to either call an
attorney or to have such testing conducted. There are several flaws with this argument. First, the
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right to call an attorney to gather exculpatory evidence is not necessarily the same as the right to
have an independent test done. While it is true that an independent test is one thing an attorney
could have done for Mr. Stegall, it is certainly not the only thing. The Court in Carr noted that
an attorney could have helped the defendant arrange for photographs to be taken, prepare a tape
recording, take video, have the defendant perform SFST, or simply serve as a witness to what
sort of condition the defendant was in. Id., at 184-185, 911 P.2d at 777-778.
Second, Defendant is unaware of any authority for the proposition that if a defendant
refuses to comply with the State's request to conduct a search or gather evidence, the defendant
himself has thereby waived his own right to conduct such searches or gather such evidence. This
argument, if accepted by the Court, would lead to patently absurd results. For example, we could
imagine a scenario where a defendant is suspected of committing a robbery. Defendant has a
backpack that holds potentially exculpatory evidence for his case. The police ask defendant for
permission to search that backpack, but defendant refuses to give his consent. Is this defendant
now foreclosed from using the contents of that backpack at his own trial because he refused to
allow the State to conduct a search of it? In Mr. Stegall's case, counsel fails to see how Mr.
Stegall's rejection of the officer's request to go to the hospital so they could conduct a search
thereby forecloses Mr. Stegall's opportunity to have the same type of search conducted by his
own counsel.
By denying his request to use a phone to call an attorney, the State violated Mr. Stegall' s
due process rights. As an appropriate remedy for this violation, Defendant seeks suppression of
the results of the State's own blood draw.

DATED t h i s ~ day of October, 2019.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NUMBER

CR28-19-0010375

F

V.

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
AKA: JEFFREY DWAYNE STEGALL

CLOSING ARGUMENT REPLY

Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, by and through his attorney, Benjamin M
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby submits this Reply Closing Argument.

I.

Seizure

Defendant disputes that officers possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that he had
been involved in the reported roll-over accident. Officer Cushman testified that he was asked to
stop out with Mr. Stegall's vehicle in order to check whether or not he was involved in the
accident. While the officer was able to point to other alleged justifications for a seizure after the
fact, he was clear that at the time of the seizure his only purpose was to see if Mr. Stegall was
involved in the accident. Officer Cushman's video shows that he passed many vehicles which
were pulled over to the side of the road while they were running code.
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A similar situation occurred in State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 947 P.2d 1000 (1997),
where officers stopped a vehicle merely to inquire whether it was involved in an accident. Just
as in Wixom, the officers in this case lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Stegall had
been involved in the reported roll-over accident.
II.

Statements prior to Miranda

The State has acknowledged that Mr. Stegall was in custody, and was asked questions by
officers prior to being advised of his Miranda rights. The State also concedes that the questions
were designed to elicit a response. The State's only argument against suppression of these
statements is that the questions were not designed to elicit "incriminating" responses.

This

argument has been squarely rejected by the Supreme Court:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination.

[N]o distinction may be drawn between inculpatory statements and statements
alleged to be merely 'exculpatory.' If a statement made were in fact truly
exculpatory it would, of course, never be used by the prosecution. In fact,
statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used
to impeach his testimony at trial or to demonstrate untruths in the statement
given.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 476-477 (1966). The simple fact that the State wants to

use these statements at trial to obtain a conviction against Mr. Stegall shows that the statements
are incriminating against Mr. Stegall.
Defendant asks the Court to suppress all responses he made to officers while subject to
custodial interrogation prior to the giving of Miranda warnings.
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III.

Statements after Miranda

The State alleges that Mr. Stegall waived his invocation of his rights because he
continued to engage with the officers. However, this is intellectually dishonest. The Court has
the audio of Mr. Stegall "engaging" in conversation with the officers after he invoked his rights.
For example, at approximately 6:44:00 on officer Heinle's camera, Mr. Stegall can be heard
yelling at the officers "lets go."

At approximately 6:44:30, Mr. Stegall "engages m

conversation" by telling the officers get me where I got to go and leave me the F*** alone.
Counsel for defense concedes that Mr. Stegall was physically speaking words to the
officers while he was in custody. Counsel also concedes that Mr. Stegall was the one who
started speaking on several of these occasions. But to pretend that statements such has "take me
to jail" and "leave me alone" evidence Mr. Stegall's intent to speak with the officers about this
crime is silly. Defendant would ask the Court to look at the actual content of what Mr. Stegall
was saying, and reach the logical conclusion that, no, Mr. Stegall was not trying to re-initiate
conversation with the officers about this DUI investigation.

If the State has a specific statement in mind that it wishes to introduce at trial, Defendant
would be happy to give an analysis of that specific statement to determine whether or not Mr.
Stegall actually reengaged conversation to make that statement. But without any notice from the
State regarding which of Mr. Stegall's post-Miranda statements it wishes to use, Defendant can
only make blanket arguments that the statements were obtained in violation of his asserted right
to counsel and right to remain silent.
IV.

Due Process

The State appears to present two different arguments in opposition to Defendant's Due
Process motion: 1.) Mr. Stegall did not ask specifically for an "independent test," and 2.) Mr.
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Stegall did not ask one of the arresting officers to use a telephone.
The State's first argument must fail because case law is clear that a defendant does not
need to make a specific request for an "independent test" in ordered to be entitled to call an
attorney or have such a test conducted.

The defendant in Carr made no request for an

independent evidentiary test, she only asked to use a phone. State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 911
P.2d 774 (1995). Our Court still found a due process violation. This case alone demonstrates the
State is simply incorrect when it argues that a defendant must make an affirmative request for
independent testing in order to make out a Due Process violation.
The State's second argument fails because it lacks any support in law. The unrebutted
and undisputed evidence presented in this case showed that Mr. Stegall asked jail staff to use a
phone after the blood draw process was complete. The State's only argument in Close is that
Mr. Stegall did not make this request to one of the arresting officer's in the room. Defendant is
unaware of any statute or case requiring that a request for phone call be made to a police officer,
as opposed to any other jail deputy. Unless there is legal support for the argument that the
request to use a phone be made to a police officer, this Court should reject the State's request for
such a rule.

DATED t h i s ~ day ofNovember, 2019.

ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:
BENJAMIN M ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the

~

day of November, 2019,

addressed to:
Kootenai County Prosecutor
Via Fax (208) 446-2168
Interoffice Mail
~ Via iCourt kcpaicourts@kcgov.us
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Anne C. Taylor, Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO

CASE NUMBER CR28-19-0010375
F
Plaintiff,
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS

V.
JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL, AKA:
Jeffrey Dwayne Stegall
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, by and through their attorney, Benjamin M
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender respectfully submits Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions No. 1
in addition to the Court's general instructions on the law.
DATED this

2(

day ofNovember, 2019.
ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:

z~~

BENJAMIN M. ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct COP}: olthe foregoing was personally served by placing
a copy of the same as indicated below on this_'V_\day ofNovember, 2019.

,~w

Kootenai County Prosecutor Via iCourt kcpaicouk{Yigov. us
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ICJI 301 EFFECT OF DEFENDANT'S ELECTION NOT TO TESTIFY

INSTRUCTION NO. - - Jeffery Stegall has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. The decision
whether to testify is left to Mr. Stegall, acting with the advice and assistance of his lawyer.
You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that Mr. Stegall does not testify, nor
should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any way.
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Anne C. Taylor, Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
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Bar Number: 5836
iCourt Email: pdfax@kcgov.us

Assigned Attorney:
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, Bar Number: 8448
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CASE NUMBER CR28-19-0010375
F

ST ATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S WITNESS LIST

vs.

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL, AKA:
JEFFREY DWAYNE STEGALL
Defendant.

The defendant will call the following witness(es) at trial, although not necessarily in the
same order as listed.
1.

Richard Bitonti. 1607 Lincoln Way, CDA, ID.

The defendant reserves the right to call witnesses to impeach or rebut the government's
case.

Furthermore, the defendant reserves the right to amend this list as witnesses become

known and to call, as witnesses, individuals who have been disclosed as potential witnesses by
the State, and any other persons who were named by the State within other discovery materials.
DATED this

2--l

DEFENDANT'S WITNESS LIST

day ofNovember, 2019.
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ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:

7)Jv/·

~

BENJAMIN M. ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the for org was personally served by
day of November, 2019
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the
addressed to:

2

Kootenai County Prosecutor
Via Fax (208) 446-2168
/)C... Via iCourt kcpaicourts@kcgov.us
Via Interoffice Mail
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Description CR28-19-10375 Stegall, Jeffrey Dwayne 20191121 Pretrial Conference
Judge Meyer
Clerk Denice Larsen
Court Reporter Diane Bolan

I

Date I 1112112019

Speaker
I Time
I
I 02:54:41 PM IJudge Meyer

I 02:54 :59 PM IJudge Meyer
I 02:55 :38 PM IEnd

I

Location I 1K-CRT8

Note
Calls case. Def present in custody. Tyler Naftz for def. Molly
Nivison for state.
Trial December 2 and 3

Produced by FTR Gold™
www. fortherecord. com
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Anne C. Taylor, Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 5836
iCourt Email: pdfax@kcgov.us

Assigned Attorney:
Benjamin M. Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, Bar Number: 8448

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NUMBER CR28-19-0010375
F

Plaintiff,
vs.

EXHIBIT LIST

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL, AKA:
JEFFREY DWAYNE STEGALL

Defendant.

The defendant will call the following witness(es) at trial, although not necessarily in the
same order as listed.
1.

Two pictures of the inside of the vehicle Mr. Stegall was found in;

2. Four pictures from the crime scene.
The defendant reserves the right to call witnesses to impeach or rebut the government's
case.

Furthermore, the defendant reserves the right to amend this list as witnesses become

known and to call, as witnesses, individuals who have been disclosed as potential witnesses by
the State, and any other persons who were named by the State within other discovery materials.
DATED this

2-4,-/day ofNovember, 2019.
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ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:

~~

BENJAMIN M. ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the for~ng was personally served by
~L- day of November, 2019
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the
addressed to:
Kootenai County Prosecutor
Via Fax (208) 446-2168
Via iCourt kcpaicourts@kcgov.us
Via Interoffice Mail
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Anne C. Taylor, Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
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Assigned Attorney:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
CASE NUMBER CR28-19-0010375
F

STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff,
V.

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL AKA: Jeffrey
Dwayne Stegall

MOTION REQUIRING KOOTENAI
COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE TO
ACCEPT CLOTHING FOR DEFENDANT
TO WEAR DURING JURY TRIAL

Defendant.

COMES NOW the above named defendant by and through their attorney, Benjamin M.
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender and hereby moves the Court for an Order requiring the
Kootenai County Sheriff to accept civilian clothing for the defendant to wear during a jury trial
nd
set to begin before the Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer on December 2 , 2019 through the end of

trial.
DATED this 2

2...---

day ofNovember, 2019.
ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:

- ~---L._ p.~-~
_~
BENJAMIN M ONOSKO,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY

MOTION REQUlRING KOOTENAI COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
TO ACCEPT CLOTHING FOR DEFENDANT TO WEAR DURING JURY TRIAL
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the

1;[,,

day of November, 2019,

addressed to:
Kootenai County Prosecutor via iCourt @ kcpaico' f i i [ § 2 i i ~
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Filed:11/25/2019 10:27:50
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO

CASE NUMBER CR28-19-0010375
F
Plaintiff,

v.
JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL AKA: Jeffrey
Dwayne Stegall

ORDER REQUIRING KOOTENAI
COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE TO
ACCEPT CLOTHING FOR DEFENDANT
TO WEAR DURING JURY TRIAL

Defendant.

The Court having before it the Motion to require the Kootenai County Sheriffs Office to
Accept Clothing for defendant to wear during his upcoming jury trial and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Kootenai County Sheriffs Office shall accept a
sufficient supply of clothing for the defendant to wear during his Jury Trial set to commence on
December 2nd , 2019 through the end of trial.
Signed: 11/25/2019 10:27 AM

DATED this _ _ _ day of November, 2019.

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was personally served by
placing a copy of the same as indicated below on the _ _ _ day of November, 2019,
addressed to:
Kootenai County Public Defender Via iCourt@pdfax@kcgov.us
Kootenai County Prosecutor Via iCourt@kcpaicourts@kcgov.us
Signed: 11/25/2019 10:28 AM
Kootenai County Jail Via iCourt@jailpw@kcgov.us
~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR28-19-10375

Plaintiff,

vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

JEFFERY DWYANE STEGALL,
Defendant.

Defendant Jeffery Dwyane Stegall filed a motion to suppress on August 7, 2019. The
Defendant's motion came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer on
October 18, 2019. Defendant was represented by Deputy Public Defender Benjamin Martin
Onosko. The State was represented by Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Laura McLinton.
Defendant's motion to suppress is denied in part and granted in part for the reasons discussed
below.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 21, 2019, Corporal Jonathan Cushman was on duty running code reporting to a
crash westbound on 1-90 in the area of Cataldo, in Kootenai County, Idaho. Cpl. Cushman was
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asked by Sergeant Kitsch, who was ahead of him on 1-90, to investigate a car pulled over on the
side of the road near mile post 35. At around 6:20 p.m. Cpl. Cushman spotted a vehicle, a 2000
Subaru Forester, parked with the engine off on the right shoulder of Interstate 1-90 with its left
rear tire touching the fog line of the road. Cpl. Cushman's camera captured the events, Pl's. Ex.
1. Cpl. Cushman pulled up behind the vehicle with his emergency lights flashing and approached
the passenger side of the vehicle. Cpl. Cushman observed the Defendant unconscious and seated
in the driver's seat. Cpl. Cushman contacted the Defendant by knocking on the window which
woke the Defendant.
Cpl. Cushman tried to talk to the Defendant through a partially rolled down window and
observed the Defendant's slurred speech, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and the strong smell of
alcohol. Cpl. Cushman asked the Defendant to open the door to speak with him. The Defendant
had difficulty opening the door but eventually did so and spoke with Cpl. Cushman giving
conflicting answers regarding whether he had been driving and if he was travelling by himself.
The vehicle's passenger seats were covered in clothing and various other luggage. Pl's. Ex. 4,5,6.
Sgt. Klitch and Trooper Heinle appeared on the scene around 6:29 p.m. Cpl. Cushman
asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle and come to the rear of the vehicle so they could speak
further. The Defendant stumbled upon exiting the vehicle and had to be pulled out of the road to
avoid being hit by traffic. Cpl. Cushman had the Defendant sit on the guard rail to ask him
questions while they ran his identifying information to dispatch. A felony warrant was reported
to them from dispatch and he was told to put his hands behind his back and was told he was
under arrest at 6:33:30 p.m. The Defendant resisted the handcuffing. After a struggle, Cpl.
Cushman, Sgt. Kitch, and Trp. Heinle were able to force the Defendant's hands behind his back
and handcuff him.
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Trp. Heinle asked the Defendant if he had any weapons on him and searched him for
weapons. Trp. Heinle 's Camera captured the events, Pl's. Ex. 2. At 6:38:30 p.m., Trp. Heinle
asked the Defendant, "so where was your passenger, where did he go," and then asked the
Defendant further questions regarding whether he was driving and how much alcohol he had
consumed. At 6:39:20 p.m., the Defendant said, "believe me, I ain't saying nothing I'm getting a
lawyer." At 6:39:30 p.m. Trp. Heinle advised him of his Miranda rights. At 6:40:30 p.m. Trp.
Heinle spoke to Cpl. Cushman and asked if the Defendant told Cpl. Cushman he was driving.
The Defendant then responded to this conversation between the officers. Officers then
questioned him regarding whether he was driving, which elicited further responses by the
Defendant. Officers continued to question the Defendant about whether he was driving. At
6:41 :21 p.m. the Defendant said, "I'm done talking to you. I'll get a lawyer. I'm done. I'm done.
You fucking bet I will. Fuck that. I don't care. You done cuff me up. Leave me alone. Alright.
I'm going back to prison, that's where I'm going. I know where I'm going." Trp. Heinle said,
"Do you know where you are right now." The Defendant responded, "Yeah I know where I'm at.
I'm in between fucking Cataldo and fucking somewhere and I'm fucking pissed." The officers
continued to question him until 6:42:30 p.m. when the Defendant said, "You know what, shut the
fuck up and take me to jail." The officers then left the vehicle to speak with each other while the
Defendant continued to talk in a loud manner, at times yelling at the police from inside the
vehicle.
When the officers returned, the Defendant said, "Leave me the fuck alone and take me
where I've got to go." The Defendant then continued speaking unprompted. At 6:49:10 p.m., an
officer said to the defendant, "You twice admitted to driving." Officers continued to question the
Defendant and the Defendant gave responses, sometimes unprompted. At 6:50:35 p.m., the
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Defendant said, "Don't worry about it, I'm fucking done, can we go." Officers then stopped
engaging in conversation and returned to the front of the car to converse with each other, and the
Defendant continued to yell loudly at the officers in a continuous manner while they were
outside the vehicle. At 6:54:40 p.m., an officer returned to the car and engaged in conversation
with the Defendant. At 6:57:45 p.m., the Defendant said, "I'll get a lawyer. I'm a get me one."
At 6:58:30 p.m., the Defendant said. "I'm getting a lawyer. I love it." Immediately following this
statement, the Defendant continued to speak at length without prompting by the officers.
At 7:03:20 p.m., the Defendant said, "I want my lawyer, that's all I want. I want my
lawyer that's all I want." An officer asked if he would submit to a breath or blood test for
alcohol. The Defendant responded, ''No ... I want my lawyer, I'm a get my lawyer on this, I
guarantee you that... get my lawyer that's all I want. I want my lawyer." After this exchange the
Defendant continued to speak without prompting or response by the officers. Shortly after, Trp.
Heinle began driving the Defendant to Kootenai County jail. The defendant continued to speak
to the officers unprompted throughout the drive. Neither Trp. Heinle nor any other officer
questioned him regarding his suspected crimes during the drive and during the blood draw. Little
was said by the officers during this time. The officers in the car only responded to two questions
by the Defendant regarding the location of his heart medication and why they had two officers
riding with him. The Defendant continued to speak unprompted in the squad car the entire
duration of the ride to the jail with no response by the officers. At 7:33:05, unprompted by the
officers, the Defendant said, "I want my lawyer," and then continued to speak unprompted
without response by the officers as they arrived at the jail.
The blood draw was only able to obtain a partial sample, and the Defendant said to the
officers in the room, "I want my lawyer that's all I want. I want a lawyer." The events of the
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blood draw were captured on video, Def's. Ex. 3. The Defendant then refused to submit further
blood draws or go to the hospital for a blood draw without his lawyer present. Officers did not
interrogate the Defendant during or after the blood draw.
The Defendant was charged with Driving Under the Influence (2nd Offense Felony
Violation Within 15 Years) in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-8005(9). Defendant filed a motion to
suppress on August 7, 2019. The State filed a brief in opposition on October 1, 2019. Defendant
filed a reply brief on October 7, 2019.
A hearing on the Defendant's motion to suppress was held on October 18, 2019. Three
body camera videos were entered into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits. 1, 2, and 3, and three
photographs were entered into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits. 4, 5, and 6.
Officer Cushman testified at the hearing regarding his encounter with the Defendant.
Officer Cushman testified that his contact with the Defendant started as a welfare check in a
community caretaking function. Officer Cushman's Testimony, Hr' g on Mot. to Suppress Oct.
18, 2019. Officer Cushman testified that after waking the defendant, he immediately believed the
defendant was intoxicated based on his severely slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes, and
the smell of alcohol. Id. Trp. Heinle testified that while placing the Defendant under arrest the
Defendant physically attempted to resist being handcuffed and it required Trp. Heinle, Officer
Cushman, and Sgt. Kitch to pull his hands behind his back. Trp. Heinle 's Testimony. Trp. Heinle
also testified that he spoke with the Defendant for a few minutes after placing him under arrest
before Mirandizing him. Id. Trp. Heinle testified that at one point the defendant said something
about "having a lawyer," and later there were multiple instances where the defendant asked for a
lawyer and said he did not want to speak with the officers, but the defendant still continued speak
to the officers unprompted. Id. Trp. Heinle testified that they could never do a field sobriety test
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because he was acting too violent to be released from handcuffs. Id. Trp. Heinle testified that the
defendant never indicated to him that he wanted a phone call or wanted to perform an
independent test of his choosing. Id. Tpr. Heinle also testified that he did not stop asking the
defendant questions after the defendant "said he'd get a lawyer" because the defendant
"continued to re-engage in conversation making him think he wanted to talk more." Id. Tpr.
Heinle testified that while getting the blood draw Defendant requested a lawyer. Id. Tpr. Heinle
also testified that to him the words "I'll get an attorney" meant that he will get one in the future.
Id.

Sgt. Klitch testified that during the blood draw the defendant never asked to make a
phone call or asked for additional independent testing. Sgt. Klitch 's testimony, Id. The Defendant
testified that he told an officer or deputy that he wanted a lawyer before the blood draw. Mr.
Stegall 's Testimony, Id The Defendant testified that he never asked to get his own independent

testing done because ''they had a warrant and I figured that was enough." Id. The Defendant
testified that after the blood draw he asked to make a phone call. Id The defendant testified that
he asked the booking officer to get a phone call to a lawyer before the blood sample was taken
and he was never answered. Id. The Defendant also testified that he asked the officer that booked
him to make a phone call after the blood draw as well as several other officers. Id
Upon request from the court, the State and the Defendant filed closing arguments with
the Court. The State filed State's Motion to Suppress Closing Argument on October 24, 2019.
The Defendant filed Closing Arguments on October 29, 2019, and Closing Argument Reply on
November 4, 2019. The motion to suppress was then taken under advisement.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

At a suppression hearing, ''the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any
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conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial
court." State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 105-06, 897 P.2d 993, 996-97 (1995).

"The

standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413,414,
398 P.3d 146, 147 (2017) (quoting State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454,456 (2004)).
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the reviewing court accepts the trial
court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews the trial
court's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. Id.

DISCUSSION
The Defendant asks the court to rule on four issues. First, the "Defendant disputes that
the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that he had been involved in the reported
roll-over incident." Closing Arguments Reply 1. Second, "[t]he Defendant asks this Court to
suppress all responses he made to officers while subject to custodial interrogation prior to the
giving of Miranda warnings." Id at 2. Third, the Defendant asks this Court to suppress all
statements made by the Defendant post Miranda. Id at 3. Fourth, the Defendant seeks
suppression of the results of the State's BAC test. Id. at 7.

I.

Officer Cushman lawfully contacted the Defendant in the community caretaking
function of law enforcement, and Officer Cushman possessed reasonable
suspicion to detain the Defendant to investigate a possible DUI based on
observing the Defendant's slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes, the strong
smell of alcohol, and the Defendant's uncoordinated demeanor.
The Defendant argues: "While the officer was able to point to other alleged justifications

for a seizure after the fact, he was clear that at the time of the seizure his only purpose was to see
if Mr. Stegall was involved in the accident." Id. at 1.
The State argues that the detention of the Defendant was lawful and pursuant to the
officer's caretaker role of the public. State's Mot. to Suppress Closing Arg. 1. The State argues
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that Officer Cushman lawfully parked behind the Defendant's vehicle and contacted him to
ensure the safety of the public and to make sure the driver or occupants of the vehicle were not in
need of medical care or other assistance. Id. at 2. The State goes on to argue that Officer
Cushman had reasonable articulable suspicion to expand his caretaker role to a DUI investigation
by observing the Defendant's slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes, the strong smell of
alcohol, and the Defendant's uncoordinated inability to open the door when asked to do so. Id. at
2, 3.

A warrantless search and seizure may be justified pursuant to the community caretaking
function of law enforcement. Community caretaking involves the duty of officers to help citizens
in need of assistance and it includes investigations to determine if a citizen needs vehicle
assistance or medical assistance due to injury or illness. See State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 947
Pl2d 100 (1997); Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401 (1988); and State v. Mireles,
133 Idaho 690,991 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999).
In order to qualify as community caretaking, the investigation should be totally divorced

from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 438, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973). The Idaho courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test in determining whether a seizure is justified as
community caretaking. Matter of Clayton. The proper inquiry is ''whether the intrusive action of
the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances." State v. Waldie, 126
Idaho 864,867, 893 P.3d 811, 814 (Ct. App.1995). See also Wixon and State v. Deccio, 136
Idaho 442, 34 P.3d 1125 (Ct. App. 2001).
In this case, Officer Cushman observed the Defendant's car parked on the side of 1-90
with a portion of the vehicle in the fog line. This is a danger to both oncoming traffic as well as
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the occupants of the vehicle. Therefore, taken in the totality of the circumstances, the intrusive
action of pulling up behind the Defendant and checking on him is reasonable in view of the
surrounding circumstances involved in the possible danger that the Defendant was in. Upon
observing the Defendant unconscious in the driver's seat, and his subsequent slurred speech,
bloodshot and glassy eyes, and the smell of alcohol, Officer Cushman possessed reasonable
suspicion to perform a DUI investigation. The immediate results of the investigation provided
further evidence to continue the DUI investigation, namely the defendant's conflicting answers
regarding ifhe had been driving and the defendant's uncoordinated inability to open the door of
the vehicle. For these reasons, this Court finds the Defendant's detention to be lawful, and the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress based on an unlawful detention is DENIED.

II.

This Court grants the motion to suppress any statements made by the Defendant
in the short window of time after being asked "so where was your passenger,
where did he go" until after he was read his Miranda rights because a suspect
must be Mirandized during a custodial interrogation.

The Defendant argues that officers interrogated the Defendant after placing him under
arrest and before reading him his Miranda warnings. Def's Closing Arg. 2. "Thus any statements
made by Mr. Stegall during this period of his in-custody interrogation, approximately 6:33 :20
p.m. to 6:39:40 p.m. (on officer Heinle's camera), must be suppressed because the statements
were made prior to the giving of Miranda warnings." Id.
The State acknowledges that questions were asked of the Defendant after being placed
under arrest and before being advised of his Miranda rights. State's Mot. to Suppress Closing
Arg. 3. The State argues that only "one of the questions was likely to elicit an incriminating
response." Id. According to the State, this question was asked at approximately 6:39 p.m., and
was "a question about doing all his drinking prior to driving." Id. The State concedes this answer
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should be suppressed. Id The State goes on to argue that other questions asked by officers during
this time period were not likely to elicit an incriminating response and should therefore not be
suppressed. Id at 4.
Once a suspect is placed in custody, he must be advised of his Miranda rights before he is
interrogated by police, and "[o]pportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,479, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694 (1966). After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or
make a statement. Id. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him."
Id.
In this case, the officers told the Defendant that he was under arrest and began placing
him in handcuffs at 6:33:30. p.m. At this time, the defendant was not Mirandized and he was in
custody. What followed was a struggle, and once the Defendant was finally hand-cuffed he was
searched for weapons. At 6:38:30 p.m. Trp. Heinle asked, "So where was your passenger, where
did he go?" Prior to this time, no officer asked the defendant any questions other than questions
pertaining to their search of the Defendant for weapons.
The question asked by Trp. Heinle at 6:38:30 p.m. was the beginning of an interrogation
regarding the crime he was charged with, and statements made during this custodial interrogation
of Defendant prior to being Mirandized should be suppressed.
For these reasons, the Defendant's motion to suppresses statements made by the
defendant after 6:38:30 p.m., and until the Defendant's Miranda rights were read to him at
6:39:30 p.m. (Officer Hein/e's camera), is GRANTED. The motion to suppress all other
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statements made before this time frame is DENIED.

III.

The motion to suppress evidence after the Defendant was read his Miranda
rights is denied because the Defendant's right to counsel was initially not
invoked unequivocally. Later, once the right to counsel was invoked
unequivocally, all statements made by the Defendant were made voluntarily and
unprompted by the police. Therefore, the motion to suppress is denied.
The Defendant argues that he "made a clear invocation of his Miranda rights to cut off

questioning, and his right to speak with an attorney prior to any questioning," by saying, "he is
done talking to them and he will get a lawyer." Defs. Closing Arg. 4. The Defendant goes on to
argue that "[a]t approximately 7:03:20 p.m., Mr. Stegall again told officers that he wants his
lawyer, that's all he wants." Id. For these reasons, the Defendant asks this Court to suppress all
statements made by the Defendant after being Mirandized." Id. The Defendant argues that "since
the Defendant cannot anticipate what statements the State will seek to introduce at trial, he must
ask for suppression of all of the statements. Id. at 5.
The State argues that after being Mirandized, the Defendant did not make a clear and
unequivocal request to speak to a lawyer. State's Mot. to Suppress Closing Arg. 4. The State
goes on to argue that "[t]he statements made on the part of Mr. Stegall after indicating his desire
to remain silent were voluntary and most of the time unsolicited and should not be subject to
suppression." Id.
The Davis Court held that an objective standard applies in determining whether a
detainee has properly invoked his right to counsel thus requiring a cessation of the interrogation.
In order to do so, a detainee is required to
articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an
attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not
require that the officers stop questioning the suspect. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 433 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1147 n. 4, 89 L.Ed.2d 410[ 428 n.4] (1986) ("[T]he
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interrogation must cease until an attorney is present only [i]f the individual states that he
wants an attorney").

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994).
In order for Miranda to apply to statements made by a suspect while in custody the
suspect must be interrogated. State v. Arenas 161 Idaho 646, 387, 190 (Ct. App. 2016). For
purposes of Miranda, an interrogation includes express questioning as well as "any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect." Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297
(1980).
In this case the Court denies the motion to suppress regarding all the statements made by
the Defendant after he was Mirandized. The Defendant argues that he made a clear invocation of
his right to an attorney and his right to remain silent immediately prior to being Mirandized when
he said "believe me, I ain't saying nothing I'm getting a lawyer," This Court finds that such a
statement is not a clear invocation of a request for counsel. Stating, "I'm getting a lawyer," is
simply not the same as an individual asking for a lawyer. This statement presents the kind of
ambiguity that the Davis Court sought to avoid by requiring a direct request for an attorney.
At 7:03:20 p.m. The defendant told the officers "I want my lawyer, that's all I want."
This was a clear invocation of his right to counsel, and officers ceased all questioning of the
defendant. During oral arguments on the Defendant's motion to suppress, the Defendant was
asked by this Court to outline in writing which statements it wanted to be suppressed and the
reasons for suppression. The Defendant filed a brief that stated:
If the State has a specific statement in mind that it wishes to
introduce at trial, Defendant would be happy to give an analysis of
that specific statement to determine whether or not Mr. Stegall
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actually reengaged conversation to make that statement. But
without any notice from the State regarding which of Mr. Stegall's
post-Miranda statements it wishes to use, Defendant can only
make blanket arguments that the statements were obtained in
violation of his asserted rights to counsel and right to remain silent.
Defs Closing Arg. Reply. 3.

Rather than comply with the court's directive, Defendant continues to argue (as he did at
the hearing on the motion to suppress) that everything the Defendant said after his invocation at
7:03:20 p.m. should be suppressed, but this Court cannot find any instance on the recordings
during the drive to the jail or the recordings of the blood draw in which any officer said much of
anything to the Defendant, let alone asking the defendant questions that where likely to elicit an
incriminating response. All the while, the Defendant spoke continuously without any prompting
by the officers. In light of the lack of any evidence that that police interrogated the defendant
after 7:03:20 p.m., this Court finds the statements made by the Defendant to be voluntarily given.
For the above stated reasons, the Defendant's motion to suppress statements made after
the Defendant was read his Miranda rights is DENIED.

IV.

The Defendant's motion to suppress the blood draw evidence is granted because
the Defendant requested use of a phone after the blood draw was performed,
and the Defendant was not given access to a phone until enough time had passed
that additional testing would have been unusable as evidence.

The defendant argues that "Mr. Stegall testified that after these attempts to draw blood,
he asked a jailer to use a phone." Defs Closing Arg. 5. The Defendant goes on to argue that the
State has not offered any evidence to contradict his testimony and the Defendant was not given
access to a phone until 5:00 a.m. the next morning. Id For these reasons, the Defendant asks this
Court to suppress the evidence of the blood draw. Id. at 7.
The State argues that the video evidence shows that the Defendant never asked to make a
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phone call and never made a request for an independent evidentiary hearing. State's Mot. to
Suppress Closing Arg. 5. Additionally, the State argues that the request for a lawyer made during
the attempts to get a full blood draw are not pertinent because the defendant did not have a right
to contact an attorney for advise regarding the blood draw that he was required to submit to by
warrant, and there is no evidence that the Defendant requested a phone call outside of the
Defendant's testimony. Id. at 5-6.
The Court of Appeals in State v. Carr stated that
when a person is arrested for DUI and given an evidentiary BAC test, that person must be
allowed, at a minimum, to make a phone call upon request to do so. Such contact
provides the means through which the arrestee is able to gather evidence tending to refute
the State's evidence of intoxication and thereby preserve the ''right to a fair opportunity
to defend against the State's evidence of intoxication and thereby preserve the 'right to a
fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."

State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 184,911 P.2d 774, 777 (Ct. App. 1995).
In this case, the Defendant's testimony that he asked for a phone call from the booking
officer, and several other officers outside of those present during the blood draw, was not
challenged with conflicting evidence by the State. The State offered evidence through testimony
by Cpl. Cushman and Trp. Heinle that the Defendant did not ask for a phone call from them, but
the State did not offer additional evidence regarding the Defendant's request for a phone call,
other than pointing out that he did not do so on the recordings provided to the Court.
Since the Defendant was not granted a phone call until the next morning, when an
evidentiary test would not be usable, this Court orders the suppression of the State's blood draw
evidence under due process grounds. The State is correct that the Defendant is not entitled to a
lawyer during a BAC test, but after the conclusion of the BAC test, the Defendant cannot be
restrained from the means to conduct an independent test. In cases such as this, when the
Defendant remains in custody overnight, the utilization of a phone call is how the Defendant
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would begin his effort to conduct an independent test. The State cites State v. Hedges, 143 Idaho
884, 886, 154 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Ct. App. 2007) to show that a defendant must make an
affirmative request for an independent BAC test in order to trigger a due process claim. Defs
Closing Argument 6. But State v. Hedges does not overrule the holding in Carr that police must
grant a defendant's request for a phone call following a BAC test. Hedges instead dealt with the
issue of a defendant who never requested a phone call. "The record reflects that Hedges did not
request the use of a phone, nor did he ask to arrange for an independent BAC test while he was
in custody. State v. Hedges at 889. Rather, the defendant in Hedges asserted, both at the Parma
police station and again at the Canyon County jail that he intended to get an independent test
when he was released." Id. In this case, the Defendant did request the use of a phone and was
denied use of a phone until after an independent BAC would not have provided useful evidence.
For the above reasons, the Motion to Suppress the State's BAC test is GRANTED.
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ORDER:
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Defendant's motion to suppress statements made by the Defendant between
approximately 6:38:30 p.m. to 6:39:30 p.m. (on Trooper Heinle's camera) is GRANTED.
ORDERED that the Defendant's motion to suppress all other statements made by the defendant
before and after the window of time between 6:33:20 p.m to 6:39:40 p.m. (on Trooper Heinle's
camera) is DENIED.
ORDERED that the Defendant's motion to suppress the State's blood draw evidence 1s
GRANTED.
DATED thi~&y of November, 2019.
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V.
JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL, AKA:
Jeffrey Dwayne Stegall
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above-named defendant, by and through their attorney, Benjamin M
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender respectfully submits Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions No.
2- in addition to the Court's general instructions on the law.
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!CJ! I 003 ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL DEFINED

INSTRUCTION NO. 2

The phrase "actual physical control," means being in the driver's position of the motor vehicle
with the motor running or with the motor vehicle moving.
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INSTRUCTION NO .3

A person is "under the influence," if the person's ability to drive is impaired in some
identifiable way by alcohol.

Quoting State v. Stark, 157 Idaho 29, 31 (Ct. App. 2013).
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INSTRUCTION NO. 4
The State must prove the defendant was "under the influence" at the time he was driving or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle.

See State v. Austin, 163 Idaho 378.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR KOOTENAI COUNTY

) District Court Case No. CR28-19-10375
)
) Supreme Court No.
Plaintiff-Appellant,
)
) NOTICE OF APPEAL
V.
)
)
JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
)
)
Defendant-Respondent.
______________ )
STATE OF IDAHO,

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL, THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT,
TO:
BENJAMIN MARTIN ONOSKO, KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE,
DEPT. PD, P. 0. BOX 9000, COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83815-9000, AND THE CLERK OF THE
ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above-named appellant, State of Idaho, appeals against the above-named

respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS, entered in the above-entitled action on the 26th
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day of November, 2019, the Honorable Cynthia K.C. Meyer presiding. A copy of the order
being appealed is attached to this notice.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to
Rule 11 (c)(3 ), I.A.R.
3.

Preliminary statement of the issue on appeal: Whether the district court erred by

suppressing evidence of blood alcohol testing.
4.

To undersigned's knowledge, no part of the record has been sealed.

5.

The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's

transcript in electronic format:
Hearing on Stegall's motion to suppress, held October 18, 2019 (Diane Bolen, court
reporter, less than 200 pages estimated).
6.

Appellant requests the normal clerk's record pursuant to Rule 28, I.A.R.

7.

I certify:
(a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal is being served on each reporter of

whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
DIANE BOLAN
Court Reporter
realtimereporter@hotmail.com
(b)

That arrangements have been made with the Kootenai County Prosecuting

Attorney who will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript;
(c)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the

preparation of the record because the State ofldaho is the appellant (Idaho Code§ 31-3212);
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(d)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal

case (I.A.R. 23(a)(8));
(e)

That service is being made upon all parties required to be served pursuant

to Rule 20, I.A.R.
DATED this 2nd day of December, 2019.

Deputy Attorney Gener 1
Attorney for the Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2nd day of December, 2019, served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to the individuals listed below by means of
iComi File and Serve:
THE HONORABLE CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER
Kootenai County District Court
cmeyer@kcgov.us
BARRY McHUGH
LAURA B. McCLINTON
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney's Office
kcpaicomis@kcgov.us
BENJAMIN M. ONOSKO
Kootenai County Public Defender's Office
pdfax@kcgov.us
DIANE BOLAN
Court Rep01ier
realtimereporter@hotmail.com

COPY TO:
KAREL A. LEHRMAN
CLERK OF THE COURT
IDAHO SUPREME COURT
su remecourtdocuments idcourts.ne
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NO. CR28-19-10375

Plaintiff,
vs.

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO SUPPRESS

JEFFERY DWYANE STEGALL,

Defendant.

Defendant Jeffery Dwyane Stegall filed a motion to suppress on August 7, 2019. The
Defendant's motion came on for hearing before the Honorable Judge Cynthia K.C. Meyer on
October 18, 2019. Defendant was represented by Deputy Public Defender Benjamin Martin
Onosko. The State was represented by Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Laura McLinton.
Defendant's motion to suppress is denied in part and granted in part for the reasons discussed
below.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On June 21, 2019, Corporal Jonathan Cushman was on duty running code reporting to a
crash westbound on 1-90 in the area of Cataldo, in Kootenai County, Idaho. Cpl. Cushman was
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asked by Sergeant Kitsch, who was ahead of him on 1-90, to investigate a car pulled over on the
side of the road near mile post 35. At around 6:20 p.m. Cpl. Cushman spotted a vehicle, a 2000
Subaru Forester, parked with the engine off on the right shoulder of Interstate 1-90 with its left
rear tire touching the fog line of the road. Cpl. Cushman's camera captured the events, Pl's. Ex.
1. Cpl. Cushman pulled up behind the vehicle with his emergency lights flashing and approached
the passenger side of the vehicle. Cpl. Cushman observed the Defendant unconscious and seated
in the driver's seat. Cpl. Cushman contacted the Defendant by knocking on the window which
woke the Defendant.
Cpl. Cushman tried to talk to the Defendant through a partially rolled down window and
observed the Defendant's slurred speech, bloodshot and glassy eyes, and the strong smell of
alcohol. Cpl. Cushman asked the Defendant to open the door to speak with him. The Defendant
had difficulty opening the door but eventually did so and spoke with Cpl. Cushman giving
conflicting answers regarding whether he had been driving and if he was travelling by himself.
The vehicle's passenger seats were covered in clothing and various other luggage. Pl's. Ex. 4,5,6.
Sgt. Klitch and Trooper Heinle appeared on the scene around 6:29 p.m. Cpl. Cushman
asked the Defendant to exit the vehicle and come to the rear of the vehicle so they could speak
further. The Defendant stumbled upon exiting the vehicle and had to be pulled out of the road to
avoid being hit by traffic. Cpl. Cushman had the Defendant sit on the guard rail to ask him
questions while they ran his identifying information to dispatch. A felony warrant was reported
to them from dispatch and he was told to put his hands behind his back and was told he was
under arrest at 6:33:30 p.m. The Defendant resisted the handcuffing. After a struggle, Cpl.
Cushman, Sgt. Kitch, and Trp. Heinle were able to force the Defendant's hands behind his back
and handcuff him.
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Trp. Heinle asked the Defendant if he had any weapons on him and searched him for
weapons. Trp. Heinle 's Camera captured the events, Pl's. Ex. 2. At 6:38:30 p.m., Trp. Heinle
asked the Defendant, "so where was your passenger, where did he go," and then asked the
Defendant further questions regarding whether he was driving and how much alcohol he had
consumed. At 6:39:20 p.m., the Defendant said, "believe me, I ain't saying nothing I'm getting a
lawyer." At 6:39:30 p.m. Trp. Heinle advised him of his Miranda rights. At 6:40:30 p.m. Trp.
Heinle spoke to Cpl. Cushman and asked if the Defendant told Cpl. Cushman he was driving.
The Defendant then responded to this conversation between the officers. Officers then
questioned him regarding whether he was driving, which elicited further responses by the
Defendant. Officers continued to question the Defendant about whether he was driving. At
6:41 :21 p.m. the Defendant said, "I'm done talking to you. I'll get a lawyer. I'm done. I'm done.
You fucking bet I will. Fuck that. I don't care. You done cuff me up. Leave me alone. Alright.
I'm going back to prison, that's where I'm going. I know where I'm going." Trp. Heinle said,
"Do you know where you are right now." The Defendant responded, "Yeah I know where I'm at.
I'm in between fucking Cataldo and fucking somewhere and I'm fucking pissed." The officers
continued to question him until 6:42:30 p.m. when the Defendant said, "You know what, shut the
fuck up and take me to jail." The officers then left the vehicle to speak with each other while the
Defendant continued to talk in a loud manner, at times yelling at the police from inside the
vehicle.
When the officers returned, the Defendant said, "Leave me the fuck alone and take me
where I've got to go." The Defendant then continued speaking unprompted. At 6:49:10 p.m., an
officer said to the defendant, "You twice admitted to driving." Officers continued to question the
Defendant and the Defendant gave responses, sometimes unprompted. At 6:50:35 p.m., the
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Defendant said, "Don't worry about it, I'm fucking done, can we go." Officers then stopped
engaging in conversation and returned to the front of the car to converse with each other, and the
Defendant continued to yell loudly at the officers in a continuous manner while they were
outside the vehicle. At 6:54:40 p.m., an officer returned to the car and engaged in conversation
with the Defendant. At 6:57:45 p.m., the Defendant said, "I'll get a lawyer. I'm a get me one."
At 6:58:30 p.m., the Defendant said. "I'm getting a lawyer. I love it." Immediately following this
statement, the Defendant continued to speak at length without prompting by the officers.
At 7:03:20 p.m., the Defendant said, "I want my lawyer, that's all I want. I want my
lawyer that's all I want." An officer asked if he would submit to a breath or blood test for
alcohol. The Defendant responded, ''No ... I want my lawyer, I'm a get my lawyer on this, I
guarantee you that ... get my lawyer that's all I want. I want my lawyer." After this exchange the
Defendant continued to speak without prompting or response by the officers. Shortly after, Trp.
Heinle began driving the Defendant to Kootenai County jail. The defendant continued to speak
to the officers unprompted throughout the drive. Neither Trp. Heinle nor any other officer
questioned him regarding his suspected crimes during the drive and during the blood draw. Little
was said by the officers during this time. The officers in the car only responded to two questions
by the Defendant regarding the location of his heart medication and why they had two officers
riding with him. The Defendant continued to speak unprompted in the squad car the entire
duration of the ride to the jail with no response by the officers. At 7:33:05, unprompted by the
officers, the Defendant said, "I want my lawyer," and then continued to speak unprompted
without response by the officers as they arrived at the jail.
The blood draw was only able to obtain a partial sample, and the Defendant said to the
officers in the room, "I want my lawyer that's all I want. I want a lawyer." The events of the
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blood draw were captured on video, Def's. Ex. 3. The Defendant then refused to submit further
blood draws or go to the hospital for a blood draw without his lawyer present. Officers did not
interrogate the Defendant during or after the blood draw.
nd
The Defendant was charged with Driving Under the Influence (2 Offense Felony

Violation Within 15 Years) in violation ofldaho Code§ 18-8005(9). Defendant filed a motion to
suppress on August 7, 2019. The State filed a brief in opposition on October 1, 2019. Defendant
filed a reply brief on October 7, 2019.
A hearing on the Defendant's motion to suppress was held on October 18, 2019. Three
body camera videos were entered into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits. 1, 2, and 3, and three
photographs were entered into evidence as Plaintiff's Exhibits. 4, 5, and 6.
Officer Cushman testified at the hearing regarding his encounter with the Defendant.
Officer Cushman testified that his contact with the Defendant started as a welfare check in a
community caretaking function. Officer Cushman's Testimony, Hr'g on Mot. to Suppress Oct.
18, 2019. Officer Cushman testified that after waking the defendant, he immediately believed the
defendant was intoxicated based on his severely slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes, and
the smell of alcohol. Id Trp. Heinle testified that while placing the Defendant under arrest the
Defendant physically attempted to resist being handcuffed and it required Trp. Heinle, Officer
Cushman, and Sgt. Kitch to pull his hands behind his back. Trp. Heinle 's Testimony. Trp. Heinle
also testified that he spoke with the Defendant for a few minutes after placing him under arrest
before Mirandizing him. Id. Trp. Heinle testified that at one point the defendant said something
about "having a lawyer," and later there were multiple instances where the defendant asked for a
lawyer and said he did not want to speak with the officers, but the defendant still continued speak
to the officers unprompted. Id. Trp. Heinle testified that they could never do a field sobriety test
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because he was acting too violent to be released from handcuffs. Id. Trp. Heinle testified that the
defendant never indicated to him that he wanted a phone call or wanted to perform an
independent test of his choosing. Id. Tpr. Heinle also testified that he did not stop asking the
defendant questions after the defendant "said he'd get a lawyer" because the defendant
"continued to re-engage in conversation making him think he wanted to talk more." Id. Tpr.
Heinle testified that while getting the blood draw Defendant requested a lawyer. Id. Tpr. Heinle
also testified that to him the words "I'll get an attorney" meant that he will get one in the future.
Id.

Sgt. Klitch testified that during the blood draw the defendant never asked to make a
phone call or asked for additional independent testing. Sgt. Klitch 's testimony, Id. The Defendant
testified that he told an officer or deputy that he wanted a lawyer before the blood draw. Mr.
Stegall 's Testimony, Id The Defendant testified that he never asked to get his own independent

testing done because ''they had a warrant and I figured that was enough." Id The Defendant
testified that after the blood draw he asked to make a phone call. Id The defendant testified that
he asked the booking officer to get a phone call to a lawyer before the blood sample was taken
and he was never answered. Id. The Defendant also testified that he asked the officer that booked
him to make a phone call after the blood draw as well as several other officers. Id.
Upon request from the court, the State and the Defendant filed closing arguments with
the Court. The State filed State's Motion to Suppress Closing Argument on October 24, 2019.
The Defendant filed Closing Arguments on October 29, 2019, and Closing Argument Reply on
November 4, 2019. The motion to suppress was then taken under advisement.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
At a suppression hearing, ''the power to judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve any
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conflicts in the testimony, weigh the evidence and draw factual inferences, is vested in the trial
court." State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 105-06, 897 P.2d 993, 996-97 (1995).

"The

standard ofreview of a suppression motion is bifurcated." State v. McNeely, 162 Idaho 413, 414,
398 P.3d 146, 147 (2017) (quoting State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 843, 103 P.3d 454,456 (2004)).
When a decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the reviewing court accepts the trial
court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence and freely reviews the trial
court's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. Id.

DISCUSSION
The Defendant asks the court to rule on four issues. First, the "Defendant disputes that
the officers possessed reasonable suspicion to believe that he had been involved in the reported
roll-over incident." Closing Arguments Reply 1. Second, "[t]he Defendant asks this Court to
suppress all responses he made to officers while subject to custodial interrogation prior to the
giving of Miranda warnings." Id at 2. Third, the Defendant asks this Court to suppress all
statements made by the Defendant post Miranda. Id at 3. Fourth, the Defendant seeks
suppression of the results of the State's BAC test. Id. at 7.

I.

Officer Cushman lawfully contacted the Defendant in the community caretaking
function of law enforcement, and Officer Cushman possessed reasonable
suspicion to detain the Defendant to investigate a possible DUI based on
obsenring the Defendant's slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes, the strong
smell of alcohol, and the Defendant's uncoordinated demeanor.
The Defendant argues: "While the officer was able to point to other alleged justifications

for a seizure after the fact, he was clear that at the time of the seizure his only purpose was to see
if Mr. Stegall was involved in the accident." Id. at 1.
The State argues that the detention of the Defendant was lawful and pursuant to the
officer's caretaker role of the public. State's Mot. to Suppress Closing Arg. 1. The State argues
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that Officer Cushman lawfully parked behind the Defendant's vehicle and contacted him to
ensure the safety of the public and to make sure the driver or occupants of the vehicle were not in
need of medical care or other assistance. Id. at 2. The State goes on to argue that Officer
Cushman had reasonable articulable suspicion to expand his caretaker role to a DUI investigation
by observing the Defendant's slurred speech, glassy and bloodshot eyes, the strong smell of
alcohol, and the Defendant's uncoordinated inability to open the door when asked to do so. Id. at

2, 3.
A warrantless search and seizure may be justified pursuant to the community caretaking
function of law enforcement. Community caretaking involves the duty of officers to help citizens
in need of assistance and it includes investigations to determine if a citizen needs vehicle
assistance or medical assistance due to injury or illness. See State v. Wixom, 130 Idaho 752, 947
Pl2d 100 (1997); Matter of Clayton, 113 Idaho 817, 748 P.2d 401 (1988); and State v. Mireles,
133 Idaho 690,991 P.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999).

In order to qualify as community caretaking, the investigation should be totally divorced
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a criminal
statute, Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433,438, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2528 (1973). The Idaho courts
have adopted the totality of circumstances test in determining whether a seizure is justified as
community caretaking. Matter of Clayton. The proper inquiry is ''whether the intrusive action of
the police was reasonable in view of all the surrounding circumstances." State v. Waldie, 126
Idaho 864,867, 893 P.3d 811, 814 (Ct. App.1995). See also Wixon and State v. Deccio, 136
Idaho 442, 34 P.3d 1125 (Ct. App. 2001).
In this case, Officer Cushman observed the Defendant's car parked on the side of I-90
with a portion of the vehicle in the fog line. This is a danger to both oncoming traffic as well as
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the occupants of the vehicle. Therefore, taken in the totality of the circumstances, the intrusive
action of pulling up behind the Defendant and checking on him is reasonable in view of the
surrounding circumstances involved in the possible danger that the Defendant was in. Upon
observing the Defendant unconscious in the driver's seat, and his subsequent slurred speech,
bloodshot and glassy eyes, and the smell of alcohol, Officer Cushman possessed reasonable
suspicion to perform a DUI investigation. The immediate results of the investigation provided
further evidence to continue the DUI investigation, namely the defendant's conflicting answers
regarding if he had been driving and the defendant's uncoordinated inability to open the door of
the vehicle. For these reasons, this Court finds the Defendant's detention to be lawful, and the
Defendant's Motion to Suppress based on an unlawful detention is DENIED.

II.

This Court grants the motion to suppress any statements made by the Defendant
in the short window of time after being asked "so where was your passenger,
where did he go" until after he was read his Miranda rights because a suspect
must be Mirandized during a custodial interrogation.
The Defendant argues that officers interrogated the Defendant after placing him under

arrest and before reading him his Miranda warnings. Defs Closing Arg. 2. "Thus any statements
made by Mr. Stegall during this period of his in-custody interrogation, approximately 6:33:20
p.m. to 6:39:40 p.m. (on officer Heinle's camera), must be suppressed because the statements
were made prior to the giving of Miranda warnings." Id.
The State acknowledges that questions were asked of the Defendant after being placed
under arrest and before being advised of his Miranda rights. State's Mot. to Suppress Closing
Arg. 3. The State argues that only "one of the questions was likely to elicit an incriminating
response." Id According to the State, this question was asked at approximately 6:39 p.m., and
was "a question about doing all his drinking prior to driving." Id. The State concedes this answer
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should be suppressed. Id The State goes on to argue that other questions asked by officers during
this time period were not likely to elicit an incriminating response and should therefore not be
suppressed. Id at 4.
Once a suspect is placed in custody, he must be advised of his Miranda rights before he is
interrogated by police, and "[o]pportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him
throughout the interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,479, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1630, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694 (1966). After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the
individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or
make a statement. Id But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the
prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him."

Id.
In this case, the officers told the Defendant that he was under arrest and began placing
him in handcuffs at 6:33 :30. p.m. At this time, the defendant was not Mirandized and he was in
custody. What followed was a struggle, and once the Defendant was finally hand-cuffed he was
searched for weapons. At 6:38:30 p.m. Trp. Heinle asked, "So where was your passenger, where
did he go?" Prior to this time, no officer asked the defendant any questions other than questions
pertaining to their search of the Defendant for weapons.
The question asked by Trp. Heinle at 6:38:30 p.m. was the beginning of an interrogation
regarding the crime he was charged with, and statements made during this custodial interrogation
of Defendant prior to being Mirandized should be suppressed.
For these reasons, the Defendant's motion to suppresses statements made by the
defendant after 6:38:30 p.m., and until the Defendant's Miranda rights were read to him at
6:39:30 p.m. ( Officer Heinle 's camera), is GRANTED. The motion to suppress all other
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statements made before this time frame is DENIED.

III.

The motion to suppress evidence after the Defendant was read his Miranda
rights is denied because the Defendant's right to counsel was initially not
invoked unequivocally. Later, once the right to counsel was invoked
unequivocally, all statements made by the Defendant were made voluntarily and
unprompted by the police. Therefore, the motion to suppress is denied.
The Defendant argues that he "made a clear invocation of his Miranda rights to cut off

questioning, and his right to speak with an attorney prior to any questioning," by saying, "he is
done talking to them and he will get a lawyer." Defs. Closing Arg. 4. The Defendant goes on to
argue that "[a]t approximately 7:03:20 p.m., Mr. Stegall again told officers that he wants his
lawyer, that's all he wants." Id. For these reasons, the Defendant asks this Court to suppress all
statements made by the Defendant after being Mirandized." Id. The Defendant argues that "since
the Defendant cannot anticipate what statements the State will seek to introduce at trial, he must
ask for suppression of all of the statements. Id. at 5.
The State argues that after being Mirandized, the Defendant did not make a clear and
unequivocal request to speak to a lawyer. State's Mot. to Suppress Closing Arg. 4. The State
goes on to argue that "[t]he statements made on the part of Mr. Stegall after indicating his desire
to remain silent were voluntary and most of the time unsolicited and should not be subject to
suppression." Id.
The Davis Court held that an objective standard applies in determining whether a
detainee has properly invoked his right to counsel thus requiring a cessation of the interrogation.
In order to do so, a detainee is required to
articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an
attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, Edwards does not
require that the officers stop questioning the suspect. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 433 n. 4, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1147 n. 4, 89 L.Ed.2d 410[ 428 n.4] (1986) ("[T]he
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interrogation must cease until an attorney is present only [i]f the individual states that he
wants an attorney").

Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452,459, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994).
In order for Miranda to apply to statements made by a suspect while in custody the
suspect must be interrogated. State v. Arenas 161 Idaho 646, 387, 190 (Ct. App. 2016). For
purposes of Miranda, an interrogation includes express questioning as well as "any words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that
the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect/' Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90, 64 L. Ed. 2d 297
(1980).
In this case the Court denies the motion to suppress regarding all the statements made by
the Defendant after he was Mirandized. The Defendant argues that he made a clear invocation of
his right to an attorney and his right to remain silent immediately prior to being Mirandized when
he said "believe me, I ain't saying nothing I'm getting a lawyer," This Court finds that such a
statement is not a clear invocation of a request for counsel. Stating, "I'm getting a lawyer," is
simply not the same as an individual asking for a lawyer. This statement presents the kind of
ambiguity that the Davis Court sought to avoid by requiring a direct request for an attorney.
At 7:03:20 p.m. The defendant told the officers "I want my lawyer, that's all I want."
This was a clear invocation of his right to counsel, and officers ceased all questioning of the
defendant. During oral arguments on the Defendant's motion to suppress, the Defendant was
asked by this Court to outline in writing which statements it wanted to be suppressed and the
reasons for suppression. The Defendant filed a brief that stated:
If the State has a specific statement in mind that it wishes to
introduce at trial, Defendant would be happy to give an analysis of
that specific statement to determine whether or not Mr. Stegall
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actually reengaged conversation to make that statement. But
without any notice from the State regarding which of Mr. Stegall's
post-Miranda statements it wishes to use, Defendant can only
make blanket arguments that the statements were obtained in
violation of his asserted rights to counsel and right to remain silent.
Defs Closing Arg. Reply. 3.
Rather than comply with the court's directive, Defendant continues to argue (as he did at
the hearing on the motion to suppress) that everything the Defendant said after his invocation at
7:03:20 p.m. should be suppressed, but this Court cannot find any instance on the recordings
during the drive to the jail or the recordings of the blood draw in which any officer said much of
anything to the Defendant, let alone asking the defendant questions that where likely to elicit an
incriminating response. All the while, the Defendant spoke continuously without any prompting
by the officers. In light of the lack of any evidence that that police interrogated the defendant
after 7:03:20 p.m., this Court finds the statements made by the Defendant to be voluntarily given.
For the above stated reasons, the Defendant's motion to suppress statements made after
the Defendant was read his Miranda rights is DENIED.
IV.

The Defendant's motion to suppress the blood draw evidence is granted because
the Defendant requested use of a phone after the blood draw was performed,
and the Defendant was not given access to a phone until enough time had passed
that additional testing would have been unusable as evidence.

The defendant argues that "Mr. Stegall testified that after these attempts to draw blood,
he asked a jailer to use a phone.,, Defs Closing Arg. 5. The Defendant goes on to argue that the
State has not offered any evidence to contradict his testimony and the Defendant was not given
access to a phone until 5:00 a.m. the next morning. Id. For these reasons, the Defendant asks this
Court to suppress the evidence of the blood draw. Id. at 7.
The State argues that the video evidence shows that the Defendant never asked to make a
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phone call and never made a request for an independent evidentiary hearing. State's Mot. to
Suppress Closing Arg. 5. Additionally, the State argues that the request for a lawyer made during
the attempts to get a full blood draw are not pertinent because the defendant did not have a right
to contact an attorney for advise regarding the blood draw that he was required to submit to by
warrant, and there is no evidence that the Defendant requested a phone call outside of the
Defendant's testimony. Id. at 5-6.
The Court of Appeals in State v. Carr stated that
when a person is arrested for DUI and given an evidentiary BAC test, that person must be
allowed, at a minimum, to make a phone call upon request to do so. Such contact
provides the means through which the arrestee is able to gather evidence tending to refute
the State's evidence of intoxication and thereby preserve the "right to a fair opportunity
to defend against the State's evidence of intoxication and thereby preserve the 'right to a
fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."
State v. Carr, 128 Idaho 181, 184, 911 P.2d 774, 777 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the Defendant's testimony that he asked for a phone call from the booking
officer, and several other officers outside of those present during the blood draw, was not
challenged with conflicting evidence by the State. The State offered evidence through testimony
by Cpl. Cushman and Trp. Heinle that the Defendant did not ask for a phone call from them, but
the State did not offer additional evidence regarding the Defendant's request for a phone call,
other than pointing out that he did not do so on the recordings provided to the Court.
Since the Defendant was not granted a phone call until the next morning, when an
evidentiary test would not be usable, this Court orders the suppression of the State's blood draw
evidence under due process grounds. The State is correct that the Defendant is not entitled to a
lawyer during a BAC test, but after the conclusion of the BAC test, the Defendant cannot be
restrained from the means to conduct an independent test. In cases such as this, when the
Defendant remains in custody overnight, the utilization of a phone call is how the Defendant
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would begin his effort to conduct an independent test. The State cites State v. Hedges, 143 Idaho
884, 886, 154 P.3d 1074, 1076 (Ct. App. 2007) to show that a defendant must make an
affirmative request for an independent BAC test in order to trigger a due process claim. Defs
Closing Argument 6. But State v. Hedges does not overrule the holding in Carr that police must
grant a defendant's request for a phone call following a BAC test. Hedges instead dealt with the
issue of a defendant who never requested a phone call. "The record reflects that Hedges did not
request the use of a phone, nor did he ask to arrange for an independent BAC test while he was
in custody. State v. Hedges at 889. Rather, the defendant in Hedges asserted, both at the Parma
police station and again at the Canyon County jail that he intended to get an independent test
when he was released." Id. In this case, the Defendant did request the use of a phone and was
denied use of a phone until after an independent BAC would not have provided useful evidence.
For the above reasons, the Motion to Suppress the State's BAC test is GRANTED.
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ORDER:
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Defendant's motion to suppress statements made by the Defendant between
approximately 6:38:30 p.m. to 6:39:30 p.m. (on Trooper Heinle's camera) is GRANTED.
ORDERED that the Defendant's motion to suppress all other statements made by the defendant
before and after the window of time between 6:33:20 p.m to 6:39:40 p.m. (on Trooper Heinle's
camera) is DENIED.
ORDERED that the Defendant's motion to suppress the State's blood draw evidence is
GRANTED.
DATED t h i ~ y of November, 2019.

udge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the~ day of November, 2019, I caused, to be served, a true
and correct copy of the foregoing document as addressed to:
pdfax@kcgov.us
KDPAICOURTS@kcgov.us
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
V.
JEFFERY D. STEGALL AKA: JEFFREY
DWAYNE STEGALL
Defendant.

CASE NUMBER CR28-19-0010375
F
MOTION FOR RECOGNIZANCE
RELEASE OR REDUCTION OF BOND

COMES NOW, the above named Defendant, by and through their attorney, Benjamin M.
Onosko, Deputy Public Defender, and hereby moves the Court for its Order releasing the
defendant on their own recognizance or reducing the bond in this matter.
This motion is made pursuant to the 8th and 14th amendments of the U.S. Constitution;
Article I, §§ 6 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution; and I.C.R. 46.
This motion is made on the grounds that defendant has ties to the community and is not a
flight risk, and the bond as set violates the defendant's rights to due process and to be free from
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excessive bond and cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the U.S. and Idaho
Constitutions.
Counsel requests that this Motion be set for hearing in order to present oral argument,
evidence and/or testimony in support thereof. Requested time is ten minutes.
DATED this

:5

day of December, 2019.
ANNE C. TAYLOR, PUBLIC DEFENDER
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

BY:
BENJAMIN M ONOSK-0,
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
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V.
JEFFER Y DWAYN E STEGAL L AKA:
Jeffrey Dwayne Stegall,

Defendant.
The Court having before it the Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time, and good cause

appearing, now, therefore
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion to Shorten Time to hear the
Motion for Recognizance Release or Reduction of Bond is granted.
Signed: 12/5/2019 09:34 AM

DATED this - - - day of December, 2019.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR28-19-10375

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, BARRY MCHUGH, Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho, and
hereby moves this Court for a motion to stay criminal proceedings pending the outcome of appeal.
DATED this 5th day of December, 2019.
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

~-rtl~
Laura McClinton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION AND ORDER TO STA Y PROCEEDINGS
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of December, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was caused to be delivered as follows: r mailed r faxed r1 hand delivered r emailed
r JusticeWeb P" ICourts
Kootenai County Public Defender
Benjamin M Onosko

MOTION AND ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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Electronically Filed
12/5/2019 8:40 AM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Gayle Sanchez, Deputy Clerk

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us
ASSIGNED ATTORNEY
Laura McClinton, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CASE NO. CR28-19-10375

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
Defendant.

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME

COMES NOW, LAURA MCCLINTON, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai
County, Idaho, and hereby moves the Court for an order to shorten the time for notice
requirement to hear the State's Motion to Stay Proceedings.
This motion is made because jury trial is currently set to begin December 9, 2019.
DATED this 5th day of December, 2019.

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

~-,(I~
Laura McClinton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of December, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was caused to be delivered as follows: r mailed r faxed r1 hand delivered r
emailed r JusticeWeb P" ICourts
Kootenai County Public Defender
Benjamin M Onosko

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
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Filed:12/05/2019 10:50:25
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR-CR28-19-10375

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER TO SHORTEN
TIME

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
Defendant.

The Court having before it the above State's motion, and good cause appearing now,
therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the time required for the filing of the States motion to
stay proceedings be shortened.
ENTERED this 5th day of December, 2019.
Signed: 12/5/2019 10:23 AM

ru~
DISTRICT COURT

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of December, 2019 that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was delivered as indicated below:
✓

✓

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney (email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us)
Coeur d'Alene Prosecuting Attorney (email: cdaprosnotices@cdaid.org)
Post Falls Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Rathdrum Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Kootenai County Public Defender (email: pdfax@kcgov.us)
Defendant/Defendant's Attorney: bonosko@kcgov.us
Kootenai County Warrants (email: warrants@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Jail (jailpw@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Work Release (email: workrelease@kcgov.us)
Community Service (email: jhicks@kcgov.us)
Adult Misdemeanor Probation (email: kcmp@kcgov.us)
Probation & Parole (email: distl@idoc.idaho.gov;
ccdsentencingteam@idoc.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Transportation (fax: 208-334-8739)
BCI (cch@isp.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Corrections (email: centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov)
Other: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

JIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE
DISTRICT COURT
Signed: 12/5/2019 10:50 AM

By: _ _
~- - - - -

MOTION TO SHORTEN TIME
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Description CR28-19-10375 Stegall, Jeffrey Dwayne 20191205 Bond Hearing, Motion to Stay
Judge Meyer
Clerk Denice Larsen
Court Reporter Diane Bolan
Date 12/5/2019

Location lKCRTl0

I

I

Time

03:28:50
PM
I
03:29:22
PM
I

I Speaker
Judge
Meyer

Calls case. Def present in custody. Zach Jones for def. Barry McHugh
for state.

Judge
Meyer

Let's proceed with the Motion to Stay first.

Barry
McHugh

There was a motion granted by the court that we believe merits an
appeal. We are asking for an opportunity to have the motion heard and
resolve before this case proceeds to trial based on the impact of the
state's case.

Judge
Meyer

This implicates speedy.

Barry
McHugh

I think the court has the discretion for speedy trial to be tolled.

Zach
Jones

No objection to the motion to stay proceedings.

M

Judge
Meyer

I will grant the motion. It will include a toll of speedy. This would
constitute good cause. The period of time for speedy will not continue
to run during the interim of the appeal.

M

Zach
Jones

We are moving to release Mr. Stegall OR. It will take a long time to
get the decision back. He is on parole so even if OR'd he will not be
getting out. He will likely be spending a year in prison.

F

I am going to top out my term so I can move on. I think it is around 1214 months.

03:29:23

PM

03:30:48
I

PM
03:30:53

I

PM
03:31 :53

I

PM

~
~
03:33:47

I

PM
03:34: 11

I

PM
03:35:11

I

Note

PM

~
M

I 03:36:15

Zach
Jones
Zach
Jones

An OR is appropriate.
If I could pass this. I need to have a candid conversation with Mr.

Stegall.

Judge
Meyer

Obviously we don't' have a conviction in this case. But if there is, any
time would be credited. Why not keep that going if you are going to be
in custody anyway.

lzach

That is another reason why I would like to have a conversation with
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I

PM
03:36:26
PM

03:37:08
PM
I
04:24:12
I

PM

IJones
Barry
McHugh

His assigned counsel indicated he would be held on the parole
violation until November 2020. We are talking about a good chunk of
time. Seems like he would be getting credit ifhe continued to be in
custody here. I just throw htat out for consideration.

Judge
Meyer

We will pass for now.

Judge
Meyer

Back on the record.

Zach
Jones

Reviews criminal history. Ask the court to OR him. He has some ties
to the community. With to a lesser extent the Montana community. He
intends to live in Kootenai County until this is resolved. He was self
employed. He is confident he could set up his own employment very
easily. His skills are in construction. He will likely be in custody for
about a year.

Zach
Jones

If the court is concerned about him being out of custody, we can set a
status conference. It is my understanding that he will remain in
Kootenai County Jail. If he is released, he will go down to the prison
system where he can work and at least not have to be in the Kootenai
County Jail where he is being much more idle. He understands he will
not be getting credit.

Barry
McHugh

Is there any way to tell when his time may run? My concern is what
happens if we get it wrong or there is some circumstance that comes
up. I want to make sure he won't get released from custody. He is a
danger to the community. This is his 4th DUI.

Zach
Jones

November 28, 2020.

Barry
McHugh

Should the matter get resolved and remanded, I suggest we set a
hearing.

Zach
Jones

I agree

Judge
Meyer

Release OR on the understanding he will remain in custody. Given
your history ofDUI's you are a danger to the community.

Judge
Meyer

I want to set two status conferences. One around November 2020. I
will expect your office Mr. Jones to be in contact with Mr. Stegall in
terms of where he is. I will condition your release in this case on your
returning to Kootenai County in the event that you are released from
IDOC custody before your sentence satisfaction in case number
Shoshone CR15-1557. If not, I will issue a bench warrant.

04:24:51

PM

04:26:58

PM

04:28:33

PM

04:30:41
I

PM
04:30:53

I

PM
04:31 :20

I

PM
04:31 :21

I

PM
04:33:21

PM

I

04:38: 14

him.

IJudge

Release OR with conditions.
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I

PM

04:39:44
PM
I
04:41:18
PM
I
04:41:34
PM
I

IMeyer
Judge
Meyer

Status Conferences set for March 13 at 1:30, July 17 at 1:30,
November 13 at 1:30.

Judge
Meyer

Mr. McHugh to prepare the order for stay.

~
Produced by FTR Gold™
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'
STATE OF IDAHO

}ss

COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

FILED
AT

/ ;J, -S--L9
i ', 3:S: O'CLOCK....f._m

CLERK,~~
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO
Plaintiff

CASE NO. CR-

v.

U-{<j

-/0 3 7.S-

ORDER SETTING BAIL or
RELEASE ON OWN RECOGNIZANCE and
CONDITIONS

:reffr~-~ Ow4-.'!_)ne ,5+-etooJI
Defendant

The above case having come before the Court on the below date and the Court having
considered the factors in I.C.R. 46, now therefore,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that bail be set in the amount of$_~()~(;__~~----and the following are established as the conditions of release:

/

,

- PY1 p~m,e.. h,}/d THE DEFENDANT SHALL: ~'4.#S h ~ ~ ]
1

1. ffCommit no new criminal offenses greater than an infraction (a finding of probable cause on a
§lJ0Sequent offense is sufficient to revoke bail);
2. ef§j.gn waiver of extradition and file with the Court;
3. .0"'"M~l court appearances timely;
4. ~~onsume alcohol, or controlled substances that are not prescribed by a doctor;
5. ~~ notify the Court and defense counsel of any change of address;
6. ~aintain regular contact with defense counsel;
7. □ Do NOT drive, operate or be in physical control of a motor vehicle without a valid license and
insurance;
8. □ Obtain a Substance Abuse/Batterer's Evaluation from an approved evaluator by:
9. □ Submit to: □ EtG □ Drug □ Both EtG & Drug urinalysis testing __ times monthly through:
[ ] Avertest (address/phone below)
[ ] Absolute (address/phone below)
[ ] Other_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _. Results to be provided to the
!J:Psecuting Attorney's office, Public Defender/Defense Attorney_ _ _ _ _ _ _, □ Court
10. ~ther: ~ ~ts~~ _J_Dt)L ~ - £ -

~ ~ ? , , da-0, ~ ll·z8-ztJ20 Iii

~=dh!

~i
'~

1 ~~

j
j- _
~

,'-"

UJl.)IS"~.

Defendant has acknowledged these conditions in open court, and is advised that a violation of any
term may result in the defendant being returned to jail.

I ~-5'-/C,

Date: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
ies sent~ S- 1Jj_ To:
rosecutor
t i n court
[ ] e-mail
efense Counsel
in court
[ ] e-mail
efendant
in court
p(Jail jailpw@kcgov.us
Judge
□ Avertest FAX: (208) 416-2539, 500 N Government Way, Suite 100, CD'
□ Avertest Emailed: coeurdaleneid@avertest.com
□ Absolute FAX: (208) 758-0401, 5433 N Government Way, Suite B, CD'A, ID, Ph: (208) 758-0051
□ Absolute Emailed: fastdrugtesting@gmail.com
□ Probation Department:
mp@kc v.us
□ Other _ f - - , . , ~ , - + - t . , , - , = - - - - - - - - - - - - - C

Deputy Cle

Defendant
ORDER SETTING BAIL AND CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

Date
PAO-1001 7/2019
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Electronically Filed
12/6/2019 1:58 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Gayle Sanchez, Deputy Clerk

Benjamin M Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816
Phone:(208)446-1700; Fax: (208)446-1701
Bar Number: 8448
Email: Pdfax@kcgov.us

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
ST ATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NUMBER PD CR28-19-0010375
FM

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
JEFFERY STEGALL,
Defendant-Respondent.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER; RETAINING TRIAL
COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL
PURPOSES

COMES NOW, the above named Defendant/Respondent, by and through his attorney,
Benjamin M Onosko, Deputy Public Defender and hereby moves the Court for an Order
pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-867, et seq., and Idaho Appellate Rules 13 and 45.1 for its order
appointing the State Appellate Public Defender's Office to represent the Appellant in all further
proceedings. This motion is brought on the grounds and for the reasons that the Defendant is
currently being represented by the Office of the Public Defender, Kootenai County; the State
Appellate Public Defender is authorized by statute to represent the Defendant in all felony
appellate proceedings; and it is in the interest of justice, for them to do so in this case since the
Defendant is indigent, and any further proceedings on this case will be appealed.

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF ST ATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES

PAGE 1
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DATED this

0

day of December, 2019.
KOOTENAI COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
1

BY:

~ ~ ' - + " - - -/"_ -_ _
~-----'-~-;~~-----"'--

BENJAMIN M ONOSKO
DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this
(.0 day of December, 2019, served a true
and correct copy of the attached MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STA TE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER; RETAINING TRAIL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES via
interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon the parties as follows:
X

X

X

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000

LJ

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

[_]

State Appellate Public Defender
322 East Front, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83 702

LJ
LJ
lk1,

Email:Documents@sapd.state.id.us

Supreme Court (certified)

[ ]
[ ]

First Class Mail
Fax Certified (208) 334-2616

[_]

(kJ

~

iCourt
Facsimile (208) 446-2168
Email kcpaicourts@kcgov.us
First Class Mail
Facsimile (208) 854-8074
Email: ECF@ag.idaho.gov

First Class Mail
Facsimile (208) 334-2985

Reporter for District Judge John T. Mitchell, Julie Foland via Interoffice Mail
Reporter for District Judge Scott Wayman,Valerie Larson via Interoffice Mail
Reporter for District Judge Rich Christensen, Keri Veare via Interoffice Mail
Reporter for District Judge Benjamin Simpson, Anita Self via Interoffice Mail
Reporters for District Judge Lansing Haynes, Valerie Nunemacher and Kim Hannan via
Interoffice Mail
__X__

Reporter for District Judge Cynthia Meyer, Diane Bolan (Kootenai County, PO Box
9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816) via l-Hte10ffite Matt 'CrY\~\ l)bOIC<..f\Q~Ov',tJS

MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC D E ~
; RETAINING TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES

c!J~
PAGE 2
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Filed:12/09/2019 07:37:06
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR28-19-10375

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
Defendant.

The Court having before it the State's motion, and good cause appearing, now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED stay criminal proceedings pending the outcome of appeal.
Signed: 12/6/2019 05:35 PM

ENTERED this __ day of December, 2019.

MOTION AND ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of December, 2019 that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was
delivered as indicated below:
✓

-✓

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney (email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us)
Coeur d'Alene Prosecuting Attorney (email: cdaprosnotices@cdaid.org)
Post Falls Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Rathdrum Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Kootenai County Public Defender (email: pdfax@kcgov.us)
Defendant/Defendant's Attorney: bonosko@kcgov.us
Kootenai County Warrants (email: warrants@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Jail (jailpw@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Work Release (email: workrelease@kcgov.us)
Community Service (email: jhicks@kcgov.us)
Adult Misdemeanor Probation (email: kcmp@kcgov.us)
Probation & Parole (email: distl@idoc.idaho.gov ;
ccdsentencingteam@idoc.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Transportation (fax: 208-334-8739)
BCI (cch@isp.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Corrections (email: centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov)
Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

JIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Signed: 12/9/2019 07:37 AM

By: _ _
~-----

MOTION AND ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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Filed:12/10/2019 09:20:09
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice
Benjamin M Onosko, Deputy Public Defender
Kootenai County Public Defender
PO Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83 816
Phone: (208) 446-1700; Fax: (208) 446-1701
Bar Number: 8448
Email: Pdfax@kcgov.us

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,

CASE NUMBER PD CR28-19-0010375
FM

Plaintiff-Appellant,
V.

JEFFERY STEGALL,
Defendant-Respondent.

TO:

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF
STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC
DEFENDER; RETAINING TRIAL
COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL
PURPOSES

OFFICE OF THE IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER, AND,

BENJAMIN M ONOSKO, DEPUTY PUBLIC DEFENDER, KOOTENAI COUNTY.
A Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's Motion to Suppress having been
entered in the above entitled action on November 26, 2019, and the Defendant having requested
the aid of counsel in defending an appeal from this District Court in this felony matter, and the
State having filed a timely notice of appeal, and the Court being satisfied that said Defendant
continues to be a needy person entitled to public representation, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, in accordance with LC. 19-870, that the State Appellate
Public Defender is appointed to represent defendant in all further proceedings involving his
appeal.

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF ST ATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER; RETAINING
TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES

Page 1

Page 187

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial counsel shall remain as appointed counsel of

record for all other matters involving action in the trial court which could affect the judgment,
order or sentencing in the action, until the expiration of the time limit for filing said motions or,
if sought and denied, upon the expiration of the time for appeal of such ruling with the
responsibility to decide whether or not a further appeal will be taken in such matters.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that trial counsel shall cooperate with the Office of State

Appellate Public Defender in the prosecution of defendant' s appeal.
Signed: 12/10/2019 09:11 AM

DATED this _ _ _ day of December, 2019.

CYN~
DISTRIJUDGE

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER; RETAINING
TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this _ _ _ day of December, 2019, served a true
and correct copy of the attached ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER IN DIRECT APPEAL; RETAINING TRAIL COUNSEL FOR
RESIDUAL PURPOSES via interoffice mail or as otherwise indicated upon the parties as
follows:
Interoffice Mail
Facsimile (208) 446-1701
Email: pdfax@kcgov.us

X

Kootenai County Public Defender

X

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000

LJ

Lawrence G. Wasden
Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010

LJ
LJ
~

First Class Mail
Facsimile (208) 854-8074
Email: ECF@ag.idaho.gov

Supreme Court (certified)

[ ]
[ ]

First Class Mail
Fax Certified (208) 334-2616

State Appellate Public Defender
322 East Front, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83 702

[_]
[_]

First Class Mail
Facsimile (208) 334-2985

:!'.J

Email:Documents@sapd.state.id.us

X

X

[_]
[✓

Interoffice Mail
Facsimile (208) 446-2168
Email kcpaicourts@kcgov.us

Reporter for District Judge John T. Mitchell, Julie Foland via Interoffice Mail
Reporter for District Judge Scott Wayman,Valerie Larson via Interoffice Mail
Reporter for District Judge Rich Christensen, Keri Veare via Interoffice Mail
Reporter for District Judge Benjamin Simpson, Anita Self via Interoffice Mail
Reporters for District Judge Lansing Haynes, Valerie Nunemacher and Kim Hannan via
Interoffice Mail
__X__

Reporter for District Judge Cynthia Meyer, Diane Bolan (Kootenai County, PO Box
9000, Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816) via Interoffice Mail Email-realtimereporter@gmail.com
Signed: 12/10/2019 09:20 AM

ORDER FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE APPELLATE
PUBLIC DEFENDER; RETAINING
TRIAL COUNSEL FOR RESIDUAL PURPOSES
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Electronically Filed
12/10/2019 4:34 PM
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Arlene Simac, Deputy Clerk

BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney
501 N. Government Way/P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone Number: (208) 446-1800
Email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us
Assigned Attorney: Laura McClinton
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR28-19-10375

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

MOTION TO AMEND ORDER
TO STAY PROCEEDINGS

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, BARRY MCHUGH, Prosecuting Attorney for Kootenai County, Idaho, and
hereby moves this Court for Amend the Order to Stay Proceedings to include that speedy trial is
tolled during the pendency of the appeal.
DATED this 10th day of December, 2019.
BARRY MCHUGH
Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney

Laura McClinton
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

MOTION TO AMEND ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of December, 2019, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was caused to be delivered as follows: r mailed r faxed r1 hand delivered r emailed
r JusticeWeb P" ICourts
Kootenai County Public Defender
Benjamin M Onosko

MOTION TO AMEND ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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Filed:12/12/2019 10:50:09
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Larsen, Denice
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF
IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR28-19-10375

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,
vs.

AMENDED-ORDER TO STAY
PROCEEDINGS

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL,
Defendant.

The Court having before it the State's motion, and good cause appearing, now, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED stay criminal proceedings pending the outcome of appeal
and time on speedy trial is tolled.
Signed: 12/12/2019 09:54 AM

ENTERED this

day of December, 2019.

ru~
DISTRICT COURT

AMENDED ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Signed: 12/12/2019 10:50 AM
I hereby certify that on the _ _ day of _
_ _ _ _ _ , 20_ that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing was delivered as indicated below:
✓

✓

Kootenai County Prosecuting Attorney (email: KCPAICOURTS@kcgov.us)
Coeur d'Alene Prosecuting Attorney (email: cdaprosnotices@cdaid.org)
Post Fa11s Prosecuting Attorney (email: 1ega1services@postfa11spo1ice.com)
Rathdrum Prosecuting Attorney (email: legalservices@postfallspolice.com)
Kootenai County Public Defender (email: pdfax@kcgov.us)
Defendant/Defendant's Attorney: pdfax@kcgov.us
Kootenai County Warrants (email: warrants@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Jail (jailpw@kcgov.us)
Kootenai County Work Release (email: workrelease@kcgov.us)
Community Service (email: jhicks@kcgov.us)
Adult Misdemeanor Probation (email: kcmp@kcgov.us)
Probation & Parole (email: distl@idoc.idaho.gov ;
ccdsentencingteam@idoc.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Transportation (fax: 208-334-8739)
BCI (cch@isp.idaho.gov)
Idaho Department of Corrections (email: centralrecords@idoc.idaho.gov)
Other: - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Other: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Other:

----------------------------

JIM BRANNON
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

By:~

AMENDED ORDER TO STAY PROCEEDINGS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,
Supreme Court No. 47612-2019
District Court No. CR28-19-10375
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
JEFFERY DWYANE STEGALL
Defendant.

I, Gayle Sanchez, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of
Idaho in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify:
That the following exhibit list is a true and accurate copy of the exhibits being forwarded to
the Supreme Court on Appeal ~ in electronic format D in hard copy format.

Exhibit Number
PL 1
DFA
PL 1
PL 2
PL 3
PL4
PL 5
PL 6

Exhibit Description
Document; 7/5/19 PH; ISP Lab Report
Document; 10/18/19 Motion to Suppress
Electronic Media; 10/18/2019 Motion to Suppress
Electronic Media; 10/18/2019 Motion to Suppress
Electronic Media; 10/18/2019 Motion to Suppress
Photograph; 10/18/2019 Motion to Suppress
Photograph; 10/18/2019 Motion to Suppress
Photograph; 10/18/2019 Motion to Suppress

It should be noted, that all original exhibits will be retained at the district court clerk's office and
will be made available for viewing upon request.

IN WITNESS, I have set my hand and affixed the seal of the said Court on this the 12th day of
December, 2019.
JIM BRANNON
Clerk of the Court

(jay{e Sancliez

By:
Deputy Clerk

@

certificate of Exhibits - D (MISC28) (Appv.02.11.16)
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Filed:07/29/2019 09:10:32
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - O'Reilly, Cindy

Keri J~ Veare
OFFICIAL

C

URT REPORTER -

ID CSR N . 675, RPR

324 West Garden Avenue • P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 83816-9000
Phone: (20 ) 446- l 116
Emall: kveare wkcgo v. us

TO:

Kootenai County Clerk

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
vs.

)Case No. CR28-19-10375

JEFFERY DWAYNE STEGALL, AKA:
Jeffrey Dwayne Stegall,
Defendant.
----------------------

)
)
)
)
)
)

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

Notice is hereby given that on July 25, 2019,

I

digitally filed an Original Transcript entitled "PRELIMINARY
HEARING," held July 5, 2019, totaling 81 pages,

for the

above-referenced matter with the District Court Clerk of the
County of Kootenai in the First Judicial District, Kootenai
County Case No. CR28-19-10375.
Transcript has been emailed to:
Kootenai County Prosecutor's Office
Kootenai County Public Defender's Office

-- X~~~1e~✓~Ke ~ ~: :: , Court Reporter/Transcriber

cc:

Kootenai County Prosecutors, via email
Kootenai County Public Defenders, via email
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Filed:12/13/2019
12/12/2019 07:51:49
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Sanchez, Gayle

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff/Respondent,

Case No.

CR28-19-10375

vs.

S.C. No.

47612-2019

JEFFREY DWAYNE STEGALL,
Defendant/Appellant.

NOTICE OF LODGING

Please be advised that the transcript of
the Motion to Suppress Hearing
18,

(139 pages)

held October

2019 in the above-entitled case has been lodged

with the Clerk of the Kootenai County District Court.

Date:

12-12-19

Diane Bolan
Official Court Reporter
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Filed:12/13/2019 08:38:33
First Judicial District, Kootenai County
Jim Brannon, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Sanchez, Gayle
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

Case No. CR28-19-10375

State of Idaho
Plaintiff,
vs.
JEFFERY DWYANE STEGALL
Defendant.

Clerk's Certificate of Service

I, Gayle Sanchez, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the First Judicial District, of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record
in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full and
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties.
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript (if

D No Exhibits submitted;
D Pre-sentence Investigation, or D Other Confidential Documents; or D Confidential Exhibits
requested), along with copies of~ all Exhibits offered or admitted;

(if applicable) to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on this date, I served a copy of the attached to:
□ By E-mail X□ By mail

Lawrence Wasden - Attorney General
700 W State St, 4 th Floor
Boise, ID 83702
ecf@ag.idaho.gov

D By fax (number) _ _
D By overnight delivery/Fed Ex
D By personal delivery

Eric Fredericksen - State Appellate PD
322 E Front St, Ste 570
Boise, ID 83702
documents@sapd.state.id.us

□ By E-mail X
□ By mail
D By fax (number) _ _
D By overnight delivery/Fed Ex
D By personal delivery

Jim Brannon
Clerk of the
Dated: 12/13/2019

Cou'A,. __ .. I.

.1...

~

By:~-~-------Deputy Clerk

Clerk's Certificate of Service - Revised 07/01/2018
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